U.S. v. Seagroves, 96-1431

Decision Date07 January 1997
Docket NumberNo. 96-1431,96-1431
Citation107 F.3d 5
PartiesNOTICE: THIS SUMMARY ORDER MAY NOT BE CITED AS PRECEDENTIAL AUTHORITY, BUT MAY BE CALLED TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COURT IN A SUBSEQUENT STAGE OF THIS CASE, IN A RELATED CASE, OR IN ANY CASE FOR PURPOSES OF COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL OR RES JUDICATA. SEE SECOND CIRCUIT RULE 0.23. UNITED STATES of America, Appellee, v. Timothy J. SEAGROVES, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit

Appearing for Appellant: Paul S. Volk, Blodgett, Watts & Volk, Burlington, Vt.

Appearing for Appellee: John P. Tavana, Ass't U.S. Att'y, D. Vt., Burlington, Vt.

D.Vt.

AFFIRMED.

Before KEARSE, CARDAMONE, Circuit Judges, and POLLACK, District Judge *.

This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of record from the United States District Court for the District of Vermont, and was argued by counsel.

ON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now hereby ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the judgment of said District Court be and it hereby is affirmed.

Defendant Timothy J. Seagroves appeals from a judgment entered in the United States District Court for the District of Vermont following his plea of guilty before William K. Sessions III, Judge, convicting him of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and conspiracy to commit arson, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and sentencing him principally to 70 months' imprisonment to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release. On appeal, Seagroves challenges his sentence, contending principally that the district court erred in finding (1) that he "knowingly" created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another within the meaning of Guidelines § 2K1.4(a)(1), and (2) that he destroyed a "dwelling" within the meaning of that section. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

The Guidelines with respect to arson offenses provide for an offense level of 24 if the offense either "(A) created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to any person other than a participant in the offense, and that risk was created knowingly; or (B) involved the destruction or attempted destruction of a dwelling." Guidelines § 2K1.4(a)(1). With respect to part (A) of this section, the record before the district court showed that Seagroves caused the burning of a building tenanted by several commercial enterprises other than his own. Though Seagroves contends that he had attempted to eliminate any risk of personal injury by checking through the premises and locking the doors, the risk was not eliminated because the other tenants had keys to the doors he locked, and Seagroves's actions were...

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