People v. Vela

Decision Date24 April 2017
Docket NumberG052282
Citation11 Cal.App.5th 68,218 Cal.Rptr.3d 1
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Parties The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Adrian Raphael VELA, Defendant and Appellant.

Certified for Partial Publication.*

Sharon M. Jones, Ventura, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Collette Cavalier, Elizabeth M. Carino and Daniel J. Hilton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

OPINION

MOORE, J.

IINTRODUCTION

Sixteen-year-old defendant Adrian Raphael Vela and one of his fellow gang members "hit up" (confronted) two suspected rival gang members. Vela's accomplice pulled out a gun and shot the two victims, killing one of them. The prosecutor directly filed charges against Vela in "adult" criminal court. The jury found Vela guilty of murder, attempted murder, and found true the related firearm and gang allegations.

Vela makes several interrelated claims of instructional error concerning accomplice liability. Vela also raises two constitutional challenges to his 72 years to life sentence. In the unpublished parts of this opinion, we will find that the trial court committed no instructional errors. Further, Vela's sentence does not violate either the equal protection clause or the Eighth Amendment.

In the published portion of this opinion, we conditionally reverse the judgment. Due to the electorate's recent approval of Proposition 57, which emphasized juvenile rehabilitation, prosecutors can no longer directly file charges against a minor in an "adult" criminal court. Only a juvenile court judge can determine whether a minor can be prosecuted and sentenced as an adult, after conducting a transfer hearing, taking into account various factors such as the minor's age, maturity, criminal sophistication, and his or her likelihood of rehabilitation.

We find that Vela is retroactively entitled to a transfer hearing because his case is not yet final on appeal. If, after conducting the hearing, the juvenile court judge determines that Vela's case should be transferred to a court of criminal jurisdiction, then his convictions and sentence will be reinstated. But if the juvenile court determines that Vela is amenable to rehabilitation, and should remain within the juvenile justice system, then his convictions will be deemed juvenile adjudications. The juvenile court is then to impose an appropriate disposition within its discretion under juvenile court law.

II**
IIIDISCUSSION
A.-C.***
D. The Effect of Proposition 57

Although Vela was 16 years old when he committed these offenses, the Orange County District Attorney chose to file the charges directly in "adult" or criminal court. At that time, the district attorney was permitted to do so.

While this appeal was pending, Proposition 57, also known as "The Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016," became effective. Among other provisions, Proposition 57 amended the Welfare and Institutions Code so as to eliminate direct filing by prosecutors. Certain categories of minors—which would include Vela—can still be tried in criminal court, but only after a juvenile court judge conducts a transfer hearing to consider various factors such as the minor's maturity, degree of criminal sophistication, prior delinquent history, and whether the minor can be rehabilitated. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 707, subd. (a)(1).)1

After we filed an unpublished opinion affirming the judgment, Vela filed a petition for rehearing contending that Proposition 57 applies retroactively to his case. (In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948 (Estrada ).) Ordinarily, this court will not address an issue that has been raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing. (People v. Holford (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 758, 759, 136 Cal.Rptr.3d 713.) However, for good cause we may do so. (Alameda County Management Employees Assn. v. Superior Court (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 325, 338, fn. 10, 125 Cal.Rptr.3d 556.) This court granted the petition.

We hold that: 1) the amendments to the Welfare and Institutions Code that require a juvenile transfer hearing before a minor may be prosecuted and sentenced in a criminal court apply retroactively; and 2) the appropriate resolution is a conditional reversal dependent on the outcome of a juvenile transfer hearing on remand.

1. Proposition 57 applies retroactively.

The Legislature ordinarily makes laws that will apply to events that will occur in the future. Accordingly, there is a presumption that laws apply prospectively rather than retroactively. But this presumption against retroactivity is a canon of statutory interpretation rather than a constitutional mandate. (Evangelatos v. Superior Court (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1188, 1224, 246 Cal.Rptr. 629, 753 P.2d 585.) Therefore, the Legislature can ordinarily enact laws that apply retroactively, either explicitly or by implication. (Tapia v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 282, 311, 279 Cal.Rptr. 592, 807 P.2d 434(dis. opn. of Mosk, J.).) In order to determine if a law is meant to apply retroactively, the role of a court is to determine the intent of the Legislature, or in the case of a ballot measure, the intent of the electorate. (People v. Conley (2016) 63 Cal.4th 646, 659, 203 Cal.Rptr.3d 622, 373 P.3d 435.)

a. The purpose of the juvenile justice system is to rehabilitate minors.

