Tiffany v. United States
| Decision Date | 02 February 1901 |
| Citation | 105 F. 766 |
| Parties | TIFFANY v. UNITED STATES. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
William B. Coughtry, for importer.
Henry L. Burnett, U.S. Atty., and Henry C. Platt, Asst. U.S. Atty.
The importations involved in this controversy are drilled or pierced pearls. The collector classified them under section 6 of the act of July 24, 1897, and assessed a duty of 20 per centum ad valorem as 'articles manufactured, in whole or in part. ' The importer insists by his protest that they should have been classified under paragraph 436 of said act and subjected to an ad valorem duty of 10 per centum as 'pearls in their natural state, not strung or set. ' He also insists in the protest that if not classified in the first instance as pearls in their natural state they should be so classified by virtue of the similitude clause of section 7 of the said act. The pearls in their natural state was decided by this court in Tiffany v. U.S. (C.C.) 103 F. 619. It is admitted by the district attorney that the similitude clause should operate before the general catch-all clause providing for nonenumerated manufactured articles. Hahn v. U.S., 40 C.C.A. 622, 100 F. 635, and cases cited. He insists, however, that the resemblance of the imported articles is greater to 'pearls set or strung,' as provided for by paragraph 434 of the act, than to 'pearls in their natural state,' as provided for by paragraph 436. The burden is upon the importer to prove that his contention is correct and if he fails in sustaining this burden the action of the collector stands, even though it appear that the collector also has selected the wrong paragraph. In other words, in order to succeed the importer must show by a preponderance of proof that his importations bear a greater similitude to pearls in their natural state than to any other article enumerated in the act. The only difference between a drilled pearl and a pearl in its natural state is that the former has a hole in it, but there is no difference whatever between a drilled pearl and a strung pearl; the two are identical. No difference in the quality, texture or use to which the two pearls are applied can be predicated of the fact that one has a cord through the hole and the other has not. Place drilled pearls on a cord and they become strung pearls. An attempt is made in the importer's brief to establish a greater similarity in the use to which they are...
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