Allen v. Southern Ry. Co.

Decision Date25 February 1959
Docket NumberNo. 237,237
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court
Parties, 43 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2652, 36 Lab.Cas. P 65,245 Anna Mae ALLEN et al., Plaintiffs, and Bickett Bass et al., Additional Plaintiffs, v. SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY et al., Defendants.

Blakeney & Alexander, Charlotte, for plaintiffs, appellees.

Schoene & Kramer, Washington, D. C., and J. B. Craighill, Charlotte, for defendant Unions, appellants.

BOBBITT, Justice.

Decision depends upon whether the evidence, considered in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, was sufficient to withstand the motion by defendant Unions for judgment of involuntary nonsuit.

Upon adoption of the Railway Labor Act, 20 May, 1926, 44 Stat. 577, Congress 'made a fresh start toward the peaceful settlement of labor disputes affecting railroads. ' Virginia Ry. Co. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 57 S.Ct. 592, 597, 81 L.Ed 789. This Act, as amended, is now codified as 45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. The basic principle underlying this Act is embodied in these provisions: 'Employees shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing. The majority of any craft or class of employees shall have the right to determine who shall be the representative of the craft or class for the purposes of this chapter.' 45 U.S.C.A. § 152, Fourth. In the case cited, the Supreme Court of the United States sustained the constitutionality of the Railway Labor Act, both under the commerce clause and as to the Fifth Amendment, in relation to the requirement that the carrier treat exclusively with the employees' duly chosen bargaining representative.

Defendant Unions, duly chosen as such by the majority, are the exclusive bargaining representatives of all employees of the respective crafts or classes to which plaintiffs belong. Under the collective bargaining agreements between defendant Unions and Southern, plaintiffs acquire and have the same rights in respect of seniority, rates of pay, rules, working conditions, etc., under their employment by Southern, as Southern's employees who become and are members of defendant Unions by their free choice.

The validity of the union shop agreement of February 27, 1953, depends solely upon the authority granted by the Union Shop Amendment to the Railway Labor Act. Act of Congress, January 10, 1951, 64 Stat. 1238, 45 U.S.C.A. § 152, Eleventh, hereafter called Union Shop Amendment. The agreement contains provisions expressly authorized by the Union Shop Amendment.

Absent the Union Shop Amendment, the union shop agreement would be void under the North Carolina 'Right to Work' Act, Session Laws of 1947, Ch. 328, G.S. § 95-78 et seq.

In Hudson v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 242 N.C. 650, 89 S.E.2d 441, certiorari denied, 351 U.S. 949, 76 S.Ct. 844, 100 L.Ed. 1473, the action was to restrain the carrier and the unions from entering into a proposed union shop agreement as permitted, but not required, by the Union Shop Amendment. Plaintiffs therein based their case primarily upon the North Carolina 'Right to Work' Act. The constitutional questions now raised were not presented.

In Hudson [242 N.C. 650, 89 S.E.2d 444], it was noted that the North Carolina 'Right to Work' Act superseded the common law rule approved by this Court in State v. Van Pelt, 136 N.C. 633, 49 S.E. 177, 68 L.R.A. 760, 1 Ann.Cas. 495. The North Carolina 'Right to Work' Act was recognized as valid and in full force and effect 'except to the extent Congress, in enacting labor legislation related to interstate commerce, has pre-empted the field'; and that the Union Shop Amendment, which relates only to labor relations between carriers and their employees, was in conflict with and superseded the North Carolina 'Right to Work' Act. Reference to the opinion will disclose the several questions then considered and discussed.

Prior to Hudson, the Supreme Court of Nebraska decided Hanson v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 160 Neb. 669, 71 N.W.2d 526, 545, an action to restrain the carrier and the unions from putting into effect provisions of union shop agreements containing provisions expressly authorized by the Union Shop Amendment.

For reasons fully set forth by Justice Wenke, the Supreme Court of Nebraska held that the enforcement of contract provisions authorized by the Union Shop Amendment would deprive plaintiffs of specific constitutional rights, to wit: (1) '* * * the freedom of association, the freedom to join or not to join in association with others for whatever purposes such association is lawfully organized, * * *' guaranteed by the First Amendment; and (2) due process of law, guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, in that, by requiring an employee who does not desire to join a union to pay initiation fees, dues and assessments, such employee 'is required to pay for many things besides the cost of collective bargaining,' that is, 'all of the varied objects and undertakings in which such labor organizations are or may become engaged. ' The opinion states: '* * * it is apparent that some of these labor organizations advocate political ideas, support political candidates, and advance national economic concepts which may or may not be of an employee's choice.'

In Hudson, we expressly reserved the constitutional questions decided by the Supreme Court of Nebraska.

In Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 76 S.Ct. 714, 100 L.Ed. 1112, the United States Supreme Court reversed the Nebraska decision. Plaintiffs, citing Looper v. Georgia, Southern & Florida Railway Co., 213 Ga. 279, 99 S.E.2d 101, contend the questions now presented were not decided but reserved. Defendant Unions contend the identical questions were considered and decided. If the contention of defendant Unions is correct, the decision of the United States Supreme Court, referred to hereafter as Hanson, controls.

Mr. Justice Douglas, referring to the decision of the Supreme Court of Nebraska, said [351 U.S. 355, 76 S.Ct. 717]: 'It held that the union shop agreement violates the First Amendment in that it deprives the employees of their freedom of association and violates the Fifth Amendment in that it requires the members to pay for many things besides the cost of collective bargaining. The Nebraska Supreme Court, therefore, held that there is no valid federal law to supersede the 'right to work' provision of the Nebraska Constitution.'

Before considering further what was decided in Hanson, an analysis of plaintiffs' action seems appropriate.

Plaintiffs have made no tender of dues, initiation fees or assessments. The Hudson and Hanson decision determined adversely to plaintiffs the cause of action originally alleged. See Allen v. Southern Ry. Co., D.C., 114 F.Supp. 72. All original defendants were restrained by interlocutory orders until February 1, 1957, on the basis of facts originally alleged. Allegations that enforcement of the union shop agreement would deprive them of constitutional rights guaranteed by the First, Fifth and Ninth Amendments were first made in amendment to complaint filed February 1, 1957; and on the basis of these new allegations all original defendants were restrained by interlocutory order until the trial at April Term, 1958.

Whatever the legal relationship between plaintiffs, a minority of the employees of their respective crafts or classes, and defendant Unions, their duly chosen collective bargaining representatives, such relationship is involuntary on the part of plaintiffs. They do not want defendant Unions to represent them. They do not want to become members of defendant Unions. They do not want to pay any amount as dues, initiation fees or assessments. Finally, if required to pay any amount, they insist that no part thereof shall be used, directly or indirectly, except for purposes reasonably necessary or related to collective bargaining. In short, they are completely at cross-purposes with defendant Unions.

Plaintiffs' cause of action, under amended complaint, proceeds on the premise that if plaintiffs can show that defendant Unions use any portion of the dues, initiation fees or assessments, directly or indirectly, for any purpose not reasonably necessary and related to collective bargaining, the enforcement of the union shop agreement should be restrained until such time as defendant Unions establish precisely what portion of the dues, etc., is used solely for purposes reasonably necessary and related to collective bargaining. The trial proceeded, issues were submitted and judgment entered in accordance with plaintiffs' said premise.

The judgment, based on the jury's findings, restrained the enforcement of the union shop agreement until such time as defendant Unions establish 'what portion of the periodic dues, initiation fees and assessments, which they desire to collect from the plaintiffs, will be reasonably necessary and related to collective bargaining between the defendant Union and plaintiffs' employer, * * *.' At the contemplated further hearing, the determination of what expenditures by defenant Unions are reasonably necessary or related to collective bargaining is not limited to expenditures for uses challenged in the amended complainti.

It is noted that the judgment is determinative only as between named plaintiffs and defendant Unions. If persons hereafter employed by Southern should seek similar relief, their status must be determined in subsequent actions.

Considering the testimony and documents in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there was evidence tending to establish the facts narrated below.

The Brotherhood of Railway Clerks has in excess of 300,000 members in the United States and Canada. Its organizational structure consists of the Grand Lodge, system boards of adjustment and local lodges. The initiation fee, applicable to members of the Charlotte Local Lodge, is $10, of which $5 is paid to the Grand Lodge; and the dues are $2.25 per month, of which $1 per month is...

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3 cases
  • Hostetler v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court (Maryland)
    • 27 d3 Abril d3 1960
    ...It is not settled what effect the alleged improper use of dues money would have on the Union Shop Agreement. Cf. Allen v. Southern R. Co., 249 N.C. 491, 107 S.E.2d 125, with Looper v. Georgia Southern & Florida R. Co., 213 Ga. 279, 99 S.E.2d 101, and the later opinion in the same case, Inte......
  • Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employes v. Allen, 316
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • 13 d1 Maio d1 1963
    ...bargaining, the injunction would be modified appropriately. On appeal, the Supreme Court of North Carolina reversed, Allen v. Southern R. Co., 249 N.C. 491, 107 S.E.2d 125, holding that judgment for petitioners was required by our decision in Railway Employes' Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225,......
  • Allen v. Southern Ry. Co., 249
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of North Carolina
    • 11 d3 Abril d3 1962
    ...Term 1958. An opinion, delivered by Bobbitt, J., for a majority of the Court was filed at the Spring Term 1959. Allen v. Southern R. R. Co., 249 N.C. 491, 107 S.E.2d 125. That opinion gives an adequate summary of the pleadings, evidence, issues of fact, preliminary proceedings, and judgment......

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