Slater v. Advance Thresher Company

• Decision Date: 16 February 1906
• Docket Number: 14,601 - (199)
• Parties: FRANK L. SLATER v. ADVANCE THRESHER COMPANY
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

107 N.W. 133

97 Minn. 305

FRANK L. SLATER v. ADVANCE THRESHER COMPANY

Nos. 14,601 - (199)

Supreme Court of Minnesota

February 16, 1906

Action in the district court for Clay county to recover $1,975 for personal injuries. The case was tried before Baxter, J., and a jury, which rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $1,000. From an order denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and denying a motion for a new trial upon condition that plaintiff consent to a reduction of the verdict to $500, defendant appealed. Reversed and judgment ordered for defendant.

SYLLABUS

Negligence of Servant -- Injury to Third Person.

The master is not liable for injuries occasioned to a third person by the negligence of his servant while the latter is engaged in some act beyond the scope of his employment, for his own or the purposes of another, although he may be using the instrumentalities furnished by the master with which to perform his duties as servant.

"Course of Employment."

The expression "in the course of his employment" means in contemplation of law, "while engaged in the service of the master," and nothing more. It is not synonymous with "during the period covered by his employment."

Application of Rule.

Defendant is a Michigan corporation, engaged in the manufacture and sale of farm implements. Gregory was its general manager for the northwest, with headquarters at Minneapolis, this state and Nichols was its general agent for the state of North Dakota, and resided at Fargo, in that state. Defendant furnished its agent at Fargo an automobile to facilitate the performance of the duties of his agency, which he used whenever necessary. After business hours on the day of the injury complained of in this action, the two agents, Gregory and Nichols, took the automobile so furnished Nichols by the defendant, and started for Moorhead, this state, just across the river from Fargo, on a mission purely personal to themselves and wholly independent from the affairs and business of defendant. While so engaged a team of horses belonging to plaintiff became frightened by the alleged negligent manner in which the agents operated the automobile, and this action was brought against the defendant to recover damages occasioned thereby, on the theory that it was liable for the negligence of its agents. Held that, on the principle of the law above stated, defendant is not liable for the wrongful acts of the agents; the same not having been committed in the course of their employment.

Wm. R. Tillotson and H. R. Turner, for appellant.

C. A. Nye, for respondent.

OPINION

BROWN, J.

The facts in this case are as follows: Defendant is a corporation organized under the laws of the state of Michigan, engaged in the manufacture and sale of farm machinery. Walter Gregory is its general manager for the northwest, with headquarters at the city of Minneapolis, this state, and W. L. Nichols is its general agent for the state of North Dakota, residing at Fargo, in that state. Defendant furnished its agent at Fargo, to facilitate the discharge of his duties, an automobile, which he used and operated whenever convenient in his work. After business hours on the day of the injury complained of, the two agents, Gregory and Nichols, took the automobile so furnished Nichols by defendant and started for Moorhead, a city in this state just across the river from Fargo, on a mission and for a purpose purely personal to themselves, and wholly distinct from the affairs and business of the defendant. Just as the agents with the automobile reached the bridge between the two cities, plaintiff's horses, which he was driving, became frightened by reason, as alleged in the complaint, of the negligent manner in which the agent operated the machine, and ran away, injuring plaintiff and damaging the buggy to which they were attached. This action was brought against defendant to recover for the injuries so occasioned, on the theory that it was liable for the negligent conduct of its agents. At the close of the trial in the court below, defendant requested that a verdict be instructed in its favor, which was refused; the case was submitted to the jury and a verdict returned for plaintiff for the sum of $1,000. On motion for a new trial the verdict was reduced to $500 by order of the court, and a new trial denied, from which defendant appealed.

The assignment of error to the effect that the court erred in not directing a verdict for defendant is the only one requiring consideration, and that presents the question whether on the facts stated, which are not in dispute, defendant is liable for the negligence of its agents in the operation of the automobile under the circumstances and on the occasion stated.

