Jamal v. Kane

Decision Date28 April 2015
Docket NumberCivil Action Nos. 1:14–CV–2148,1:15–CV–45.
Citation105 F.Supp.3d 448
PartiesMumia Abu JAMAL, et al., Plaintiffs v. Kathleen KANE, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Defendant. Prison Legal News, et al., Plaintiffs v. Kathleen Kane, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

Ashley K. Henderson, Deneekie Grant, Amistad Law Project, Philadelphia, PA, David Shapiro, Northwestern Univ. School of Law, Chicago, IL, Dustin McDaniel, Wilkinsburg, PA, Bret D. Grote, Jules Lobel, Pittsburgh, PA, for Plaintiffs.

Kenneth L. Joel, M. Abbegael Giunta, Office of the Attorney General, Harrisburg, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM

CHRISTOPHER C. CONNER, Chief Judge.

The case at bar presents a constitutional challenge to a state statute. The disputed enactment creates a right of action to enjoin the expressive conduct of violent criminals that causes mental anguish to victims or their families. Significantly, however, the fact that certain plaintiffs have been convicted of infamous or violent crimes is largely irrelevant to our First Amendment analysis. A past criminal offense does not extinguish the offender's constitutional right to free expression. The First Amendment does not evanesce at the prison gate, and its enduring guarantee of freedom of speech subsumes the right to expressive conduct that some may find offensive.

The court concludes that the challenged statute betrays several constitutional requirements; the enactment is unlawfully purposed, vaguely executed, and patently overbroad in scope. However well-intentioned its legislative efforts, the General Assembly fell woefully short of the mark. The result is a law that is manifestly unconstitutional, both facially and as applied to plaintiffs. Thus, the court is compelled to grant plaintiffs' requests for declaratory relief, declare the Revictimization Relief Act, 18 Pa. Cons.Stat.§ 11.1304, to be violative of the First and Fifth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and permanently enjoin its enforcement.

I. Background1

Before the court are two challenges to the Revictimization Relief Act, a 2014 amendment to Pennsylvania's Crime Victims Act, 18 Pa. Cons.Stat.§ 11.101 et seq.Plaintiffs attack the constitutionality of section 11.1304, which authorizes the Commonwealth's Attorney General, district attorneys, and “victims” of personal injury crimes to bring a civil action to obtain injunctive relief when an “offender” engages in “conduct which perpetuates the continuing effect of the crime on the victim.” 18 Pa. Cons.Stat.§ 11.1304(a)(b). Both plaintiff groups seek preliminary and permanent injunctive relief as well as a declaratory judgment that the Act violates the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution.

The full text of the Act provides:

(a) ACTION.—In addition to any other right of action and any other remedy provided by law, a victim of a personal injury crime may bring a civil action against an offender in any court of competent jurisdiction to obtain injunctive and other appropriate relief, including reasonable attorney fees and other costs associated with the litigation, for conduct which perpetuates the continuing effect of the crime on the victim.
(b) REDRESS ON BEHALF OF VICTIM.—The district attorney of the county in which a personal injury crime took place or the Attorney General, after consulting with the district attorney, may institute a civil action against an offender for injunctive or other appropriate relief for conduct which perpetuates the continuing effect of the crime on the victim.
(c) INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.—Upon a showing of cause for the issuance of injunctive relief, a court may issue special, preliminary, permanent or any other injunctive relief as may be appropriate under this section.
(d) DEFINITION.—As used in this section, the term “conduct which perpetuates the continuing effect of the crime on the victim” includes conduct which causes a temporary or permanent state of mental anguish.

18 Pa. Cons.Stat.§ 11.1304. The Act's sponsor, State Representative Mike Vereb, announced the bill on October 2, 2014, just three days after Goddard College—a small liberal arts college in Vermont and plaintiff Mumia Abu–Jamal's alma mater—announced its selection of Abu–Jamal as its commencement speaker. (SeeJoint Stip. ¶¶ 1–2).2His cosponsor memorandum admonished an unidentified “convicted killer” for “traumatizing the victim's family.” (Id.Ex. 2). The Act passed both chambers of the General Assembly in less than two weeks' time, unaltered from its original form. (See id.¶¶ 6–7, 11).

During an October 21 bill-signing event near the intersection where Abu–Jamal's crime of conviction occurred, then-Governor Tom Corbett lauded the Act for its ability to enjoin offenders whose speech distresses victims. The Governor noted that the Act “is not about any one single criminal” but was “inspired by the excesses and hypocrisy of one particular killer,” (id.Ex. 7 at 1), transparently referencing Abu–Jamal. John Rafferty, a sponsoring senator, championed the Act as a means to prohibit “these rascals, these bad people from becoming entertainment values here in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.” (Id.at 3). The law took effect immediately. See2014 Pa. Laws 150, § 2.

