Benton v. Hamilton
| Decision Date | 02 April 1887 |
| Docket Number | 12,819 |
| Citation | 11 N.E. 238,110 Ind. 294 |
| Parties | Benton v. Hamilton et al |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
From the Jackson Circuit Court.
Judgment affirmed.
B. H Burrell, R. Applewhite, J. F. Applewhite and D. A. Kochenour for appellant.
J. B Brown, W. K. Marshall and R. Hill, for appellees.
The first question in this case is this: Is a contract between the town treasurer and the town for the improvement of a public street valid as against a property-owner assessed for the expense of the improvement?
It is conceded that the decision in Case v. Johnson, 91 Ind. 477, is adverse to the appellant, but it is contended that the decision was wrong, and should be overruled. We can not yield to the counsel's claim, for, in our judgment, the case before us falls fully within the spirit of section 2049, R. S. 1881, as did that of Case v. Johnson, supra.
A town treasurer is a public officer, although, strictly speaking, not an officer of the State. He is, also, in many respects, the agent of the corporation. As the statute applies to town agents and to public officers, we think there can be no doubt that a person holding that office must be regarded as within the provisions of the statute.
The second question is this: Was the contract with the town treasurer validated by the curative act of March 19th, 1885 (Acts of 1885, p. 99)? This question must receive a negative answer. It is always proper in construing a statute to look to other statutes and to the object to be accomplished. In looking to other statutes, we find a general statute prohibiting a town from making a contract with its treasurer, and it would violate settled principles to assume that the Legislature intended to abrogate this general statute in favor of one particular town or person. It is, indeed, very doubtful whether the Legislature has the constitutional power to do such a thing, but we do not deem it necessary to decide this question of constitutional law. Repeals by implication are not favored, and we can not hold that the Legislature meant by the general words employed in the act of 1885 to repeal a general statute for the benefit of a particular case. Where it is the intention of the Legislature to break down a general statute, such as is section 2049, it is necessary that it be done by a clear implication or express words, and the implication here is far from clear, and there are no express words of...
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