Jenkins by Agyei v. State of Mo., s. 90-2238
| Decision Date | 15 March 1994 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 90-2238,92-3194 and 92-3200,91-3636,s. 90-2238 |
| Citation | 11 F.3d 755 |
| Parties | 88 Ed. Law Rep. 33 Kalima JENKINS, by her friend, Kamau AGYEI; Carolyn Dawson, by her next friend Richard Dawson; Tufanza A. Byrd, by her next friend, Teresa Byrd; Derek A. Dydell; Terrance Cason, by his next friend, Antoria Cason; Jonathan Wiggins, by his next friend, Rosemary Jacobs Love; Kirk Allan Ward, by his next friend, Mary Ward; Robert M. Hall, by his next friend, Denise Hall; Dwayne A. Turrentine, by his next friend, Sheila Turrentine; Gregory A. Pugh, by his next friend, David Winters, on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, American Federation of Teachers, Local 691, Plaintiffs, v. STATE OF MISSOURI; John Ashcroft, Governor of the State of Missouri; Wendell Bailey, Treasurer of the State of Missouri; Missouri State Board of Education; Roseann Bentley; Dan L. Blackwell; Gary M. Cunningham; Raymond McCallister, Jr.; Susan D. Finke; Thomas R. Davis; Cynthia B. Thompson, Members of the Missouri State Board of Education; Robert E. Bartman, Commissioner of Education of the State of Missouri, Defendants-Appellants, * School District of Kansas City, Missouri; Claude C. Perkins, Superintendent thereof, Defendants-Appellees. * Kalima JENKINS, by her next friend, Kamau AGYEI; Carolyn Dawson, by her next friend, Richard Dawson; Tufanza A. Byrd, by her next friend, Teresa Byrd; Derek A. Dydell, by his next friend, Maurice Dydell; Terrance Cason, by his next friend, Antoria Cason; Jonathan Wiggins, by his next friend, Rosemary Jacobs Love; Kirk Allen Ward, by his next friend, Mary Ward; Robert M. Hall, by his next friend, Denise Hall; Dwayne A. Turrentine, by his next friend, Sheila Turrentine; Gregory A. Pugh, by his next friend, David Winters; on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees, American Federation of Teachers, Local 691, Intervenor-Appellee, v. STATE OF MISSOURI; John Ashcroft, Governor of the State of Missouri; Wendell Bailey, Treasurer of the State of Missouri; Missouri State Bo |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Bart A. Matanic, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, MO, argued for appellant.
Daniel B. Kohrman and Kevin J. Lanigan, Washington, D.C., argued, for Kelima Jenkins, et al.
Shirley Ward Keeler and Arthur A. Benson, II, Kansas City, MO, argued, for Kansas City School Dist.
Before McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge, HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge, and JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge.
The State of Missouri appeals from four orders of the district court 1 entered in the ongoing Kansas City school desegregation case. The district court ruled in two orders that base costs of the original group of magnet schools were properly included as desegregation costs, which the State could be required to pay as a result of its joint and several liability for desegregation expenses. The State argues that the district court erred in placing this expense on the State, because in earlier orders the district court had required that these orders be paid by the Kansas City, Missouri School District. The State appeals the district court order approving certain quality education programs known as Milliken II programs after Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (Milliken II ), for the 1992-93 school year. 2 The State contends that the Milliken II programs already in place had achieved the goals set for them, and had attained unitary status under Freeman v. Pitts, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1430, 118 L.Ed.2d 108 (1992), and the district court erred in not recognizing this and in ordering further programs. Finally, the State appeals from orders requiring the State to pay for a salary increase for KCMSD teachers and other employees. We affirm the orders of the district court.
The first two appeals involve orders allowing the base costs of the "flagship magnets" as desegregation expenses for which the State and KCMSD are jointly and severally liable. The flagship magnets (also referred to as the "1986-87" magnets in reference to their inception date) are schools that existed before the desegregation remedy and were converted into magnet schools as part of the desegregation remedy. 3 The costs that KCMSD would have incurred in running these schools, regardless of the desegregation remedy, are referred to as "base costs." Costs associated with the magnet themes are called "incremental magnet costs."
