State v. Rhoades
Decision Date | 18 September 2000 |
Docket Number | No. 25435.,25435. |
Citation | 11 P.3d 481,134 Idaho 862 |
Parties | STATE of Idaho, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. Paul Ezra RHOADES, Defendant-Appellant. |
Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Nevin, Herzfeld & Benjamin, Boise, for appellant. Dennis A. Benjamin argued.
Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. L. LaMont Anderson, Deputy Attorney General, argued.
This is an appeal from a ruling by the district judge denying Paul Rhoades' (Rhoades) motion under Rule 35 of the Idaho Criminal Rules to correct an illegal sentence. Rhoades' motion challenges the three sentence enhancements for use of a firearm imposed as a part of Rhoades' sentences for murder, kidnapping, and robbery.
Rhoades entered a convenience store in Blackfoot, Idaho on February 28, 1987, and robbed the store clerk, Stacy Baldwin (Baldwin) at gunpoint. He then forced Baldwin into his pickup truck and drove to a secluded area where he shot Baldwin several times. Baldwin died approximately an hour and a half later.
After a jury trial, Rhoades was found guilty of first degree murder, first degree kidnapping, and use of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Rhoades was given the death sentence for the murder and kidnapping charges, and a fixed life term for the robbery charge. The district judge further provided that in the event the death sentences were commuted to life in prison or any other sentence, they would be enhanced by a fixed consecutive term of 15 years for the use of a firearm. The enhancement was also applied to the fixed life term for the robbery charge.
Following the imposition of his sentence, Rhoades filed a Rule 35 motion for correction of sentence seeking a correction of the sentence "heretofore given by providing only one sentence for weapons enhancement per the entire transaction." The district judge denied Rhoades' motion for correction of sentence, finding "no statutory nor case law supports the defendant's position that only one sentence for weapons enhancement is allowed."
Rhoades then timely appealed his convictions, but not the district judge's denial of his Rule 35 motion for correction of sentence. This Court affirmed Rhoades' convictions, sentences and the district judge's denial of post-conviction relief in State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 820 P.2d 665 (1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 987, 112 S.Ct. 2970, 119 L.Ed.2d 590 (1992).
On December 30, 1996, Rhoades filed a second I.C.R. 35 motion to correct illegal sentence, asking the court "to correct the illegal firearms enhancements imposed in this case." The district judge denied the motion, determining the three "convictions and sentences all arose from divisible conduct, or separate acts." (emphasis in original). This appeal followed.
Both below and on appeal, the State has argued Rhoades' motion for correction of an illegal sentence under I.C.R. 35 is barred by the doctrine of res judicata because Rhoades has already filed a Rule 35 motion, had that motion denied, and failed to appeal the denial of that motion. Thus, according to the State, Rhoades is barred from bringing a subsequent Rule 35 motion addressing the same issues which were finally decided by the order denying the earlier Rule 35 motion. The question of whether an action is barred by res judicata is a question of law over which we exercise free review. Wolfe v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co., 128 Idaho 398, 403, 913 P.2d 1168, 1173 (1996).
As a general matter, the doctrine of res judicata holds that "`in an action between the same parties upon the same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes parties and privies ... as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim....'" Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 150, 804 P.2d 319, 323 (1990) (quoting Joyce v. Murphy Land & Irrigation Co., 35 Idaho 549, 553, 208 P. 241, 242 (1922)). While this doctrine has traditionally been applied in the context of civil disputes, it is not foreign to criminal law. For example, in State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 766 P.2d 678 (1988), cert denied, 489 U.S. 1073, 109 S.Ct. 1360, 103 L.Ed.2d 827 (1989), this Court applied the principles of res judicata to a criminal defendant's attempts to raise the same issues previously ruled upon on direct appeal in a subsequent petition for post-conviction relief. Id. at 210-11, 766 P.2d 680-81.
Id. at 161. In so holding, the Third Circuit noted it ...
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