Julian v. Kansas City Star Co.

• Decision Date: 24 December 1907
• Citation: 209 Mo. 35,107 S.W. 496
• Parties: JULIAN v. KANSAS CITY STAR CO.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

107 S.W. 496

209 Mo. 35

JULIAN v. KANSAS CITY STAR CO.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

December 24, 1907.

1. CORPORATIONS — NATURE — RIGHTS — OBLIGATIONS.

A corporation is an artificial being, possessing only the rights granted by the state and bearing the burdens imposed in its charter.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW — EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.

Rev. St. 1899, § 997 [Ann. St. 1906, p. 878], providing that suits against corporations shall be commenced either in the county where the cause of action accrued or in any county where such corporations shall have an office or agent for the transaction of their business, embodied in the chapter relating to corporations, when read in connection with section 971 [Ann. St. 1906, p. 862], declaring that corporations may sue and be sued, is not invalid, as class legislation, because it does not afford to corporations organized under the statutes the protection of the law equal to that afforded an individual by section 562 [Ann. St. 1906, p. 591], providing that suits shall be brought where defendant is a resident either in the county within which he resides or in the county within which plaintiff resides and defendant may be found.

3. CORPORATIONS — ACTIONS — VENUE.

Under Rev. St. 1899, § 997 [Ann. St. 1906, p. 878], in force since 1855, providing that suits against corporations shall be commenced either in the county where the cause of action accrued or in any county where such corporations shall keep an office or agent for the transaction of business, a domestic corporation organized since the adoption of the statute may be sued in the county where the cause of action accrued, though it may not be the county in which it resides or is found, or that in which plaintiff resides.

4. LIBEL — RIGHT OF ACTION.

The right of action for a libel contained in a newspaper accrues wherever the newspaper is publicly circulated by the publisher, though it is published in another county and a publication there first occurs.

5. SAME — JUSTIFICATION.

Since, under the statute, the truth of an alleged libelous article may be shown in justification, the word "false" must be added to the definition of libel as any publication injurious to the reputation of another; citing 5 Words & Phrases, 4116.

6. ACTION — CAUSE OF ACTION — SPLITTING.

The publication of a newspaper containing a libel and the distribution of the newspaper in different counties of the state by the publisher give but one cause of action; there being but one publication.

7. LIBEL — MEANING OF LIBELOUS WORDS — QUESTION FOR JURY.

Where the words in an alleged libel are ambiguous, or where, under the circumstances under which they were used, they are susceptible of a double meaning, the question whether they were used in one sense or the other is for the jury.

8. SAME — EVIDENCE — ADMISSIBILITY.

Where, under the circumstances, words in an alleged libel are susceptible of a double meaning, the evidence of the circumstances thought to give the words a peculiar meaning is competent.

9. SAME — QUESTIONS FOR JURY.

Where the words are on their face susceptible of more than one meaning, the question of their meaning is one of fact, without proof; and where the words, innocent in themselves, may become offensive because of the conditions under which they were uttered, their meaning is one of fact, on proof showing conditions under which they might have a sinister meaning.

10. EVIDENCE — OPINION EVIDENCE — MEANING OF WORDS.

Where alleged libelous words are susceptible of more than one meaning, or where the words, innocent in themselves, may be offensive because of the circumstances under which they were uttered, the testimony of witnesses as to what they understood the words to mean is admissible.

11. SAME — WEIGHT.

The testimony of witnesses in libel as to what they understood alleged libelous words to mean is opinion evidence, and the jury are not bound by it, though they credit the witnesses with honesty.

12. LIBEL — QUESTIONS FOR JURY.

Where words alleged to be libelous are not susceptible of such a construction as will render them libelous, either in themselves or in the light of the circumstances shown, the court should not submit the question of their meaning to the jury.

13. SAME.

A newspaper article, saying of one who had been a member of the Legislature and the chief of police of a city, that he "is remembered * * * as a member of the Legislature who did well in a legislative way, but also as * * * chief of police, of whom a Democratic Senate committee said he is not a proper man for the position. A Democratic Senate removed him and the commissioners who appointed him" — is sufficiently double in its meaning to authorize the court to submit the question of its meaning to the jury, after the admission of evidence of a condition of suspicion in the public mind in reference to the conduct of members of the Legislature and of the testimony of witnesses that they understood the article charged plaintiff with having been corruptly influenced in his official acts as a member of the General Assembly by accepting bribes.

