In re Application of Devoe Manuf'g Co. for a Writ of Prohibition.

• Decision Date: 07 May 1883
• Citation: 27 L.Ed. 764,108 U.S. 401,2 S.Ct. 894
• Parties: In re Application of DEVOE MANUF'G CO. for a Writ of Prohibition. *
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

108 U.S. 401

2 S.Ct. 894

27 L.Ed. 764

In re Application of DEVOE MANUF'G CO. for a Writ

of Prohibition.^*

May 7, 1883.

[Syllabus from page 401 intentionally omitted]

[Statement of Case from page 401 intentionally omitted]

H. J. Scudder, for petitioner.

[Argument of Counsel from pages 401-403 intentionally omitted] Franklin A. Wilcox, in opposition.

BLATCHFORD, J.

The question involved in this case is as to the territorial jurisdiction of the district court of the United States for the district of New Jersey. In April, 1882, a libel in admiralty, in personam, for damages growing out of a collision, was filed in that court against the Devoe Manufacturing Company, a New York corporation. In October, 1882, process was issued by the court to the marshal, commanding him to cite the respondent if it should be found in the district, and, if it could not be there found, to attach its goods and chattels within the district. On this process the marshal seized a tug belonging to the corporation and made return that he had attached the tug, as its property. At the time of the seizure the tug was afloat in the Kill van Kull, between Staten island and New Jersey, at the end of a dock at Bayonne, New Jersey, at a place at least 300 feet below high-water mark and nearly the same distance below low-water mark, and about half a mile from the entrance of the Kill into the bay of New York, and was fastened to the dock by means of a line or fastening running from the tug and attached to piles on the dock, and was lying close up to the dock. The respondent, insisting that the tug, when seized, was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the eastern district of New York, and not within the jurisdiction of the district of New Jersey, applied to the court to set aside the service of the process. The court denied the application, holding that the tug, being, when seized, fastened to a wharf or pier on the western side of the Kill van Kull, was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the district of New Jersey. The respondent now applies to this court to issue a writ of prohibition to the district court, restraining it from exercising the jurisdiction so asserted.

By section 2 of the act of September 24, 1789, 'to establish the judicial courts of the United States,' (1 St. at Large, p. 73, c. 20,) the United States were divided 'into 13 districts, to be limited and called as follows: * * * one to consist of the state of New York, and to be called New York district; one to consist of the state of New Jersey, and to be called New Jersey district;' and, by section 3, a court called a district court was created in each of said districts, and, by section 9, exclusive original cognizance was given to such district courts of all civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, within their respective districts. By these provisions the territorial limits of the respective states of New York and New Jersey were made the territorial limits of the respective judicial districts of New York and New Jersey.

By section 1 of the act of April 9, 1814, (3 St. at Large, p. 120, c. 49,) it was enacted that the state of New York 'shall be and the same is hereby divided into two districts, in manner following, to-wit, the counties of Rensselaer, Albany, Schenectady, Schoharie, and Delaware, together with all that part of the said state lying south of the said above-mentioned counties, shall compose one district, to be called the southern district of New York; and all the remaining part of the said state shall compose another district, to be called the northern district of New York.' By virtue of this act all that part of the state of New York which was bounded on the line between New York and New Jersey fell within the southern district of New York. The boundary line between the states still formed the boundary line of jurisdiction between the districts.

By section 3 of the act of April 3, 1818, (3 St. at Large, p. 414, c. 32,) the counties of Albany, Rensselaer, Schenectady, Schoharie, and Delaware were transferred from the southern district of New York to the northern district of New York, but the boundaries of the southern district of New York were otherwise not altered.

