106 F.3d 405 (8th Cir. 1997), 96-3512, U.S. v. Gray

Docket Nº:96-3512.
Citation:106 F.3d 405
Party Name:UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Robert J. GRAY, Appellant.
Case Date:January 21, 1997
Court:United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
 
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Page 405

106 F.3d 405 (8th Cir. 1997)

UNITED STATES of America, Appellee,

v.

Robert J. GRAY, Appellant.

No. 96-3512.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

January 21, 1997

Editorial Note:

This opinion appears in the Federal reporter in a table titled "Table of Decisions Without Reported Opinions". (See FI CTA8 Rule 28A, FI CTA8 IOP and FI CTA8 APP. I regarding use of unpublished opinions)

Submitted Jan. 7, 1997.

Filed Jan. 21, 1997.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas

Before McMILLIAN, HENLEY and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit

PER CURIAM.

Robert J. Gray appeals his nine-month sentence imposed by the District Court 1 for the Eastern District of Arkansas after he pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting in wrecking a train, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1992 and 2. Counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and was granted leave to withdraw. Gray did not avail himself of the opportunity to file a pro se supplemental brief. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm.

Although Gray argues that his sentence should have included probation, an option authorized by U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 5C1.1(c)(3) (1995), the district court was within its discretion to impose imprisonment. The district court specifically noted at sentencing its options under Guidelines § 5C1.1(c)(2) and (3), and also stated that the sentence should be fair and just, reflect the seriousness of the crime, and deter others from similar conduct in the future. Thus, contrary to Gray's contention, the district court considered the sentencing options and stated reasons for the sentence. The district court was not required to state its reason for choosing the particular point within the sentencing range, because the applicable range did not span more than 24 months. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1); United States v. Garrido,...

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