Patterson Oil Terminals v. The Port Covington, 149 of 1949.

• Decision Date: 29 September 1952
• Docket Number: No. 149 of 1949.,149 of 1949.
• Citation: 109 F. Supp. 953
• Parties: PATTERSON OIL TERMINALS, Inc. v. THE PORT COVINGTON. THE GIRARD POINT.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania

109 F. Supp. 953

PATTERSON OIL TERMINALS, Inc. v. THE PORT COVINGTON.

THE GIRARD POINT.

No. 149 of 1949.

United States District Court E. D. Pennsylvania.

September 29, 1952.

Benjamin F. Stahl, Jr., and Clark, Ladner, Fortenbaugh & Young, Philadelphia, Pa., for libellant.

Rawle & Henderson, Philadelphia, Pa., for respondents Curtis Bay Towing Co. and Tugs Girard Point and Port Covington.

Krusen, Evans & Shaw, Philadelphia, Pa., for respondent Black Diamond S.S. Corp.

KIRKPATRICK, Chief Judge.

This is an action to recover damages resulting from a collision between the S.S. Creighton Victory and a dolphin belonging to the libellant, located 175 feet upriver from the libellant's loading dock on the Delaware River at Billingsport, New Jersey. The accident occurred as the vessel, assisted by two tugs, was maneuvering under her own power into the berth at the end of the dock. The time was 12:20 P.M. on a clear but windy day in February and there were no other vessels anywhere near the place.

"When a moving vessel strikes a stationary object, such as a wharf, an inference of negligence arises and the burden is then upon the owners of the vessel to rebut the inference of negligence." General Petroleum Corp. of California v. City of Los Angeles Hokonesan Maru, Cal. App., 109 P.2d 754, 756.

The common sense behind the rule makes the burden a heavy one. Such accidents simply do not occur in the ordinary course of things unless the vessel has been mismanaged in some way. It is not sufficient for the respondent to produce witnesses who testify that as soon as the danger became apparent everything possible was done to avoid an accident. The question remains, How then did the collision occur? The answer must be either that, in spite of the testimony of the witnesses, what was done was too little or too late or, if not, then the vessel was at fault for being in a position in which an unavoidable collision would occur.

The only escape from the logic of the rule and the only way in which the respondent can meet the burden is by proof of the intervention of some occurrence which could not have been foreseen or guarded against by the ordinary exertion of human skill and prudence — not necessarily an act of God, but at least an unforeseeable and uncontrollable event.

In the present case the accident occurred in broad daylight in a part of the river entirely free of all traffic which might have interfered with the maneuver or produced an unforeseeable emergency. The respondents rely upon testimony to the effect that when the vessel was about 150 feet out from the pier and not yet quite abreast of it, lying almost parallel with it, a sudden gust of wind sent her into a sheer which the pilot and crew could not possibly break before she struck the dolphin.

The Court is not called upon to appraise the seamanship involved in the steps taken to break the sheer and decide whether they were correct and timely, as the respondents argue. Unless the conditions when the trip began were such that the gust could not have been foreseen by the exercise of the kind of judgment which good seamanship requires, the burden of disproving negligence has not been met.

The facts are these:

When the vessel hove anchor, about 20 minutes before...