Thayer v. Finton

Citation15 N.E. 615,108 N.Y. 394
PartiesTHAYER v. FINTON.
Decision Date28 February 1888
CourtNew York Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from general term, supreme court, Fifth department.

M. A. Leary, for appellant.

Charles S. Baker, for appellee.

RUGER, C. J.

The question in this case involves the title to a parcel of land said to contain about nine acres, in the town of Barrington in this state, and depends for its solution upon the construction of the description contained in a deed dated April, 1864, given by Samuel and Ann Maria Thayer to Stephen Eggleston. The plaintiff claims as tenant by the curtesy through his wife, Ann Maria Thayer, alleging that the lot was not transferred by the deed referred to; and the defendant asserts title thereto under a deed from Eggleston, plaintiff's grantee, which did describe the premises, and was given in 1867. It was held by the court at circuit that the deed to Eggleston did not describe the lot in question, and therefore did not convey title to the grantee. Upon appeal to the general term that court reversed the judgment, and ordered a new trial; holding the description in the deed indicated an intention of the parties to pass title to the nine-acre lot. Previous to this conveyance, Ann M. Thayer, the wife of plaintiff, owned and occupied three parcels of land theretofore purchased by her from Peter Coons and his wife. Two of these lots adjoined, and constituted an improved and cultivated farm of about eighty-eight acres of land, as appeared from a subsequent measurement; and the third parcel is the lot in dispute, and was a wild, uninclosed, and uncultivated wood lot, situated at a distance from the other lands, and containing, as afterwards appeared, about nine acres of land. The description contained in the deed read as follows: ‘All that tract or parcel of land situate in the town of Barrington aforesaid, and bounded as follows: On the north by lands of William Thayer; on the east by lands of Maryette Bain; on the south by lands of Benjamin F. Freeman, John Rinehart, and Abraham Ferris, and on the west by the Crooked lake, containing ninety-five acres and one-half acre of land, be the same more or less, being the same premises now in the occupation of the party of the first part, in Barrington aforesaid, and conveyed by Peter Coons and Jane A., his wife, to the said Ann Maria Thayer of the first part.’

It is not claimed on the part of the defendant that the boundaries contained in the deed do not describe a parcel of land clearly and certainly ascertainable, or that the land in dispute is embraced in such boundaries; but it is argued that from the quantity of land mentioned, and the circumstance that it is stated to be land conveyed by Peter Coons and wife to Ann Maria Thayer, it may be inferred that it was the intention of the parties to convey the wood lot as well as the lands described. We are constrained to think that such a claim is untenable, under the established rules of construction applying to conveyances of real estate. While it is the settled rule that such conveyances shall be construed so as to carry into effect the intent of the parties so far as such intent can be collected from the whole instrument, it is equally well settled that nothing will pass by a deed except what is described in it, whatever the intention of the parties may have been. Coleman v. Manhattan Beach Co., 94 N. Y. 229. The question here presented is whether the parties intended to embrace the wood lot in the description given, or whether, having given a precise and definite description of land, the court is authorized, from the inconclusive and indefinite language following the description, to infer an intention to convey another distinct parcel of land not referred to, and lying at a distance from that described, and confessedly not included within the boundaries given. The rule, as stated in the head-note of Jones v. Smith, 73 N. Y. 205, seems to be of controlling force in the disposition of this question. It is there said: ‘When a deed contains an accurate description by permanent boundaries capable of being ascertained, a general reference, in addition, to the premises as in the possession of the grantor or grantee will not pass title to lands outside of the...

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24 cases
  • Warner v. Marshall
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • October 6, 1905
    ...deed, or the local situation of the property, or the possession enjoyed, to modify the application of this rule.” See Thayer v. Finton, 108 N. Y. 394, 15 N. E. 615. The words concerning value, which are found in the letter of August 1st, do not, however, create the difficulty which counsel ......
  • Warner v. Marshall
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • October 6, 1905
    ... ... property, or of the possession enjoyed, to modify the ... application of this rule." See Thayer v ... Finton (1888), 108 N.Y. 394, 15 N.E. 615 ...          The ... words concerning value which are found in the letter of ... ...
  • Gorham v. Settegast
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • November 21, 1906
    ...Sup.] 26 S. W. 1071; Dull v. Blum, 68 Tex. 299, 4 S. W. 489; Harris v. Shafer, 86 Tex. 315, 23 S. W. 979, 24 S. W. 263; Thayer v. Finton, 108 N. Y. 394, 15 N. E. 615; Coleman v. Manhattan Beach Co., 94 N. Y. 229; Jones v. Smith, 73 N. Y. 205; Andrew v. Watkins, 26 Fla. 390, 7 South. 876; Ma......
  • Idaho Gold-Mining Co. v. Union Mining & Milling Co.
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • December 12, 1896
    ... ... (Warvelle on Vendors, 373, 374; Jones ... v. Smith, 73 N.Y. 205; Tyler v. Hammond, 11 ... Pick. (Mass.) 193, and notes, 212; Thayer v. Finton, ... 108 N.Y. 394, 15 N.E. 615; Brunswick Savings Inst. v ... Crossman, 76 Me. 577; Tiedman on Real Property, sec ... 827, p. 663, ... ...
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