A dispute existed for a long time between the states of New York and New Jersey respecting the boundary line between them as to property and jurisdiction. The history and circumstances of this dispute, some particulars of which are to be found in the reports of the cases of State v. Babcock, 1 Vroom, 29; People v. Central Railroad Co. of New Jersey, 42 N. Y. 283; and Hall v. Devoe Manuf'g Co. 14 Fed. Rep. 183, are not material to the determination of this case, in the view we take of it, any further than to show what was the subject-matter of the dispute. For the purpose of having it settled, the state of New Jersey filed a bill in equity in this court against the state of New York, in February, 1829. That bill sets forth the patent of March 12, 1664, from Charles the Second to the duke of York; the conveyance of lease and release by the duke of York, of June 24, 1664, to Lord Berkeley and Sir George Carteret, of land constituting the state of New Jersey; the division of the land, by various conveyances, into East New Jersey and West New Jersey; its settlement and the institution of proprietary governments therein, which continued until May, 1702, when the proprietors surrendered their right of government to Queen Anne; and the union of the two divisions into one province and government, under the crown of England, which continued until July 4, 1776. The bill sets forth——

That the Hudson river was, by the said grants, the dividing boundary between New Jersey and New York; and New Jersey was bounded on her eastern shores by the waters formed by the confluence of the Hudson and East rivers, and also by the waters of Staten Island sound, or Kill van Kull, or Arthur Kull, which sound is distinct from Hudson river or bay; that soon after the grant to Berkeley and Carteret the inhabitants of East New Jersey proceeded to use the waters of the Hudson and sound adjoining the New Jersey shore for the purposes of fishing, navigation, wharfing, and other purposes, and erected docks and piers at Jersey City and Hoboken, and on the shores of the Hudson, and far beyond low-water mark, without interruption from the inhabitants or public authorities of New York; and the citizens of New Jersey had always exercised full and absolute right and enjoyment over the river Hudson and the other adjoining waters to the midway or channel thereof, and also a common right of navigation and use over the whole of the river and dividing waters in common with the state of New York; that by the fair construction of the said grants, and by the principles of public law, New Jersey is entitled to the exclusive jurisdiction and property of and over the waters of the Hudson river from the forty-first degree of latitude to the bay of New York, to the filum aquce, or middle of the river, and to the midway or channel of the bay of New York, and the whole of Staten Island sound, together with the land covered by the water of the river, bay, and sound, in the like extent; that while the said two states were colonies, New York became wrongfully possessed of Staten island and the other small islands in the dividing waters between the two states; that the possession thus acquired by New York had been since acquiesced in, New York insisting that her possession of said islands had established her title; that New York has no other pretense of title to said islands but adverse possession; that, as such possession has been uniformly confined in its exercise to the fast land thereof, the title of New Jersey to the whole waters of the Staten Island sound remains clear and absolute in New Jersey, according to the terms of said grants; that, though the people of the state of New York formerly recognized the rights and jurisdiction of New Jersey as so set forth, they had lately asserted an absolute and exclusive right of property, jurisdiction, and sovereignty over all the waters of the Hudson river and bay and Staten Island sound, and that quite up to high-water mark on the New Jersey shore, and, by late public statutes, had extended the west lines of her counties lying opposite to New Jersey, on the east side of the Hudson river, to the west bank of the river, and had enforced the said unjust pretension by enacting that penalties should be imposed on any person who should execute, or attempt to execute, civil or criminal process on any part of the dividing waters by virtue of any other authority than her own laws; that, under color of said statutes, her officers had occasionally executed process on the west side of Hudson river, and on the wharves so erected on the west bank of the river, within the territory and jurisdiction of New Jersey; that New York pretends that all that part of said tract of country granted to the duke of York, and which he did not convey to Berkeley and Carteret, remained in him; that no part of Hudson river was granted to Berkeley and Carteret; and that, when New York became an independent state, all the said domain of the duke of York, with the Hudson river and the other dividing waters, vested in full propriety and sovereignty in New York; and that New York has always* claimed and possessed the same accordingly; that New Jersey insists that, in the grants to Berkeley and Carteret, the equal use and property of the river Hudson and sound is expressly and in terms conveyed to them; and, accordingly, Berkeley and Carteret and their grantees and assigns before the revolution, and New Jersey, as one of the United States, since the revolution, had always claimed, exercised, occupied, and enjoyed right, title, and jurisdiction, as well over the territory as the waters of Hudson river and bay, equal in extent to those used and exercised by New York; that the citizens of New Jersey, both before and since...