In the original magnet school order, June 16, 1986, the court made no distinction between base costs and incremental costs for the flagship schools, but classified the total amount as a desegregation expense, allocating half to the State and half to the KCMSD. Jenkins v. Missouri, 639 F.Supp. 19, 53-55 (order on pending motions) (W.D.Mo.1985), aff'd, 855 F.2d 1295 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied as to this order, 490 U.S. 1034, 109 S.Ct. 1931, 104 L.Ed.2d 403 (1989). The State alluded to this very briefly in an appeal of that funding order, complaining that the district court "held all of the operating costs of the schools, whether part of the original budgets or newly ordered by the court, were to be counted as necessary desegregation expenses," and that the court had "effectively transfer[red] to the desegregation plan all of the operating expenses of the schools." We affirmed the June 16, 1986 order, though without discussion of this point. Jenkins v. Missouri, 855 F.2d 1295, 1319 (8th Cir.1988) (Jenkins II ), cert. denied in relevant part, 490 U.S. 1034, 109 S.Ct. 1931, 104 L.Ed.2d 403 (1989).
The district court in November 1986 ordered a more extensive "Long Range Magnet Plan" which created new magnets in addition to the flagship magnet schools. The Long Range Magnet Plan budget distinguished between base and incremental costs for the new magnets, and required the KCMSD to pay base costs from its operating budget. On July 25, 1988, the district court decided that the flagship magnets and the new magnets should be funded according to the same principles, and that it would therefore not require the State to pay the base costs for the flagship magnets for 1988-89. Because the KCMSD could not show which costs were base and which incremental, the court simply included the whole cost in the desegregation budget, but allowed the State a credit for the base amount, which was to be determined later. The court issued a similar ruling for 1989-90.
Before the State obtained the benefit of these credits, however, money problems intervened. The court stayed the orders requiring the KCMSD to pay the 1988-89 and 1989-90 base costs, pending a review of KCMSD's finances by an independent consulting firm to determine what KCMSD could pay for out of its operating budget. 4
Two orders are on appeal, dated June 26, 1990 and July 5, 1991, in which the district court approved the total expenses for the flagship magnets as desegregation expenses for the years 1990-91 and 1991-92, respectively. In those orders, the court allocated the flagship base costs entirely to the KCMSD, but the effect of joint and several liability is that the State could be called on to pay these costs. In the 1990-91 order the court stated that the consultant's study was still pending, and that if the report should result in the February 1, 1990 stay order being lifted, the State could receive a credit for the base costs. In the 1991-92 order the court stated the budget study did not indicate that the KCMSD had the money to pay the base costs from its operating budget, and therefore, the costs would have to be shifted to the desegregation budget.
The State's objection is that by designating the 1990-91 and 1991-92 base costs as desegregation expenses, payable by the KCMSD, the court is indirectly requiring the State to pay the costs, through the operation of joint and several liability. The State raises four arguments against such a result.
First, the State argues that requiring it to pay for the ordinary costs of operating KCMSD's schools is impermissibly granting relief not related to the State's constitutional violation, since KCMSD would have had to pay the operating costs of its schools, whether or not the State ever committed a constitutional violation.
The cases the State cites are not directly applicable, since they either address situations in which there was no relation between the remedy ordered and the constitutional violation, 5 or simply refer generally to the requirement that the remedy be limited to rectifying conditions that offend the Constitution. 6 As we discuss at length in Part II, the effect of the constitutional violations in this case was to lessen student achievement in the KCMSD and to cause white flight. Jenkins II, 855 F.2d at 1300. It has already been determined that the proper remedy for these injuries is to improve the quality of education given to minority students and to implement superior educational programs that will attract white students back to the District and redistribute the whites...
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