State v. Davis

Citation106 A.2d 159,141 Conn. 319
CourtSupreme Court of Connecticut
Decision Date01 June 1954
PartiesSTATE v. DAVIS. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

John E. Larkin, West Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Bernard A. Kosicki, State's Atty., Middletown, for appellee (state).

INGLIS, C. J., and BALDWIN, O'SULLIVAN, WYNNE and DALY, JJ.

WYNNE, Justice.

The defendant went to trial before a jury on an information which contained three counts under § 8693 of the General Statutes, defining embezzlement, and three counts under § 8696, which relates to obtaining money by false token, pretense or device. She was found guilty on one of the counts purporting to charge the crime of embezzlement and on each of the counts setting worth a violation of § 8696. After the verdict, she made a motion in arrest of judgment based upon the insufficiency of the information. From the denial of this motion she has appealed. The assignment of error is based solely upon the denial.

The information is in the short form authorized by Practice Book, § 344. At common law it was necessary to set forth in an information, in detail, the means by which the particular offense was accomplished. 2 Swift's Digest 378. That requirement has now been removed by the rule. It was to avoid unnecessary prolixity that the rule permitting short-form informations was adopted.

The third count of the information accused the defendant 'on or about February 16, 1953, at Cromwell, Connecticut, of taking, purloining, secreting, or of appropriating to her own use or to the use of others the monies in her care or custody as agent with the intent to defraud another,' in violation of § 8693 of the General Statutes. As to this count, the argument is made by the defendant that neither the kind of agency supposed to have existed nor the principal is identified. While it is true that the count is in general terms, it does charge the defendant with the crime of embezzlement. It gives the date and the place in precise language, and it sets forth the statute in question. The count contained all the elements of the crime of embezzlement by agent, a crime defined by statute, and the statute was cited. State v. Henderson, 102 Conn. 658, 660, 129 A. 724; State v. Wyman, 118 Conn. 501, 507, 173 A. 155, 93 A.L.R. 913; State v. Pallotti, 119 Conn. 70, 72, 174 A. 74. It charged the crime in the manner prescribed by the rule.

The counts relating to obtaining money by false pretenses were in substantial compliance with the rules, and in each case the statute was...

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25 cases
  • State v. Coleman
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • October 22, 1974
    ...rule permitting short form informations was adopted to 'avoid unnecessary prolixity' such as was required at common law. State v. Davis, 141 Conn. 319, 320, 106 A.2d 159. The short form information has been held to be constitutional despite its brevity and incompleteness because the defenda......
  • State v. Osman
    • United States
    • Connecticut Court of Appeals
    • April 24, 1990
    ...particulars more precisely defining the manner in which the defendant committed the offense. Practice Book §§ 495, 498; State v. Davis, 141 Conn. 319, 106 A.2d 159 [1954]; see State v. Brown, 163 Conn. 52, 61, 301 A.2d 547 [1972]. Once such a bill of particulars has been filed or where ... ......
  • State v. Ruiz
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • July 6, 1976
    ...of particulars more precisely defining the manner in which the defendant committed the offense. Practice Book §§ 495, 498; State v. Davis, 141 Conn. 319, 106 A.2d 159; see State v. Brown, 163 Conn. 52, 61, 301 A.2d 547. Once such a bill of particulars has been filed or where, as in the pres......
  • State v. Carbone
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • January 18, 1977
    ...the opportunity to obtain the information to which he was constitutionally entitled by requesting a bill of particulars. State v. Davis, 141 Conn. 319, 321, 106 A.2d 159. Here the defendant made use of that opportunity so there was no waiver of the right such as was found in State v. Colema......
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