Burn & Crump v. Metropolitan Lumber Co.
| Citation | 94 Conn. 1,107 A. 609 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Decision Date | 31 July 1919 |
| Parties | BURN & CRUMP v. METROPOLITAN LUMBER CO. |
Appeal from Court of Common Pleas, Fairfield County; John R. Booth Judge.
Action by Burn & Crump against the Metropolitan Lumber Company. From judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Reversed, and case remanded.
Action to recover damages for failure to deliver lumber according to contract, brought to the court of common pleas for Fairfield county and tried to the court. Judgment for the plaintiff from which the defendant appeals. Error, and case remanded.
From the finding the following material facts appeared:
The plaintiffs were carpenters and builders in Bridgeport, Conn. The defendants were in the wholesale lumber business in Newark, N.J. May 7, 1917, the plaintiff gave defendant's agent in Bridgeport an order accepted by the agent, as follows:
A reasonable time for delivery would have been a month to six weeks. The lumber not having been delivered, on July 6, 1917 plaintiffs inquired of the defendants about the failure to deliver, and the next day the defendants replied they had received no such order. The lumber was never delivered. The court found the retail market value of this lumber in Bridgeport on July 6, 1917, was $374 greater than the contract price, and rendered judgment for that amount.
The court further found:
(9) That to entitle the purchaser of lumber to a wholesale price for the same, it would be necessary that such purchase be for an amount of at least one-half carload of each lot of lumber, to wit, about 10,000 feet or more.
(10) The plaintiffs were not entitled to a wholesale price for the lumber purchased by them by reason of the fact that it included three separate lots of 2,000, 3,000, and 5,000 feet respectively.
(11) No express agreement was made as to the place of delivery other than appears upon Exhibit C, but by a previous course of dealing the plaintiffs had purchased from the defendant a quantity of lumber as appears by Exhibit A. Under this contract the defendant had delivered the lumber to the plaintiffs in Bridgeport.
Samuel E. Hoyt and William A. Bree, both of New Haven, for appellant.
Henry E. Shannon and Frank L. Wilder, both of Bridgeport, for appellee.
This case was left to the trial court upon very meager testimony on the part of the plaintiffs and none whatever on the part of the defendants. The appeal is based on claimed errors in the finding, errors in rulings on evidence, and errors in conclusions of law. The action being for damages for failure to deliver a quantity of lumber, the first question is where was the lumber to be delivered. The court found it was to be delivered in Bridgeport, and this conclusion of fact is warranted by the evidence. The contract was in writing and dated at Bridgeport, and the parts material to this action are " Ship us transit car containing," and " Inspection allowed on this car." The provision for inspection is not conclusive for unless the buyer has previously examined the goods he must in all cases have a reasonable opportunity for examination. General Statutes, § 4713. The question then is whether the words " Ship us transit car," in connection with the place where the order was given, which was the plaintiff's place of business, constitute a contract, express or implied, designating Bridgeport as the place of delivery; for otherwise, and under the Sales Act (Laws 1907, c. 212), the seller's place of business was the place of delivery. General Statutes, § 4709. There was no evidence as to the meaning of the term " transit car" in the lumber business, and the court construed the words " transit car" as meaning loaded and on the way to Bridgeport, and that therefore the only definite place possible to be ascertained from the contract was Bridgeport. We cannot say that the court, in the absence of any information other than that contained in the order, reached an erroneous result. The result conforms to a similar result reached in Stock v. Towle, 97 Me. 408, 54 A. 918, although in this latter case the point was identification of goods ordered and not place of delivery, and the goods appeared to have been tendered to the buyer at the conclusion of the transportation which was the location of the buyer. Harlow v. Parson's Lumber & Hardware Co., 81 Conn. 572, 71 A. 734, is also instructive on this point, and seems to confirm the conclusion of the trial court in the present case.
Objection is also taken to the finding that there was a refusal to deliver the lumber on or about July 6, 1917, and that a reasonable time for delivery was from four to six weeks from May 7th, the date of the order. The evidence clearly warrants...
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State v. Kennedy
...is simply derived from inadmissible sources, because he gives the sanction of him general experience.' " Burn v. Metropolitan Lumber Co., 94 Conn. 1, 6, 107 A. 609 (1919), quoting National Bank of Commerce v. New Bedford, 175 Mass. 257, 261, 56 N.E. 288 Further, the trial court was correct ......
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Barbara J., In re
...see Fed.R.Evid. 703. This is so because of the sanction given by the witness's experience and expertise. Burn v. Metropolitan Lumber Co., 94 Conn. 5, 6, 107 A. 609 (1919)." C. Tait & J. LaPlante, Connecticut Evidence (2d Ed.) § 7.16.8(c). "[W]hen the expert witness has consulted numerous so......
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...or experience; he may not merely transmit information which he receives from outside sources in the field. Burn v. Metropolitan Lumber Co., 94 Conn. 1, 6-7, 107 A. 609 (1919); E. J. Kelley Co. v. Carlin, 4 Conn.Cir.Ct. 282, 288, 230 A.2d 443 (1966); 32 C.J.S., Evidence §§ 546(114), 546(115)......
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