Ager v. Murray

Decision Date01 October 1881
Citation26 L.Ed. 942,105 U.S. 126
PartiesAGER v. MURRAY
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Submitted on printed briefs by Mr. Thomas T. Crittenden and Mr. Warwick Martin for the appellants, and by Mr. Lemon G. Hine and Mr. S. T. Thomas for the appellee.

MR. JUSTICE GRAY delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a bill in equity by a judgment creditor to subject to the payment of his debt the interest of his debtor in patent-rights. The case was heard in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia upon bill and answers, by which it appears to be as follows:—— On the 10th of April, 1876, Talbot C. Murray, in an action at law upon a promissory note, recovered judgment against Wilson Ager for the sum of $2,164.66, with interest and costs. Upon that judgment a writ of fieri facias was issued, and returned nulla bona. Wilson Ager had no real or personal property in the District subject to execution at law, but was the owner of sundry letters-patent issued to him by the United States for useful inventions, which, if sold, would produce more than enough money to satisfy that judgment. On the 26th of September, 1876, he conveyed all his right and interest in these letters-patent to the other defendant, Elisha C. Ager, who owned an equitable interest of one-third therein, and who, on the 8th of October, 1877, reconveyed the patent-rights to Wilson by an assignment which was not recorded in the Patent Office. Wilson Ager resides in the District of Columbia, and the other defendant resides in the State of California, and both have appeared in the cause and answered to the merits of the bill.

The bill prays for an injunction against further assignment pending the suit, and that the patents be sold under the direction of the court, and the proceeds of the sale applied to the payment of the judgment debt, and the defendant, Wilson Ager, be required to execute such assignment as may be necessary to vest title in the purchaser or purchasers, in conformity with the patent laws, and for further relief. The decree is, that in default of his paying by a certain day the judgment mentioned in the bill, will interest and costs, and the costs of this suit, the patent-rights be sold and an assignment thereof executed by him as prayed for, and that, in default of his executing such assignment, some suitable person be appointed trustee to execute the same.

From that decree the original defendants have appealed to this court; and the single question argued before us is whether a patent-right may be ordered by a court of equity to be sold and the proceeds applied to the payment of a judgment debt of the patentee.

A patent or a copyright, which vests the sole and exclusive right of making, using, and vending the invention, or of publishing and selling the book, in the person to whom it has been granted by the government, as against all persons not deriving title through him, is property, capable of being assigned by him at his pleasure, although his assignment, unless recorded in the proper office, is void against subsequent purchasers or mortgagees for a valuable consideration without notice. Rev. Stat., sects. 4884, 4898, 4952, 4955. And the provisions of the patent and copyright acts, securing a sole and exclusive right to the patentee, do not exonerate the right and property thereby acquired by him, of which he receives the profits, and has the absolute title and power of disposal, from liability to be subjected by suitable judicial proceedings to the payment of his debts.

In England it has long been held that a patent-right would pass by an assignment in bankruptcy, even without express words to that effect in the Bankrupt Act. Hesse v. Stevenson, 3 Bos. & Pul. 565; S. C. Davies, Pat. Cas. 263; Longman v. Tripp, 2 New Rep. 67; Bloxam v. Elsee, 1 Car. & P. 558; S. C. Ry. & M. 187; 6 Barn. & Cress. 169; 9 D. & R. 215; Mawman v. Tegg, 2 Russ. 385; Edelsten v. Vick, 11 Hare, 78; Hudson v. Osborne, 39 L. J. N. S. Ch. 79. In Hesse v. Stevenson, Mr. Justice Chambre, in the course of the argument, said: 'The right to the patent is made assignable; why then may it not be assigned under a commission of bankrupt?' 3 Bos. & Pul. 571. And Lord Alvanley, delivering the unanimous judgment of the court, after observing that it was contended 'that the nature of the property in this patent was such that it did not pass under the assignment,' and 'that although by the assignment every right and interest, and every right of action, as well as right of possession and possibility of interest, is taken out of the bankrupt and vested in the assignee, yet that the fruits of a man's own invention do not pass,' said: 'It is true that the schemes which a man may have in his own head before he obtains his certificate, or the fruits which he may make of such schemes, do not pass, nor could the assignee require him to assign them over, provided he does not carry his schemes into effect until after he has obtained his certificate. But if he avail himself of his knowledge and skill, and thereby acquire a beneficial interest, which may be the subject of assignment, I cannot frame to myself an argument why that interest should not pass in the same manner as any other property acquired by his personal industry.' 3 Bos. & Pul. 577, 578. The recent Bankrupt Act of the United States, in defining what property should vest in the assignee in bankruptcy, expressly enumerated 'all rights in equity, choses in action, patent-rights, and copyrights,' and required the assignee to sell all the property of the bankrupt for the benefit of his creditors. Rev. Stat., sects. 5046, 5062-5064. The only difference is, that in England all such rights pass that become vested in the bankrupt before he obtains a certificate of discharge, whereas here only those rights pass which belong to him at the time of the assignment.

