Cahill v. Morrow

• Decision Date: 20 January 2011
• Docket Number: No. 2008-34-Appeal.,2008-34-Appeal.
• Citation: 11 A.3d 82
• Parties: Melanie B. CAHILL v. Margaret P. MORROW, Individually and in her capacity as Executrix of the Estate of George R. Morrow.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

11 A.3d 82

Melanie B. CAHILL

v.Margaret P. MORROW, Individually and in her capacity as Executrix of the Estate of George R. Morrow.

No. 2008-34-Appeal.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

Jan. 20, 2011.

James H. Reilly, Esq., for Plaintiff.

Lauren E. Jones, Esq., for Defendant.

Present: SUTTELL, C.J., GOLDBERG, FLAHERTY, ROBINSON, and INDEGLIA, JJ.

OPINION

Justice INDEGLIA, for the Court.

The defendant, Margaret P. Morrow (defendant or Morrow), appeals from a Washington County Superior Court judgment declaring that Melanie B. Cahill (plaintiff or Cahill) perfected title to the defendant's property by adverse possession. She challenges the trial justice's decision on two grounds. First, that he failed to give sufficient weight to the plaintiff's offers to purchase the property, thus indicating that her claim never was adverse to the defendant's ownership interest. Second, that the trial justice erred when he found that the plaintiff's evidence met the standard of clear and convincing proof required for such claims. After careful review of the record and the briefs and hearing the parties' oral arguments, this Court vacates the judgment of the Superior Court and remands the papers in this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

IFacts and Procedural History ¹

The property in dispute is located on Gooseberry Road in the Snug Harbor section of South Kingstown, Rhode Island. Identified as lot 19 on assessor's plat 88-1,the land is sandwiched between lot 20, currently owned by Cahill, and lot 18, formerly co-owned by members of the Morrow family. Morrow is the record owner of the subject property, lot 19.

In 1969, Morrow's husband, George Morrow, purchased lot 19,² and the same year George and his brothers jointly purchased lot 18. At the time of lot 19's purchase, it was largely undeveloped, marked only by a preexisting clothesline, grass, and trees. Since that time, the Morrows have not improved or maintained lot 19, but have paid all property taxes assessed to it. As such, instead of vacationing on their lot 19, the Morrows annually spent two weeks in the summer at the cottages on the adjacent lot 18. During these vacations, the Morrow children and their cousins played on lot 19's grassy area. Around 1985, the Morrows ceased summering on Gooseberry Road,³ but continued to return at least once a year to view the lot. Morrow stopped visiting lot 19 in October 2002, after her husband became ill, and she did not return again until July 2006.

In 1971, two years after George Morrow purchased lot 19, Cahill's mother bought the land and house designated as lot 20 as a summer residence. Between 1971 and 1975, Cahill and her brother did some work on lot 19. They occasionally cut the grass, placed furniture, and planted trees and flowers on it.

Cahill's mother passed away in 1975, and in 1977, after purchasing her siblings' shares, Cahill became the sole record owner of the lot 20 property. Once she became lot 20's owner, Cahill began living in the house year-round. From that time through 1991, she and her boyfriend, James M. Cronin, testified that they continued to mow lot 19's grass on occasion. In addition, she hung clothing on the clothesline, attached flags to the clothesline pole, used the picnic table,⁴ positioned a bird bath and feeder, and planted more flowers and trees. Cahill placed Adirondack chairs on lot 19 and eventually replaced the clothesline and picnic table. In 1987, Cahill held the first annual "cousins' party" allowing her relatives free rein with respect to her property and lot 19 for playing, sitting, and car parking. She also entertained friends and family on lot 19 during other summer days. Mary Frances McGinn, Cahill's cousin, likewise recalled that lot 19 was occupied by Cahill kindred during various family functions throughout this time period. Cahill admitted that she never objected to neighborhood children using lot 19, however.

During the period of 1991 through 1997, Cahill testified that she planted more flowers and trees, in addition to cutting the grass occasionally. Cahill also stored her gas grill and yard furniture on the lot and had her brother stack lobster pots for decorative purposes. In 1991 or 1992, she began hosting the annual "Cane Berry Blossom Festival," another outdoor event that used both her lot and lot 19 as the party venue. Like the other gatherings, the festival always took place on a day during a warm-weather month. In 1997 or 1998, she installed a wooden border around the flower beds.

On July 22, 1997, Cahill wrote to George Morrow expressing an interest in obtainingtitle to lot 19. In the 1997 letter, Cahill stated: "I am interested in learning if your narrow strip of property is available for sale. If so, I would be interested in discussing purchasing it from you." Cahill continued: "If there is a possibility that you would like to sell it, could you please either call me or send me a note?" Cahill did not receive a response.