Twenty days after the Act became law, the Abu–Jamalplaintiffs filed a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1983 naming Kathleen Kane, Attorney General of Pennsylvania, and R. Seth Williams, District Attorney for Philadelphia County, as defendants. (See Abu–JamalDoc. 1).3Plaintiffs later amended their complaint to include several additional challengers. (See Abu–JamalDoc. 12). The Prison Legal Newsplaintiffs followed suit shortly thereafter. (See PLNDoc. 1). Collectively, the plaintiff groups assert that the Act is impermissibly vague, substantially overbroad, and an unlawful, content-based regulation of speech. (See Abu–JamalDoc. 12; PLNDoc. 1). The Prison Legal Newsplaintiffs also label the Act an unconstitutional prior restraint of speech. (See PLNDoc. 1 ¶¶ 169–74).

The court consolidated the actions for purposes of resolving plaintiffs' requests for preliminary injunctive relief and defendants' Rule 12 motions. (See Abu JamalDocs. 23, 29; PLNDocs. 10, 21). On January 23, 2015, both defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' claims, asserting that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (See Abu JamalDocs. 30–31; PLNDocs. 24–25). Defendants argued that, because neither defendant has enforced the Act, no plaintiff can establish harm, or an imminent threat thereof, flowing from the legislation. (See Abu JamalDocs. 30–31; PLNDocs. 24–25). The court held argument limited to justiciability concerns on February 26, 2015, and thereafter issued a memorandum opinion resolving both Rule 12motions. See Abu Jamal v. Kane,No. 1:14–CV–2148, 96 F.Supp.3d 447, 2015 WL 999194 (M.D.Pa. Mar. 6, 2015). The court dismissed the District Attorney, finding that his guarantee to refrain from enforcement of the Act pending review of its constitutionality eliminated any threat of injury as to his office.See id.at 454–55, at *6. With regard to the Attorney General, the court concluded that both groups established standing given her office's refusal to disavow enforcement of the Act and the immediate self-censorship resulting therefrom. See id.at 454–57, at *6–8.

The court consolidated trial on the merits with the preliminary injunction hearing, (Doc. 48 ¶ 4), holding a bench trial and oral argument on March 30, 2015. At the conclusion thereof, the court took plaintiffs' requests under advisement.

II. Standard of Review

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65permits a district court to consolidate a preliminary injunction hearing with trial on the merits when appropriate. Fed. R. Civ.P. 65(a)(2)(“Before or after beginning a hearing on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the court may advance the trial on the merits and consolidate it with the hearing.”). In deciding whether permanent injunctive relief should issue, the court must first determine “if the plaintiff has actually succeeded on the merits.” Pa. Pride, Inc. v. Southampton Twp.,78 F.Supp.2d 359, 361 (M.D.Pa.1999)(quoting CIBA–GEIGY Corp. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., Inc.,747 F.2d 844, 850 (3d Cir.1984)). This inquiry tasks the court to determine whether a plaintiff has “met its burden of proof.” CIBA–GEIGY Corp.,747 F.2d at 850(citing Evans v. Buchanan,555 F.2d 373 (3d Cir.1977)). The parties agree that no genuine disputes of material fact remain and that the question before the court is purely one of law. Accordingly, the court will treat plaintiffs' pending applications as motions for summary judgment. SeeFed. R. Civ.P. 56(a)(“The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”); see also Krebs v. Rutgers,797 F.Supp. 1246, 1252–53 (D.N.J.1992)(applying Rule 56to injunctive relief application when parties agreed that remaining merits issue “involve[d] consideration of a pure point of law”).

III. Undisputed Facts4

Plaintiffs sub judicerepresent two distinct but allied groups. The Abu–Jamalplaintiffs include five inmates, each of whom has been convicted of and is presently incarcerated for committing a personal injury crime in Pennsylvania. (SeeDoc. 49 ¶¶ 15, 31, 40, 48, 58). These prisoners frequently engage in written and oral commentary, advocacy, and educational endeavors on a variety of topics of public concern. (See id.¶¶ 15–22, 31–37, 41–44, 49–54, 59–61). The Abu–Jamalplaintiffs also include Prison Radio, Human Rights Coalition (“HRC”), and Educators for Mumia Abu–Jamal (EMAJ), three entities which regularly publish inmate plaintiffs' speech. (See id.¶¶ 64, 75–77, 86–92). Prison Radio produces prisoner commentary “aired on hundreds of radio and television stations every week.” (Id.¶¶ 64–71). HRC is an incorporated advocacy group, comprising prisoners' families, former...

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