It has been said by an English text-writer that 'a patent-right may be seized and sold in execution by the sheriff under a fieri facias, being in the nature of a personal chattel.' Webster on Patents, 23. We are not aware of any instance in which such a course has been judicially approved. But it is within the general jurisdiction of a court of chancery to assist a judgment creditor to reach and apply to the payment of his debt any property of the judgment debtor, which by reason of its nature only, and not by reason of any positive rule exempting it from liability for debt, cannot be taken on execution at law; as in the case of trust property in which the judgment debtor has the entire beneficial interest, of shares in a corporation, or of choses in action. M'Dermutt v. Strong, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) Ch. 687; Spader v. Hadden, 5 id. 280, and 20 Johns. (N. Y.) 554; Edmeston v. Lyde, 1 Paige (N. Y.), 637; Wiggin v. Heywood, 118 Mass. 514; Sparhawk v. Cloon, 125 id. 263; Daniels v. Eldredge, id. 356; Drake v. Rice, 130 id. 410.

In Stephens v. Cady (14 How 528), and again in Stevens...

To continue reading

Request your trial
106 cases
  • Wilhelm v. Consolidated Oil Corporation
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit
    • 30 Junio 1936
    ...this should be done in his behalf by a trustee appointed by the court for that purpose. Felch v. Hooper, 119 Mass. 52; Ager v. Murray, 105 U.S. 126, 132 26 L.Ed. 942. But in such a case, as in the ordinary exercise of its jurisdiction, a court of equity acts in personam, by compelling a dee......
  • Security-First Nat. Bank v. Republic Pictures Corp.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of California
    • 26 Abril 1951
    ...1834, 8 Pet. 591, 654, 657-661, 8 L.Ed. 1055; Stevens v. Gladding, 1855, 17 How. 447, 448, 453-454, 15 L.Ed. 155; Ager v. Murray, 1881, 105 U.S. 126, 128-131, 26 L.Ed. 942; Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 1908, 210 U.S. 339, 346, 28 S.Ct. 722, 52 L. Ed. 1086; In re Leslie-Judge Co., Inc., 1921......
  • McCann v. Randall
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 7 Mayo 1888
    ...Rev.St.U.S. § 4898; Bankrupt Act 1867; 2 Drone, Copyr. 97; Hales v. Shaftoe, 1 Ves.Jr. 86, note 4; Wilder v. Kent, 15 F. 217; Ager v. Murray, 105 U.S. 126, 131; v. Buntin, 118 Mass. 279, 285. Legal appropriation of negotiable paper may be accomplished without indorsement by sequestration, a......
  • McCann v. Randall
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • 7 Mayo 1888
    ...§ 4898; Bankrupt Act 1867; 2 Drone, Copyr. 97; Hales v. Shaftoe, 1 Ves.Jr. 86, note 4; Wilder v. Kent, 15 Fed.Rep. 217; Ager v. Murray, 105 U.S. 126, 131;Somerby v. Buntin, 118 Mass. 279, 285. Legal appropriation of negotiable paper may be accomplished without indorsement by sequestration, ......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT