Doyle v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 06 October 1884
• Citation: 107 Pa. 20
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
• Parties: Doyle <I>versus</I> Commonwealth <I>ex rel.</I> Davis.

107 Pa. 20

Doyle versus Commonwealth ex rel. Davis.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

May 26, 1884.

October 6, 1884.

May 26, 1884.

Before MERCUR, C. J., GORDON, PAXSON, TRUNKEY, STERRETT, GREEN and CLARK, JJ.

CERTIORARI to the Court of Common Pleas of Warren county: Of January Term, 1884, No. 40.

R.A. Balph (with him D.T. Watson, Ball & Thompson and John Dalzell) for the plaintiff in error. A decree in habeas corpus, remanding the relator to custody is not final, but a decree discharging him from custody is final, and the only redress of the officer is by removing the record to this court for review. The jurisdiction in such case is clear under the general appellate power of this court, and it is also within the express statutory powers conferred by the Act of June 16, 1836, which are to be liberally construed: Beale v. Commonwealth, 25 Pa. St., 22; Commonwealth v. Judges, 3 Binn., 273; Erie Bank v. Brawley, 8 Watts, 530; Halsey v. Trevillo, 6 Watts, 402.

The prisoner being in custody under the writ of attachment issued upon the judgment of a court whose jurisdiction was not questioned, another court of co-ordinate jurisdiction had no power to discharge him, upon the ground that said judgment or attachment was erroneous. A judgment or sentence for contempt of court, where the court had jurisdiction of the defendant and of the subject matter, like any other judgment of the court, cannot be attacked collaterally; it can only be reviewed by the court that pronounced it, or by the superior court; it is binding and final upon all other courts: Passmore Williamson's case, 2 Casey, 9; Commonwealth v. Lecky, 1 Watts, 66; Respublica v. Gaoler, 2 Yeates, 349.

J. M. Stoner (S. P. Johnston and A. B. Force with him), for the defendant in error.—Neither in England nor in the United States is an order of a court upon a writ of habeas corpus the subject of writ of error, certiorari or appeal, unless by express statutory provision. Hurd on Habeas Corpus, book II., chap. 11. There is no such express statute in this state; the general Act of 1836, defining the powers of this court, provide that it shall hear and determine causes removed from the lower courts "in the manner now practised and allowed." The Act of May 22, 1722, § 13, prescribed that the Supreme Court should exercise the jurisdiction and powers thereby granted as fully as the justices of the Courts of Kings Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer at Westminster, or any of them, can or may do." In Russell v. Commonwealth, 1 Penr. & Watts, 82, it was held that an order of the Common Pleas discharging a prisoner upon habeas corpus was not the subject of review by writ of error, and such writ was quashed. The reason is not only because the order is not a final judgment or decree, but because the facts on which it is based are often established by oral testimony, and are not usually made matter of record. Commonwealth v. Crans, 2 Clark's Cases, 441. For this reason the writ of certiorari, which brings up only the record, is even less appropriate than a writ of error, and the writ in this case should be quashed: Commonwealth v. Kryder, 1 Pennypacker, 143; Howe v. State of Mo., 9 Mo. Rep., 690; Bell v. State of Md., 4 Gill, 304; Ex parte Mitchell 1 Lous. Ann., 413; Wade v. Judge, 5 Ala., 130; In Re Perkins, 2 Cal., 424.

Upon the merits, there are several grounds upon which the action of the court below is sustainable. The relator was arrested in Warren county, by a deputy sheriff of Allegheny county. The power of the court of Warren county to award a writ of habeas corpus in such case cannot be questioned. The return showed that he was held under a writ of attachment, issued by an ex-territorial court, which, upon its face, did not show that it had been issued according to the forms of law, as prescribed in Commonwealth v. Snowden, 1 Brewster, 218; Commonwealth v. Newton, 1 Grant, 453. In order to enforce imprisonment under summary conviction, the warrant must be self-sustaining as to jurisdictional requisites. Not only were these absent in this case, but it was shown to the court that the relator was not a party to the cause in which the attachment was issued, but had only been served with a rule to show cause. It is settled that the power of summary conviction for contempt does not exist as to persons not actual parties to the controversy. Allegheny Bank's Appeal, 12 Wr., 328. Further, it was shown that the act alleged to be a contempt was committed out of the jurisdiction of the court of Allegheny county, and that the relator acted therein not in his individual capacity, but as receiver appointed by the Common Pleas of Forest county, and in obedience to the mandate of that court. Had he failed to act as he did, he would have been in contempt of the latter court, and can it be argued that by so acting a foreign court can usurp jurisdiction by sending its officer out of its own county to arrest and carry off the officer of another court without power by the court of the county where he is arrested to protect him? The decree of the Forest county court, appointing the receiver, and directing him to do the act, was at least equally binding on the Warren county court, as was the decree of contempt and the attachment based thereon, of the Allegheny county court. A sheriff's jurisdiction is limited to his own county, except in a few cases especially excepted by Acts of Assembly, and the Contempt Act of June 16, 1836, is not one of these; it does not extend either the power of the court or its officers. If a sheriff, under a writ directed to him, make an arrest out of his own county (except when in fresh pursuit after an escape from his own county) he is a trespasser, and the arrest is void: Avery v. Seely, 3 W. & S., 494; Chase v. Joyce, 4 M. & S., 414; Hammond v. Taylor, 3 B. & A. 408; Commonwealth v. Jailer, 1 Grant, 218; Dan. Ch. Pr., 5th ed., 463.

Mr. Justice STERRETT delivered the opinion of the Court, October 6, 1884.

This contention appears to be the offspring of a jurisdictional conflict between the Court of Common Pleas No. 1 of Allegheny county, and the Court of Common Pleas of Forest county. The subject of controversy between those courts is not now directly before us, but, as explanatory of the present case, a brief reference to some of the facts and circumstances, common to both, may not be amiss.

The relator, S. V. Davis, was appointed receiver by the Court of Common Pleas of Forest county in a partition proceeding pending in that court, between George S. Lacey and wife and the executors of Sarah H. Ford; and in the equity proceeding, pending in the Court of Common Pleas No. 1 of Allegheny county, for the settlement of alleged partnership transactions between the same parties, Samuel Lewis was appointed receiver. A petition was presented by Lewis to the last mentioned court, setting forth, inter alia, that in the discharge of his duties as receiver he was unlawfully obstructed by S. V. Davis and...