14. SAME — EVIDENCE — WEIGHT — JUSTIFICATION.

In libel for a newspaper article averring that plaintiff had been removed from the office

of chief of police of a city by the state Senate, and that the Senate had evinced its condemnation of plaintiff to such a degree that the commissioners who appointed him were also removed, the evidence showing that plaintiff, by lack of training and experience, was not qualified to fill the office; that after a committee of the state Senate had investigated the police department of the city, and had made its report, the police commissioners who had appointed plaintiff chief of police were not confirmed; that other commissioners were appointed, who were confirmed, and who signified to plaintiff that they wished he would resign, and that he did so; that the commissioners whose appointment failed of confirmation had been appointed by the then Governor in vacation of the Senate; and that his successor, who preferred to make his own selection of commissioners, made new appointments — did not prove justification; and an instruction that justification pleaded had not been established by the evidence was not erroneous.

15. APPEAL — HARMLESS ERROR — ERRONEOUS ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE.

Where, in libel for a newspaper article averring that plaintiff had been removed from the office of chief of police of a city by the state Senate, defendant showed that plaintiff, while chief of police, did not enforce laws, the error, if any, in permitting plaintiff to prove by the police commissioners who succeeded those who appointed him that such laws were not enforced under their administration, because they were unable to do so, was not prejudicial.

16. LIBEL — MITIGATION — PLEADING — SUFFICIENCY.

In libel, based on a newspaper article charging that plaintiff had been removed from the office of chief of police of a city by the state Senate and that the Senate had evinced its condemnation of plaintiff to such a degree that the police commissioners who had appointed him were also removed from office, an answer setting up in mitigation the fact that plaintiff's unfitness for the office had been given wide publicity by articles previously published in another newspaper and that these articles voiced the general opinion then prevailing was properly stricken out; plaintiff's unfitness or lack of qualification for the office not being in question.

17. SAME — EVIDENCE — ADMISSIBILITY.

In libel, based on a newspaper article published in 1903, evidence that the owner of practically all of the stock of the corporation publishing the newspaper had stated to plaintiff about 12 years before that plaintiff would regret his refusal to comply with a certain request, as a newspaper could make and unmake a man, was admissible to show malice; the remoteness of the occurrence going only to the weight of the evidence.

18. SAME.

In libel, based on a newspaper article published in 1903, the admission of evidence of a conversation occurring about 12 years before between plaintiff and a third person to the effect that the third person on plaintiff's refusal to comply with a request stated that plaintiff would regret it, as a newspaper could make and unmake a man, was not erroneous, where subsequent evidence showed that such person was the owner of practically all of the stock of the corporation publishing the newspaper.

19. SAME.

In libel, publications by defendant concerning plaintiff, other than the one made the basis of the action, may be shown to prove malice, especially where the other publications relate to the same subject as the one sued on.

20. SAME.

In libel, based on a newspaper article charging plaintiff with having been removed from the office of chief of police of a city and with having done well as a member of the Legislature, understood to mean that he had received bribes while a member, evidence of other articles, previously published by defendant, criticising adversely plaintiff's appointment to the rank of major in a volunteer regiment in the Spanish-American War, was proper to show malice; the publication sued on and the other publications relating to the alleged unworthiness of plaintiff to hold office.

21. SAME — ABSENCE OF MALICE.

To justify a defamatory article or repel the inference of malice, defendant cannot rely on what others told him and that he believed it; but, where there were any facts within his knowledge at the time the publication was made, the facts may be shown to repel the inference of malice.

22. EVIDENCE — HEARSAY EVIDENCE — STATUTES.

An unauthenticated copy of the testimony of a witness before a committee of the state Senate, not published in the Senate Journal or elsewhere by authority, is hearsay, notwithstanding Rev. St. 1899, § 3091 [Ann. St. 1906, p. 1772], declaring that the printed journal of the Senate and House of Representatives and all public...