Crossman v. Bacon & Robinson Co.

• Decision Date: 29 March 1920
• Citation: 109 A. 487
• Parties: CROSSMAN v. BACON & ROBINSON CO. et al.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

109 A. 487

CROSSMAN

v. BACON & ROBINSON CO. et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

March 29, 1920.

Exceptions, and On Motion from Supreme Judicial Court, Penobscot County at Law.

Action by Walter B. Crossman against the Bacon & Robinson Company and others. Verdict for plaintiff, and defendants bring exceptions and move for a new trial. Exceptions sustained.

Argued before SPEAR, HANSON, PHILBROOK, MORRILL, WILSON, and DEASY, JJ.

H. J. Chapman and H. J. Preble, both of Bangor, and Pattangall & Locke, of Augusta, for plaintiff.

L. C. Stearus and Byder & Simpson, all of Bangor, for defendants.

SPEAR, J. The plaintiff in his brief states the case as follows:

"This is an action for deceit, in which the plaintiff seeks to recover from his former business associates for taking advantage of his alleged defective mental condition and purchasing his half interest in the business for less than its fair value, the measure of damages claimed being the difference between the fair value of plaintiff's half interest in the business and the amount which defendants paid him. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, * * * and in answer to questions propounded by the Chief Justice, presiding, found that on the dates when the plaintiff signed the instrument accomplishing the transfer of his interest he did not then have sufficient mental capacity to transact that particular business with intelligent understanding of what he was doing and a rational judgment in relation thereto.

"Defendants bring the case to this court on motion in the usual form, and exceptions to the refusal of the chief justice to direct a verdict for the defendants."

Conceding that the verdict could be allowed to stand upon the questions of mental capacity and the amount of damages we then have left the real issue in the case. Can an action of deceit, as a matter of law, be sustained upon the testimony? Upon this issue it is not necessary to consider the testimony at any length. It is conceded that the defendant made no affirmative representations. Nor did it solicit the purchase of the property. The plaintiff said:

"Q. Where did you first discuss with Mr. Robinson, if at all, the proposition of selling out your interest in the property? A. Well, some time when I was to the island. One day I can remember that I said to him: 'Give me $5,000 and you can have all I got. Let me go. I thought they were after me.'"

With reference to a later conversation with Robinson the plaintiff testified:

"He said to me at that time, 'I would give it to you quick enough, but you ain't fit to do business. It wouldn't stand law.'"

Mr. Robinson upon this phase of the case testified as follows:

"He said, 'I have decided to leave Bangor, and I want you to take my interest in this business.' * * * 'Now,' I said, 'Walter I don't want to buy out your interest in this business. I want you to stay. * * * This is Saturday. You go home; you think it over, and on Monday morning when you come to the office I will ask you whether you have decided to stay or sell, and I want you to say that you have decided to stay.'"

This evidence discloses the inception, the object, and the spirit of this transaction. Instead of leading the plaintiff on to sell, the defendant discouraged him, but was importuned to buy.

The plaintiff contends that this evidence, coupled with the fact that the plaintiff was incompetent to do business, and that the amount paid was inadequate, brings the case within the form of an action for deceit as defined in this state.

It is the opinion of the court that this contention cannot be sustained.

A careful examination of the able brief of the plaintiff presents no decision or principle of law that can be regarded as a precedent for the form of action in the present case. The lack of precedent has been frequently held to be a strong argument against innovation, especially in making judicial made changes in the forms of action. In Anthony v. Slaid, 11 Mete. (Mass.) 290, in an opinion by Chief Justice Shaw, it is said:

"That there is no precedent for such an action, where there must have been many occasions for bringing it, if maintainable, is a strong argument against it." Wellington v. Small, 3 Cush. (Mass.) 148. 50 Am. Dec. 719; Lamb v. Stone, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 527.

But the plaintiff invokes the old and wise maxim that, in law, for every wrong there is a remedy. It is equally old and wise that there are prescribed forms of procedure. Unless the established rules of pleading and practice are observed, confusion and uncertainty would take the place of intelligible and orderly procedure. With respect to this rule, our court have said in Flanders v. Cobb, 88 Me. 488, 34 Atl 277, 51 Am. St. Rep. 410:

"The remedies and forms of actions which have been afforded to parties, and which have been sanctioned by long usage and approved by the highest authorities, should be adhered to, and it is not the province of this court, upon the reason of supposed convenience or occasional hardship, to dispense with them, and to substitute one for another, varying the rights of one or both of the parties."

This decision, which is the well settled law under our mode of procedure, is directly applicable to the law and facts in the case at bar. The action of deceit is as old as the jurisdiction of the state and as well defined as any form of action known to...