Providence School Dept. v. Ana C.
| Decision Date | 06 February 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-2006,96-2006 |
| Citation | 108 F.3d 1 |
| Parties | 116 Ed. Law Rep. 584, 20 A.D.D. 651 PROVIDENCE SCHOOL DEPARTMENT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ANA C., a minor, Defendant-Appellee. . Heard |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
David A. Wollin, with whom Patricia K. Rocha, R. Bart Totten and Adler Pollock & Sheehan Incorporated, were on brief, Providence, RI, for appellant.
Martha McVicker, with whom the Rhode Island Protection and Advocacy System, was on brief, Providence, RI, for appellee.
Before BOUDIN, Circuit Judge, CYR, Senior Circuit Judge, and LYNCH, Circuit Judge.
An impartial review officer, acting under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., found that the Providence School Department owed benefits to a special needs student, Ana C., for parts of the years 1990 through 1992. The School Department sought review in the United States District Court within thirty days of receiving that decision, consistent with the time periods contained in the state Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"). The district court dismissed the claim as untimely, finding that federal law borrowed a different state limitations period, one which uses issuance of a decision, not receipt of a decision, to trigger the thirty day period. 1 We reverse the dismissal.
The essential facts are not in dispute. Ana C., a mentally retarded minor, is entitled to receive special educational services under the IDEA. Ana lived in Providence, Rhode Island from August 1989 to November 1992, and she was entitled to 230 days of special education services per year under the Rhode Island Board of Regents' Regulations Governing the Special Education of Children with Disabilities (the "Regulations").
The School Department did not provide Ana the summer educational services she sought for the summers of 1990, 1991, and a portion of 1992. The School Department conceded in October of 1992 that Ana was entitled to receive a total of 150 days of special education that the Department had previously failed to provide. But when the School Department learned that Ana and her father had moved to West Chester, Pennsylvania in November 1992, it reversed its position, saying that Ana could not receive the 150 days as long as she resided outside of Rhode Island.
Ana sought a hearing. On August 30, 1995, an impartial hearing officer for the Rhode Island Department of Education ("RIDE") decided that, because Ana lived out of state, she could not receive the 150 days. The officer was not an employee of the school district or a member of the school committee, in accordance with 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) and section 7 of the Regulations.
Ana, then age fourteen, appealed the hearing officer's decision pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(c) and section 9 of the Regulations. An impartial review officer reversed. As required by section 10 of the Regulations, that officer was not an employee of the Rhode Island Department of Education or a member of the Rhode Island Board of Regents. His decision, dated January 23, 1996, awarded Ana compensation for 150 days of special education from the Department, despite her Pennsylvania residency.
The review officer's decision was forwarded to the Office of Special Needs of the RIDE and was received on January 26, 1996. The RIDE then forwarded the decision to counsel for Ana and to the School Department. Though the precise date of the forwarding is unclear, the School Department did not receive the decision until February 7, 1996.
The Providence School Department, pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2), filed its complaint challenging the final agency decision in the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island on March 4, 1996. Ana then moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was filed forty-one days after the state review officer issued his decision. This, Ana argued, exceeded the thirty days from issuance allowed by law and was thus untimely.
Accepting the report and recommendation of a United States Magistrate Judge, the district court granted Ana's motion and dismissed the School Department's complaint. Although section 1415(e)(2) does not specify a limitations period, the Supreme Court has directed federal courts to "apply the most closely analogous statute of limitations under state law," DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 2287, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983), so long as "it is not inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so." Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67, 105 S.Ct. 1938,, 1942 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). The magistrate judge had found that the most closely analogous statute was R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-39-3.1 and therefore that the thirty day limitations period had begun to run when the decision was issued on January 23, 1996. 2
The School Department appeals, arguing that the most analogous state limitations statute is the Rhode Island APA, R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-15, under which the thirty day limitations period begins to run from the date of receipt rather than the date of issuance. See Bayview Towing, Inc. v. Stevenson, 676 A.2d 325, 328 (R.I.1996) (). Under that standard, the Department argues, its appeal was timely filed and improperly dismissed.
This case presents a pure issue of law. Our review of a grant of a motion to dismiss is de novo. Glassman v. Computervision Corp., 90 F.3d 617, 623 (1st Cir.1996).
In enacting the IDEA, Congress contemplated that there would be judicial review of the decisions of the review officer, but did not set a statutory time limit during which the petition for judicial review must be brought. Courts have looked to the most analogous statutes of limitations from the laws of the pertinent state, provided that those laws do not conflict with the federal policies inherent in the statute. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 266-67, 105 S.Ct. at 1941-42. In Amann v. Town of Stow, 991 F.2d 929, 931 (1st Cir.1993)(per curiam), this court, in a case involving a special needs child from Massachusetts, held that the Massachusetts APA contains the "most analogous" state law cause of action to the civil action authorized by section 1415(e)(2). In so doing, this court found that Id. at 932 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Amann court also considered whether the short limitations period (thirty days from receipt) was inconsistent with the goals of the IDEA, and concluded that it was not. Id.
For similar reasons, the Rhode Island APA governs the limitations period for judicial review in this case. The Rhode Island APA, like the Massachusetts APA, confines review to the record or, in cases of alleged procedural irregularity, to proof in court of those irregularities. R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-35-15(f). The reviewing court "shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to weight of the evidence on questions of fact." Id. § 42-35-15(g). The court "may reverse or modify the [agency] decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced" in a manner consistent with the usual grounds for reversal on judicial review of an administrative agency. Id. The character of the hearings under both the Rhode Island APA and the IDEA is essentially one of review. Cf. Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207-09, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 3051-52, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982); Burlington v. Department of Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 791 (1st Cir.1984).
The district court focused on the provisions of R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-39-3.1. By its literal terms, that section is not a judicial review provision for an aggrieved party but a finality and enforcement provision for the prevailing party where no review was available or was sought:
Enforcement of final decisions--All final decisions made after a hearing by the commissioner of elementary and secondary education or the board of regents for elementary and secondary education, and which are not subject to further judicial or administrative review, shall be enforceable by mandamus or any other suitable civil action in the superior court for Providence County at the request of any interested party. All such decisions of the commissioner and board shall become final if judicial or further administrative review is not properly sought within thirty (30) days of their issuance.
Id. § 16-39-3.1.
Even assuming that section 16-39-3.1 is a judicial review provision, this section of Rhode Island law is not the most analogous to the federal scheme. The decision at issue was made by an impartial review officer (not by one of the officials listed). See Regulations § 10 (); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(2) (). The decision was also subject to further judicial or administrative review.
As a matter of federal law, the administrative decision here is more similar to those governed by section 16-39-4, which expressly states that any aggrieved party may obtain judicial review "as provided in chapter 35 of title 42." Chapter 35 of title 42 is the Rhode Island APA. Chapter 39 itself is concerned with "[p]arties having any matter of dispute between them arising under any law relating to schools or education." R.I. Gen. Laws § 16-39-1. The federal district court for the district of Rhode Island had previously noted that section 16-39-4...
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