Killeen v. Angle
| Decision Date | 05 June 1888 |
| Citation | 109 N.Y. 564,17 N.E. 413 |
| Parties | PEOPLE ex rel. KILLEEN v. ANGLE et al. |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from general term, supreme court, First department.
Thomas J. Killen made application to the supreme court for an order directing that a peremptory writ of mandamus issue, requiring Clarence B. Angle, secretary of the New York state civil service commission, and John Jay and Henry A. Richmond, composing the New York civil service commission, to admit relator to examination as to his fitness for the office of collector of canal statistics. From an order refusing the mandamus relator appeals.
Everett P. Wheeler, for appellant.
D. O'Brien, for respondents.
This appeal brings before us for review an order of the general term of the supreme court denying an application by the relator for a mandamus to compel the New York civil service commission to admit him to examination as to his fitness to perform the duties of the office of clerk to the collector of canal statistics. It is claimed that the relator became entitled to the writ by virtue of the provisions of chapter 354 of the Laws of 1883, creating a civil service commission for the state, and the rules issued in pursuance of authority thereby conferred. It must be conceded that this claim is well founded, provided these statutes and rules are to be enforced according to the plain meaning and intent of the statute. It is, however, contended by the respondent that, so far as such statutes and rules intrench upon the power and authority to manage and control the business of the canal department, and appoint, remove, and suspend his subordinates at pleasure, conferred upon the superintendent of public works by the constitution, they are unconstitutional and void, and therefore neither impose the duty nor confer authority upon the commission to make the examination applied for. This contention brings before the court one of the mose important and delicate duties it is ever called upon to perform, viz., to pronounce upon the constitutionality of an act of the legislature; and, within settled rules, it requires a case to be made showing clearly that the statute, when fairly and reasonably construed, is brought into conflict with some provision of the constitution, before the court can be justified in pronouncing it an unauthorized expression of legislative will. If the act and the constitution can be so construed as to enable both to stand, and each can be given a legitimate office to perform, it is the duty of the court to give them such construction; but if this cannot be done it is equally our duty to declare the supremacy of the constitutional provision, and the nullity of the statute. While every presumption is in favor of the constitutionality of the law, if, nevertheless, it appears that its enforcement must necessarily produce a conflict with the letter or spirit of the constitution, it is the duty of the court to condemn the law.
There is but little dispute between the parties as to the rules governing the interpretation of statutes, and that subject may be disposed of by reference to the rule stated in the head-note of People v. Potter, 47 N. Y. 375, which reads as follows: ‘The established canons of construction applicable to statutes, to-wit, that the intent of the law-maker is to be sought for, and, when discovered, is to prevail over the literal meaning of the words of any part of the law, and that this intent is to be discovered, not alone by considering the words of any part, but by ascertaining the general purposes of the whole, and by considering the evil which existed calling for the new enactment, and the remedy which was sought to be applied, apply as well to the construction of a constitution as to that of a statute law.’
It will be convenient, then, at the outset, to refer briefly to the history of the constitutional amendment of 1876, and the causes which led to its adoption, and thus obtain a view of the object which its framers designed to accomplish thereby. Previous to its adoption, for many years, the management and control of the canals of the state had been mainly intrusted to the supervision of three canal commissioners, each one having special charge of a separate division of the canal, and to a board of canal commissioners, and the canal board, each having functions to perform, with sometimes joint and sometimes divided responsibility therefor. Under such an administration of canal affairs, great complaint had been made of the waste, extravagance, and inefficiency of the system, and the facilities for fraudulent practices which it afforded to the public peculators, and the difficulty of determining, in the multiplicity of the officers having authority over the subject, who was justly responsible therefor. It was therefore considered desirable that a change should be made in the method of conducting that department of the public business. Appl. Cyc. Mech. for 1875, tit. ‘New York.’ After a lengthy and continued discussion of the subject before the people, it was, by very general consent, determined that a system by which the duties theretofore performed by the various boards and officers having charge thereof should be devolved upon a single officer, who should give security, and be held solely responsible for the faithful performance of such duties, would effect the reforms deemed desirable, and the amendment to the constitution was therefore adopted. So far as it is material to the questions here involved, it reads as follows: and, It is apparent from these provisions that it was intended thereby to create a new scheme for the management of the canal affairs of the state; the principal feature of which was to give large authority to the superintendent in their management and control, and to hold him to personal accountability for any failure to exercise such powers in the interest and for the benefit and advantage of the people. As an incident of this scheme the superintendent was given power, subject only to his sense of duty and the obligations of his oath of office, to select and appoint his subordinates, and was to be made personally responsible for the faithful performance of the duties assigned to them. It was plainly intended thereby to leave to the superintendent exclusively the determination of the propriety of such appointments, and the sufficiency of the qualifications possessed by proposed appointees, and to hold him responsible for the faithful exercise of his intelligence, judgment, and discretion in the performance of that duty. The broad grant of power excludes the idea that it was intended that he should be hampered, restricted, or regulated in its exercise by any extraneous authority whatever, except such as might be authorized by other constitutional limitations expressly applicable thereto. When this amendment was adopted, the people had plainly before them the question as to the mode which should thereafter be pursued in appointing subordinate officers to have charge and control of the canals, and they decided to confide their selection to the superintendent, and trust to his judgment for the faithful performance of that duty. This decision cannot now be reversed or disregarded without overthrowing the fundamental law, although it may be thought that a better method of performing such duties had since been discovered. Any provision of law, therefore, which materially interferes with the freedom of...
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