1. It is elementary that the master is not liable for injuries occasioned to a third person by the negligence of his servant, while the latter is engaged in some act beyond the scope of his employment, for his own or the purposes of another, although he may be using the instrumentalities furnished him by the master with which to perform the ordinary duties of his employment, or, as expressed in Shear. & R., Neg. (3d Ed.) § 63, that if the act complained of be committed by the servant while at liberty from the service of the master and while pursuing his own interests exclusively, there can be no question of the master's freedom from liability, even though the injury would not have been committed without the facilities afforded the servant by his relation to the master.

The law on the subject is clearly stated in the case of Morier v. St. Paul, M. & M. Ry. Co., 31 Minn. 351, 17 N.W. 952, 47 Am. Rep. 793, where the court said: "The doctrine of the liability of the master for the wrongful acts of his servant is predicated upon the maxims, 'respondeat superior' and 'qui facit per alium facit per se.' In fact, it rests upon the doctrine of agency. Therefore, the universal test of the master's liability is whether there was authority, express or implied, for doing the act; that is, was it one done in the course and within the scope of the servant's employment? If it be done in the course and within the scope of the employment, the master will be liable for the act, whether negligent, fraudulent, deceitful, or an act of positive malfeasance. Smith, M. & S. 284. But a master is not liable for every wrong which the servant may commit during the continuance of the employment. The liability can only occur when that which is done is within the real or apparent scope of the master's business. Beyond the scope of his employment the servant is as much a stranger to his master as any third person. The master is only responsible so long as the servant can be said to be doing the act, in the doing of which he is guilty of negligence, in the course of his employment. A master is not responsible for any act or omission of his servant which is not connected with the business in which he serves him, and does not happen in the course of his employment. And in determining whether a particular act is done in the course of the servant's employment, it is proper first to inquire whether the servant was at the time engaged in serving his master. If the act be done while the servant is at liberty from the service and pursuing his own ends exclusively, the master is not responsible. If the servant was, at the time when the injury was inflicted, acting for himself and as his own master pro tempore, the master is not liable. If the servant step aside from his master's business, for however short a time, to do an act not connected with such business, the relation of master and servant is for the time suspended. Such, variously expressed, is the uniform doctrine laid down by all authorities" -- citing 2 Thompson, Neg. 885, 886; Shear. & R. Neg. §§ 62, 63; Cooley, Torts, 533, et seq.; Little Miami v. Wetmore, 19 Oh. St. 110; Storey v. Ashton, L.R. 4 Q.B. 476; Mitchell v. Crassweller, 13 C.B. 237; McClenaghan v. Brock, 5 Rich. Law, 17. The doctrine laid down in that case has been followed in all subsequent cases in this court where the question has been presented (Campbell v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 51 Minn. 488, 53 N.W. 768; Mouso v. A.N. Kellogg Newspaper Co., 58 Minn. 406, 59 N.W. 941), and is fully in harmony with the general trend of the authorities elsewhere (4 Mich. L. Rev. 199). The late cases on the subject are cited in 4 Current Law, 609.

A reference to a few of the decisions of other courts may not, in view of the earnestness with which counsel for plaintiff presented his case on the oral argument, be out of place. The proper application of the doctrine is illustrated by the following cases.

In Clancy v. Barker, 131 F. 161, 66 C.C.A. 469, 69 L.R.A. 653, a hotel servant, while off duty, negligently or wilfully discharged a pistol in the office of the hotel, injuring a guest. The court held the hotel proprietor not liable, basing the decision upon the general rule that the master is not liable for the negligent or wrongful acts of his servant when not committed in the course of his employment.

In Cavanagh v. Dinsmore, 12 Hun, 465, it appeared that plaintiff's intestate was run over and killed by one of defendant's trucks, through the negligence of the driver an employee and servant of the defendant. The driver had delivered merchandise at the office of the company and had been directed to take the truck to the stables and put it up. In proceeding to the stable in compliance with this order, he met another of the defendant's drivers, and at his request and as a personal favor to him, drove in another direction, a mile distant, to deliver a trunk belonging to the other driver. The accident complained of happened while he was thus accommodating that person. It was held that...