In the "late 1990s," though Cahill is unclear whether this occurred before or after the 1997 letter, a nearby marina sought permission to construct and elevate its property. Cahill attended the related zoning board hearings and expressed her concerns about increased flooding on lot 19 due to the marina elevation. She succeeded in having the marina developer grade part of lot 19 to alleviate flooding. Additionally, Cahill instituted her own trench and culvert drainage measures to divert water off of lot 19 and then reseeded the graded area. By Cahill's own admission, however, her trenching and reseeding work occurred in 1999 or 2000.

Subsequent to 2001, the new owners of lot 18 ⁵ stored their boat on lot 19 and planted their own flowers and small trees on the property. In 2002, when the town (with approval from George Morrow) erected a stone wall and laid a sidewalk on the Gooseberry Road border of lot 19, Cahill loamed and planted grass on that portion of the lot. Also in 2002, Cahill asked Morrow's two sisters on separate occasions whether George Morrow would be interested in selling lot 19. The Morrows gave no response to her 2002 inquiries. In 2003, George Morrow passed away.

After making her third inquiry concerning the purchase of lot 19 in 2002, Cahill testified, she continued using the property in a fashion similar to her prior practice until December 2005, when she noticed heavy-machinery tire marks and test pits on the land. Thereafter, she retained counsel and authorized her attorney to send a letter on January 10, 2006 to Morrow indicating her adverse possession claim to a "20-foot strip of land on the northerly boundary" of lot 19.⁶ According to a survey of the disputed property, however, the width of lot 19 from the northerly boundary (adjacent to Cahill's property) to lot 18 is 49.97 feet and therefore, more than double what Cahill originally claimed in this letter. Nonetheless, on April 25, 2006, Cahill instituted a civil action requesting a declaration that based on her "uninterrupted, quiet, peaceful and actual seisin and possession" "for a period greater than 10 years," she was the true owner of lot 19 in its entirety. On July 25, 2007, the trial justice agreed that Cahill had proved adverse possession under G.L.1956 § 34-7-1 and vested in her the fee simple title to lot 19.

Judgment was entered for Cahill on August 1, 2007. Morrow filed a timely notice of appeal on August 17, 2007, primarily contending that the trial justice did not weigh appropriately Cahill's 1997 offer-to-purchase letter and also that the evidencepresented did not establish adverse possession by clear and convincing proof. On December 18, 2009, this Court, sitting as a bench of four justices, was evenly divided and thus affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. Cahill v. Morrow, 985 A.2d 1016, 1017 (R.I.2009) (mem.). Morrow moved pursuant to Article I, Rule 25(a) of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure to reargue her appeal once this Court was joined by a fifth member. Her request was granted on January 15, 2010 and on September 29, 2010, this Court again heard oral argument. As such, we now decide Morrow's appeal upon its merits.

IIStandard of Review

"This Court gives great weight to the factual findings of a trial justice sitting without a jury in a civil matter, and we will not disturb such findings unless they are 'clearly erroneous or unless the trial justice misconceived or overlooked material evidence or unless the decision fails to do substantial justice between the parties.' " Costa v. Silva, 996 A.2d 607, 611 (R.I.2010) (quoting Harris v. Town of Lincoln, 668 A.2d 321, 326 (R.I.1995)). If the trial justice's decision "reasonably indicates that [he] exercised [his] independent judgment in passing on the weight of the testimony and the credibility of the witnesses it will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly wrong or otherwise incorrect as a matter of law." Now Courier, LLC v. Better Carrier Corp., 965 A.2d 429, 434 (R.I.2009) (quoting Notarantonio v. Notarantonio, 941 A.2d 138, 144-45 (R.I.2008)). Furthermore, it is permissible for the trial justice to "draw inferences from the testimony of witnesses, and such inferences, if reasonable, are entitled on review to the same weight as other factual determinations." DeSimone Electric, Inc. v. CMG, Inc., 901 A.2d 613, 621 (R.I.2006) (quoting Walton v. Baird, 433 A.2d 963, 964 (R.I.1981)). "However, '[i]n contrast to our deferential stance vis-[à]-vis factual findings made by a trial justice, we review in a de novo manner a trial justice's rulings concerning questions of law.' " Costa, 996 A.2d at 611 (quoting Grady v. Narragansett Electric Co., 962 A.2d 34, 41 (R.I.2009)).

IIIAnalysis

AThe History and Policy Rationale of Adverse Possession

Before we begin our analysis, a brief history of adverse possession may be of assistance. After first using an amalgamation of Roman and Germanic doctrine, our English predecessors in common law later settled upon statutes of limitation to...