Chicago v. Robinson

Citation106 Ill. 142,1883 WL 10192
PartiesCHICAGO AND ALTON RAILROAD COMPANYv.AMELIA T. ROBINSON.
Decision Date29 March 1883
CourtSupreme Court of Illinois

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the Third District;--heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Tazewell county; the Hon. NINIAN M. LAWS, Judge, presiding. Mr. C. BECKWITH, Mr. N. W. GREEN, and Mr. M. D. BEECHER, for the appellant.

Messrs. B. S. PRETTYMAN & SONS, and Mr. WILLIAM DON MAUS, for the appellee.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE SCOTT delivered the opinion of the Court:

This action was brought by Amelia T. Robinson, against the Chicago and Alton Railroad Company, to recover for personal injuries. Plaintiff, with her husband, was traveling on the highway in a buggy, and just as they were crossing the track of defendant's railroad, at a public road crossing, a special train, under the management and control of defendant's servants, collided with the buggy in which plaintiff and her husband were riding, by which she sustained severe and permanent injuries. The negligence with which defendant is charged, and which, it is averred, caused the injuries to plaintiff, consists in a failure to ring a bell or sound a whistle on the locomotive that caused the injury, as the law requires shall be done at all public road crossings, and in permitting banks of earth to lie, and weeds, brush and other obstructions to stand and grow at and along its track and grounds, so near the crossing as to prevent and obstruct a view of approaching trains by any one traveling on the highway and about to cross the railroad, in time to avoid danger. It is also made a ground of complaint the train that collided with the buggy in which plaintiff was riding was what is called a ““wild train,”--that is, a train run upon no schedule time,--and that it was run at an unusual rate of speed.

With the testimony to be found in the record this court will not concern itself, further than to ascertain whether the law given by the trial court to the jury, in its instructions, was applicable to the evidence. With that purpose in view the evidence has been carefully considered, and it is found some of the instructions given for plaintiff were calculated to mislead the jury, conceding, as must be done, the facts were well found by the Appellate Court. There is and can be no pretense the injuries of which plaintiff complains were willfully inflicted by defendant's servants. The utmost that can be claimed on any hypothesis consistent with the evidence, is, her injuries resulted from the negligence of defendant's servants in permitting obstructions along the line of its right of way so near the crossing as to obstruct the view of approaching trains by any one traveling on the highway, or from the negligent conduct of defendant's servants in charge of the train that produced the injury, by which it was unskillfully managed, or from the omission to give the usual signals of danger. Neither the declaration nor the ascertained facts show any willful intent on the part of defendant's servants to inflict an injury upon plaintiff. That element is absolutely wanting in any view that can be taken of the case. Indeed, defendant is not charged with any such intent, and no such issue could be rightfully submitted to the jury. Hence, it is thought the second instruction of the series given for plaintiff was calculated to and may have misled the jury as to the true issues involved. The clause of the instruction bearing on this phase of the case is, “where the jury believe, from the evidence, an injury is willfully done by a railroad company, or results from a gross neglect of duty by the company, then the company is liable for such injury.” The charge, it will be perceived, directs the attention of...

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17 cases
  • Keim v. Union Railway and Transit Co.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
    • December 20, 1886
    ...... a fact not in issue, namely, the failure of defendant to ring. the bell of the engine. Railroad v. Robinson, 106. Ill. 142; Thompson's Charging the Jury, sec. 62. (5). There was error in the refusal of the court to give the. fourth, seventh and ......
  • Berg v. New York Cent. R. Co.
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • September 19, 1945
    ...... positively to a fact while the other's evidence is negative, the positive testimony is entitled to greater weight than the negative (Chicago & Alton Railroad Co. v. Robinson, 106 Ill. 142), but no question as to the weight of evidence is involved on defendant's motion under consideration. ......
  • Lyons v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of Illinois
    • December 22, 1909
    .......        The appellant corporation owned a machine shop or structural iron factory located at Rockwell and Sixteenth streets, in Chicago. The building was divided into two sections by a partition running north and south, which separated the building into an east and west room, between ...Chicago & Alton, Railroad Co. v. Robinson, 106 Ill. 142.        But it is said by appellee that this instruction states a correct proposition of law under the rule laid down by this ......
  • Sims v. Chicago Transit Authority, Gen. No. 45820
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • June 28, 1955
    ...Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Payne, 49 Ill. 499; Illinois Central R. Co. v. Maffit, 67 Ill. 431, 435; Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Robinson, 106 Ill. 142, 144-145; Lyons v. Joseph T. Ryerson & Son, 242 Ill. 409, 416, 90 N.E. 288; Chicago City Ry. Co. v. Canevin, 72 Ill.App. 81, 83; West Chicago St.......
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