Robinson v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 04 November 1921 |
| Docket Number | 10746. |
| Parties | ROBINSON v. ATLANTIC COAST LINE RY. CO. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Sumter County; Edward McIver, Judge.
Action by Frank Robinson against the Atlantic Coast Line Railway Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Exceptions referred to in opinion follow:
1. The court erred in refusing to grant a nonsuit at the close of plaintiff's testimony for the reasons stated in the ground of said motion, which was as follows:
The defendant moves for a nonsuit on the ground that as this action alleges an injury to the title by the absolute taking of possession of part of the land alleged to be the land of the plaintiff and is not a mere action of trespass against the possession of the land, it was necessary for the plaintiff to prove his title, and this he has failed to do.
2. The court erred in holding that this was an action of trespass quare clausum fregit, that the defendant, not having pleaded title in itself in its answer, could not justify its entry under a claim of title, and on these grounds refusing to admit in evidence the charter of the Wilmington & Manchester Railroad Company offered by the defendant as the title of its predecessor and under which it claimed.
3. The court erred in refusing to allow the defendant to offer in evidence the charter of the Wilmington & Manchester Railroad Company, its predecessor in title, for the reason that the defendant was entitled as against the plaintiff alleging possession, to show under its answer pleading a general denial that it was in possession for railroad purposes at the time of the alleged trespass, and that any use which plaintiff was making of the property at that time was not inconsistent with defendant's possession for railroad purposes under the original charter.
4. The court erred in refusing to admit in evidence the charter of the Wilmington & Manchester Railroad Company when offered by the defendant as the title of its predecessor, for the reason that it was not necessary in this case for the defendant to plead title in itself in order to be allowed to introduce such charter in evidence.
5. The court erred in holding that after the plaintiff withdrew his claim for punitive damages, the defendant was not entitled to introduce in evidence the charter of the Wilmington & Manchester Railroad Company to show that its entry on the land was not done in a willful and wanton way, for the reason that since a plaintiff is entitled, upon proof of willfulness, to recover both actual and punitive damages, the withdrawal of the claim for punitive damages did not destroy the cause of action for willfulness, and the defendant had the right to introduce evidence as to the claim under which it entered, for the purpose of defeating the recovery of actual damages on the cause of action for willfulness.
6. The court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in favor of the defendant for the reasons stated in the grounds of said motion, which were as follows:
(1) Because the plaintiff fails to show title in himself.
(2) Because no demand for the possession was ever alleged to have been made, or was ever made, upon the defendant.
(3) Because no damages recoverable in an action in the nature of a trespass quare clausum fregit have been proven in this case.
7. The court erred in refusing defendant's motion for a new trial, for the reasons stated in the grounds thereof, which were as follows:
(1) The verdict of the jury was excessive and against the weight of the evidence, both the testimony of the witnesses and the actual inspection of the premises.
(2) The action was not brought for the value of the land claimed to have been trespassed upon, as for a perpetual ouster of plaintiff, but was for damages for a willful tort in committing the acts alleged in the complaint and it was error to permit the jury to consider and assess damages as for a taking of the land in question.
(3) It was error to hold that the action was in the nature of quare clausum fregit, and therefore and thereupon to exclude the evidence offered by defendant of its right to an easement over the land for railroad purposes, and thereafter as the applicable measure of damages in the case permit the jury to consider and find a verdict for plaintiff as for the actual taking of the land in question by an ascertainment of the difference in value of the entire tract before and after the construction of the track.
(4) Plaintiff was not in possession of the land within the limits of the original right of way of the Wilmington & Manchester Railroad Company as against the defendant, because there was no evidence (or, if there was, it was for the jury to pass upon) that any use which plaintiff may have made thereof was inconsistent with its possession by defendant for railroad purposes under the original charter, and defendant was entitled as against plaintiff alleging possession, to show under its answer pleading a general denial that it was in possession for railroad purposes at the time of the alleged trespass.
P. A Willcox and H. E. Davis, both of Florence, and L. W McLemone, Mark Reynolds, and H. D. Moise, all of Sumter, for appellant.
L. D. Jennings and A. S. Harby, both of Sumter, for respondent.
This is an action for damages to the plaintiff's lot, in the city of Sumter, S.C. The...
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