Nicholas v. Miller
| Decision Date | 21 July 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 96 Civ. 4249(WK).,96 Civ. 4249(WK). |
| Citation | 109 F.Supp.2d 152 |
| Parties | Jason B. NICHOLAS, Plaintiff, v. Thomas J. MILLER, Robert Hanslmaier, and New York State Department of Correctional Services, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Martin L. Zerwitz, Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP, New York, NY, Jason B. Nicholas, Warwick, NY, for Plaintiff.
Nicola N. Grey, Office of the Attorney General, State of New York, New York, NY, for Defendant.
We assume familiarity with the background information set forth in the prior decisions in this matter of this Court and the Court of Appeals. See Nicholas v. Miller (2d Cir.1999) 189 F.3d 191.
Plaintiff Jason Nicholas (hereinafter "plaintiff") sued defendant New York State Department of Corrections (hereinafter "defendant" or "DOCS") to establish an authorized Prisoners' Legal Defense Center (hereinafter the "Center") where he is incarcerated.1 We granted summary judgment to defendant and denied plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief as moot. The Second Circuit remanded, ruling that the evidentiary record as of June 1999 contained material disputes of fact. Id. at 195. Defendant in its appearances before us has done nothing to put that finding in doubt. We therefore deny its motion for summary judgment.
Turning to plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, we have held a two-day hearing, including the testimony of several witnesses. We have also considered affidavits and memoranda of law. For the reasons stated below, we deny plaintiff's motion, for which this opinion and order will constitute our findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Plaintiff's proposed Center would engage in three kinds of activities: First, as a group and using organizational stationery, it would disseminate information to the public and the media regarding legal issues of importance to prisoners. For example, the Center possibly would publish a newsletter reviewing such issues and addressing prison policy. It would, in appropriate cases, lobby for prison reform.
Additionally, the Center would engage in "impact litigation," i.e., prosecute select prisoner lawsuits of relatively wide significance. Finally, it would educate the local inmate population, allowing prisoners to assemble, discuss their views, and attempt to arrive at a consensus. It would invite speakers, hold paralegal training classes, and perhaps publish handbooks and pamphlets. Incidentally, the organization would raise money and would thus, according to plaintiff, need no other financial assistance.
DOCS proffers two justifications for rejecting the Center. First, DOCS argues that the Center will duplicate existing services. DOCS currently permits plaintiff and the other inmates individually to contact the media and the government, and to research the law and file suits with the assistance of the law library staff. But, since DOCS refuses to approve the Center as an authorized organization, plaintiff cannot now associate with other inmates to engage in these activities on a group basis, which entails a distinct kind of expression.2 We therefore shall not consider this DOCS argument for present purposes.
Second, DOCS argues that the Center might generate a significant security risk. It asserts that since the Center will engage in activities of an adversarial nature, particularly belligerent prisoners may use the Center as a way to incite violence, anti-authoritarian behavior, or extortion. We shall consider the merits of this contention.
A preliminary injunction constitutes an extraordinary remedy which should not be routinely granted. Pride v. Community Sch. Bd. (2d Cir.1973) 482 F.2d 257, 264. Someone seeking a preliminary injunction normally must demonstrate (1) a material threat of irreparable injury and (2) either a likelihood of success on the merits or (2) the existence of serious questions going to the merits as to make the case a fair ground for litigation and that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in favor of the movant. See, e.g., Cherry River Music Co. v. Simitar Entertainment, Inc., 38 F.Supp.2d 310 (S.D.N.Y.1999) (citations omitted).
Were plaintiff's request for an injunction to sustain the status quo, we would begin by assuming a material threat of irreparable harm, see Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (), since the Second Circuit has ruled that plaintiff's claimed violation of his associational rights has "an arguable basis in law." Nicholas, 189 F.3d at 193. Moreover, our present ruling denying defendant's summary judgment motion establishes the existence of serious questions going to the merits.
However, we apply a higher standard in cases, such as the instant one, where the injunction would alter the status quo. Such a "mandatory" injunction should issue "only upon a clear showing that the moving party is entitled to the relief requested" in the complaint, or "where extreme or very serious damage will result from a denial of preliminary relief." Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entertainment, Inc. (2d Cir.1995) 60 F.3d 27, 34 (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Cherry River Music Co., 38 F.Supp.2d at 316 & n. 46.
Plaintiff correctly notes that on this motion, defendant has the burden of production - i.e., to advance rationales for denying the Center that bear a reasonable relationship to a legitimate penological interest. Yet the burden of proof remains on plaintiff to show that the regulation is clearly unreasonable. Giano v. Senkowski (2d Cir.1995) 54 F.3d 1050, 1054 (citations omitted). Plaintiff has not met his burden here.
The Supreme Court has declared that, "When a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). The Turner Court set forth a four-part test to determine the reasonableness of such regulations:
First, there must be a "valid, rational connection" between the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put forward to justify it.... Moreover, the governmental objective must be a legitimate and neutral one....
A second factor ... is whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to prison inmates....
A third consideration is the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally....
Finally, the absence of ready alternatives is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation.
Id. at 89-90, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (citations omitted).
We must apply a deferential standard of review to challenges to prison regulations because "courts are ill equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform." Id. at 84, 107 S.Ct. 2254.
[T]he problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptible of resolution by decree. Running a prison is an inordinately difficult undertaking that requires expertise, planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches ... Where a state penal system is involved, federal courts have ... additional reason to accord deference to the appropriate prison authorities.
Id. at 84-85, 107 S.Ct. 2254 (citations omitted).
On the other hand, the Supreme Court did not intend Turner's reasonableness analysis to be "toothless." Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 414, 109 S.Ct. 1874, 104 L.Ed.2d 459 (1989). We should not adopt prison officials' rationales unthinkingly, especially since these officials have every incentive to "err on the side of too little freedom." Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc. (1977) 433 U.S. 119, 142, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
As the Court of Appeals intimated, plaintiff has by no means established that there clearly exists an associational right under the First Amendment for prisoners to organize for the adversarial functions that plaintiff demands. See Nicholas, 189 F.3d at 195. The Turner Court "refined the standard of review for all prison regulations that impinge on inmates' constitutional rights." Id. at 194 (our emphasis). Yet "implicit in the Turner approach is the principle that [its] four-factor analysis applies only after it is determined that the policy impinges on a first amendment right." Ali v. Dixon (4th Cir.1990) 912 F.2d 86, 89; see Turner, 482 U.S. at 95-100, 107 S.Ct. 2254 () (citation omitted).
In making its initial inquiry, the Turner Court — and the Second Circuit in the case at bar and elsewhere — continue to find guidance from an earlier precedent stating that a prisoner's associational rights are perforce significantly curtailed by his or her "status as a prisoner" and the "operational realities of a prison." Jones, 433 U.S. at 125-26, 97 S.Ct. 2532, cited in Turner, 482 U.S. at 86-89, 90, 92, 107 S.Ct. 2254; Nicholas, 189 F.3d at 194; Giano, 54 F.3d at 1052-53; Allen v. Coughlin (2d Cir.1995) 64 F.3d 77, 79.
One Third Circuit opinion did order a preliminary injunction against the disbanding of a prisoner organization called the Inmate Legal Association ("ILA") that provided high quality paralegal...
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