Before we consider the intent of Proposition 57, a brief discussion of some of the distinctions between the juvenile justice system and the criminal justice system is in order. Generally, all of the laws regarding juvenile delinquency proceedings are included within the Welfare and Institutions Code, while other code sections—primarily the Penal Code—define the offenses.2 "Significant differences between the juvenile and adult offender laws underscore their different goals: The former seeks to rehabilitate, while the latter seeks to punish." (In re Julian R. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 496, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 790, 213 P.3d 125.)

Generally, any person under the age of 18 who is charged with violating a law is considered a "minor." (§ 602.) A "juvenile court" is a separate, civil division of the superior court. (§ 246.) A prosecutor charges a minor with an offense by filing a juvenile petition, rather than a criminal complaint. (See §§ 653.7, 655.) Minors "admit" or "deny" an offense, rather than plead "guilty" or "not guilty." (§ 702.3.) There are no "trials," per se, in juvenile court, rather there is a "jurisdictional hearing" presided over by a juvenile court judge. (§ 602.) The jurisdictional hearing is equivalent to a "bench trial" in a criminal court. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.780.) Although a juvenile court judge adjudicates alleged law violations, there are no "convictions" in juvenile court. (§ 203.) Rather, the juvenile court determines—under the familiar beyond the reasonable doubt standard and under the ordinary rules of evidence—whether the allegations are "true" and if the minor comes within its jurisdiction. (See § 602 et seq.)

There is no "sentence," per se, in juvenile court. Rather, a judge can impose a wide variety of rehabilitation alternatives after conducting a "dispositional hearing," which is equivalent to a sentencing hearing in a criminal court. (§ 725.5; In re Devin J. (1984) 155 Cal.App.3d 1096, 1100, 202 Cal.Rptr. 543.) In the more serious cases, a juvenile court can "commit" a minor to juvenile hall or to the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ), formerly known as the California Youth Authority (CYA). In order to commit a minor to the DJJ, the record must show that less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate. ( In re Teofilio A . (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 571, 576, 258 Cal.Rptr. 540.) The DJJ, rather than the court, sets a parole consideration date. DJJ commitments can range from one year or less for nonserious offenses, and up to seven years for the most serious offenses, including murder. (See Cal. Code Regs, tit. 15, § 4951 -4957.) A minor committed to DJJ must generally be discharged no later than 23 years of age. (§ 607, subd. (f).)

b. Discretionary direct filing by prosecutors began with Proposition 21.

Prior to Proposition 57, rather than filing a juvenile petition, a prosecutor could, for certain offenses, choose to directly file a criminal complaint against a minor 14 years of age or older in criminal court. (Former § 707, subd. (d), repealed by Initiative Measure (Prop 57, § 4.2, approved Nov. 8, 2016, eff. Nov. 9, 2016.) Discretionary direct filing was the result of a previous ballot measure, Proposition 21, the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Act of 1998. (Manduley v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 537, 549, 574, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168, 41 P.3d 3 (Manduley ).) Among other provisions, "Proposition 21 revised the juvenile court law to broaden the circumstances in which minors 14 years of age and older can be prosecuted in the criminal division of the superior court, rather than in juvenile court. [The initiative], authorize[d] specified charges against certain minors to be filed directly in a court of criminal jurisdiction, without a judicial determination of unfitness under the juvenile court law." (Ibid ., italics added.) In Manduley , the Supreme Court upheld Proposition 21 against a variety of challenges to the prosecutor's discretionary authority to directly file charges: "The decision to file charges in criminal court [against a minor] is analogous to a prosecutor's decision to pursue capital charges against a defendant." (Id . at p. 570, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 168, 41 P.3d 3.)

Proposition 21 included various findings and declarations, among them: "While overall crime is declining, juvenile crime has become a larger and more ominous threat"; "The rehabilitative/treatment juvenile court philosophy was adopted at a time when most juvenile crime consisted of petty...

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