Combs v. Plantation Patterns

Decision Date20 February 1997
Docket NumberNo. 95-6922,95-6922
Parties73 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 232, 71 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,793, 10 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 731 Darrell COMBS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. PLANTATION PATTERNS, Meadowcraft Company, and Sam Blount Company, Inc., Defendants, Meadowcraft, Inc., Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

James Walker May, John W. Smith, Bradley, Arant, Rose & White, Birmingham, AL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Samuel Fisher, Ann C. Robertson, Amelia Haines Griffith, Gordon, Silberman, Wiggins & Childs, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Alabama.

Before BIRCH, BLACK and CARNES, Circuit Judges.

CARNES, Circuit Judge:

Meadowcraft, Inc. appeals from a judgment entered against it pursuant to a jury verdict in favor of Darrell Combs in this Title VII race discrimination case. The jury found that Meadowcraft denied Combs a supervisory position because of his race. The dispositive issue in the appeal is whether Combs produced evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable factfinder to disbelieve Meadowcraft's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for failing to promote Combs. We conclude that he did not, and that Meadowcraft was entitled to judgment as a matter of law for that reason.

Part I of this opinion is a discussion of the facts. In Part II, we summarize the procedural history of this case, followed by a brief discussion of the standard of review in Part III. Our discussion of the law and application of it to the facts is contained in Part IV, which has four subparts.

Subparts A through C of Part IV contain an explication of the legal framework applicable to discrimination cases in light of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), and St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). It is in those parts of this opinion that we answer the dicta contained in the recent panel opinion in Isenbergh v. Knight-Ridder Newspaper Sales, Inc., 97 F.3d 436 (11th Cir.1996), which is critical of the holding in Howard v. BP Oil Co., 32 F.3d 520 (11th Cir.1994), and by implication, of a number of our other decisions in line with it. Howard and those decisions like it hold that after a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, evidence from which the factfinder could find that all of the employer's proffered reasons for the challenged job action are pretextual entitles the plaintiff to have the factfinder decide the ultimate issue of discrimination. We answer the Isenbergh panel's criticism of the Howard line of decisions and explain why the holding of those cases is the law of this circuit, as well as at least eight other circuits.

Subpart D of Part IV applies the law to the facts of this case, and Part V contains our conclusion.

I. BACKGROUND FACTS

Meadowcraft owns and operates a manufacturing plant in Wadley, Alabama. The plant produces outdoor patio furniture, which is sold under the brand name "Plantation Patterns." The plant's workforce is divided into a number of departments, including materials, forming, welding, painting, packing, and shipping. The departments have various shifts, and there are supervisors for each shift.

In January 1992, Meadowcraft hired Combs, who is black, to work in the plant as a "crimp and form" operator. Shortly thereafter, Combs was promoted to "material handler" and given a pay raise. Combs was supervised by George Anderson and Edward Lane. Both Anderson and Lane are black, and both worked as supervisors in the plant's welding department.

Shortly after Combs started working at Meadowcraft, he introduced himself to John Hart, the plant superintendent. Combs told Hart that he had a degree in computer science from Alabama A & M and that he was interested in doing office work that would allow him to use his degree. In June 1992, Hart made arrangements with the plant manager for Combs to do a temporary assignment programming personal computers in the plant and preparing spreadsheets. At some point, those arrangements included reclassifying Combs to be a plant "lead man"--meaning a quasi-supervisor--even though he was not actually doing lead man work or supervising anyone. When Combs was nominally promoted to lead man, his pay was increased.

Prior to his pay raise, Combs held a second job as manager at a low-income apartment complex at which he was responsible for maintenance, cleaning, and painting, as well as supervising teenagers who did maintenance work at the complex. After Combs' pay raise, he quit his second job.

On several occasions, when Meadowcraft officials from Birmingham headquarters visited the plant, Combs was asked to "hide" from the officials. At trial, Combs implied that he was asked to hide because he is black, but he admitted on cross-examination that he was never told that was the reason. Hart testified that Combs was asked to hide because headquarters had not approved his computer job, and that he had explained that to Combs.

While Combs was assigned to the temporary computer project, Hart asked him whether he would be interested in being a supervisor at the plant. Combs said that he was interested. Although Combs indicated an interest in supervisory positions in both the painting and welding departments, he was awarded neither position. Both positions were awarded to white persons. At trial, Combs conceded that the person who was made painting supervisor was better qualified than he, and Combs abandoned his discrimination claim with respect to that position. Meadowcraft's failure to promote Combs to the welding supervisor position was the only failure-to-promote claim that was submitted to the jury, and it is the only claim in controversy in this appeal.

Meadowcraft awarded the welding supervisor position to Fred Walker in July 1992. Walker served in that capacity for ten or eleven days, but then was reassigned to work temporarily as a supervisor in the packing department. That temporary reassignment lasted for about a year, after which Walker returned to his position as a supervisor in the welding department.

Around November 1992, after Combs had completed his temporary computer assignment, he was asked to assist with a "bar code" scanning project in the plant's packing department--where Walker was then a temporary supervisor. By December 1992, the scanning project had been put on hold, and Hart told Combs that he had run out of temporary assignments for him. Hart suggested that Combs return to his position as a material handler in the plant. Combs declined to return to his material handler job, and his employment at Meadowcraft came to an end on December 18, 1992. 1

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In February 1993, Combs filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging unlawful racial discrimination. After receiving his right-to-sue letter from the EEOC, Combs filed suit in the Middle District of Alabama, alleging claims based on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and on 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Combs sought recovery under the following race discrimination theories: (1) that Meadowcraft terminated him from his employment because of his race; (2) that Meadowcraft subjected him to impermissible racial harassment; and (3) that Meadowcraft denied him a supervisory position because of his race. Combs also appended a state law claim for the tort of outrage, but the district court dismissed that claim with prejudice, and Combs has not appealed that dismissal.

Combs' three race discrimination claims were tried to a jury on August 21-25, 1995. At trial, Meadowcraft proffered evidence in support of three legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision to promote Walker instead of Combs. Those reasons were: (1) Walker's superior welding experience; (2) the recommendations of supervisors Lane and Anderson; and (3) Walker's superior supervisory experience. At trial, Meadowcraft moved for judgment as a matter of law both at the close of the plaintiff's case and at the close of all the evidence. The district court denied those motions, and the case was submitted to the jury.

The jury unanimously rejected Combs' discriminatory termination claim, but could not reach a unanimous verdict on the remaining two claims. Thereafter, the parties agreed that the remaining two claims could be decided by majority verdict. The jury by a majority vote determined that Combs had not proven his claim for discriminatory harassment, but that he had proven his claim that he was denied a supervisory position because of his race. The jury awarded Combs compensatory damages of $76,552 and punitive damages of $42,700.

After the jury returned its verdict, Meadowcraft renewed its motion for judgment as a matter of law and made an alternative motion for a new trial. In support of those motions, Meadowcraft argued (among other things) that Combs had failed to put forward sufficient evidence to permit the jury to disbelieve the nondiscriminatory reasons that Meadowcraft had proffered in explanation of its decision to promote Walker to welding supervisor instead of Combs. The district court denied both the principal and alternative motions, and this appeal followed. 2

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a district court's denial of a defendant's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, applying the same standards as the district court. Sherrin v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 2 F.3d 373, 377 (11th Cir.1993). Those standards require us to consider "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2512, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In conducting our review:

[W]e consider all the evidence, and the inferences drawn therefrom, in the...

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