Taylor v. Gardiner

Citation11 R.I. 182
PartiesWILLIAM R. TAYLOR, Receiver, v. JOSEPH L. GARDINER.
Decision Date24 July 1875
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Rhode Island

An act authorizing a change of the venue to secure an impartial trial and to avoid local prejudice, is not in violation of art. 1, § 15, of the Constitution of the state, which declares, " The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate." This provision of the Constitution not meaning " trial by jury of the vicinage or county."

Under the statutes of Rhode Island the trial by jury, except in actions relating to realty and in criminal prosecutions, is not confined to the vicinage.

A statute provided, that " whenever it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the Supreme Court, by either party to a suit or proceeding, civil or criminal, pending therein, that by reason of local prejudice, or other cause the parties to such suit or proceeding, or either of them cannot have a full, fair, and impartial trial in the county where the same shall have been commenced or shall be pending, the court shall order such cause to be removed for trial to such other county as shall be deemed most fair and equitable for the parties.

In a petition for change of venue under this act: -

Held, that it was sufficient for the petition to allege that " by reason of local prejudice and the feeling entertained by the people of said county, the petitioner cannot have a full, fair, and impartial trial in said county," without setting forth the particular facts going to show the existence of the prejudice or feeling complained of.

Held, further, that proofs of such prejudice being naturally vague, great positiveness or definiteness in them could not be required.

PLAINTIFF'S petition for a change of venue.

Charles Bradley & John Turner, for plaintiff petitioner.

Joseph M. Blake & Abraham Payne, for defendant.

DURFEE C. J.

We think the allegations of the petition are sustained by the proofs, and that the petition, unless open to the objections made by the respondent, ought to be granted. It is true the testimony is in some respects vague and indefinite, but that was to be expected. The petitioners were called upon to prove the existence of a local prejudice, a thing which is impalpable to the senses. The proofs of such a thing are naturally vague. Men moving in a community where the prejudice prevails become perfectly assured of its prevalence, yet, when inquired of, cannot tell, except in the most general way, how they are assured of it. To require the same positiveness in proof of such a matter which we might properly require in proof of a contract or a crime, would make the act under which the petition is preferred of little practical benefit. The power conferred by the act, though not lightly to be exercised, ought not to be unreasonably restricted.

There are, however, besides the more general testimony, certain specific facts which deserve mention. The action is in behalf of a broken or insolvent bank. It is one of a series of actions, one of which has already been tried. The trial lasted many days, during which the court-house was crowded with interested spectators. The trial and its incidents were much discussed, with comments generally unfavorable to the bank and its officers. The county is small, and Blackstone mentions narrowness of the county as a ground for change. These are facts which, if they do not indicate prejudice or undue feeling, make it more easy to believe that prejudice or undue feeling may exist. We are persuaded by the testimony that such a prejudice or feeling does exist.

There are two objections made by the respondent besides the objection that the proof is insufficient. The first is an objection to the form of the petition. The petition alleges that " by reason of local prejudice and the feeling entertained by the people of said county (i. e. Bristol County), he (i. e. the petitioner) cannot have a full, fair, and impartial trial in said county." The objection is that the petition should set forth the particular facts going to show the existence of the prejudice or feeling complained of. We do not think the objection is valid. The fact that the petitioner cannot, by reason of local prejudice, have a fair trial in Bristol County, is the fact to be proved; and it is enough that the petition alleges the fact to be proved without stating in detail the evidence to be given, or the particular facts to be shown in proof of it.

The second objection is an objection to the constitutionality of the act. The first section of the act is as follows (Public Laws, cap. 292, § 1, March 27, 1873): " Whenever it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the Supreme Court by either party to a suit or proceeding, civil or criminal, pending therein, that by reason of local prejudice, or other cause, the parties to such suit or proceeding, or either of them, cannot have a full, fair, and impartial trial in the county where the same shall have been commenced or shall be pending, the court shall order such cause to be removed for trial to such other county as shall be deemed most fair and equitable for the parties."

The act, it is urged, is repugnant to art. 1, § 15, of the Constitution, which declares, " The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate." Trial by jury, it is said means a trial by a jury of the vicinage, - the vicinage in this state being the county. The idea is, that because the action was commenced in Bristol County, because the cause of action there originated and the parties there reside, the respondent has the right under the Constitution to have it tried by a jury of that county, and that, if it can be removed at all without his consent, it can only be removed by the special act of the General Assembly. The idea is, in our opinion, erroneous. Juries were originally selected from the vicinage, because being so selected they were more likely to know about the matter for trial. That reason no longer operates. The principal...

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6 cases
  • Advisory Opinion to Senate
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • June 25, 1971
    ...was reached by the use in the sixth amendment of the term 'district.' Vicinage has been construed to mean 'county.' Taylor v. Gardiner, 11 R.I. 182 (1875).2 The Court in the Williams case took pains to point out in footnote 30 of Mr. Justice White's majority opinion that it was not deciding......
  • Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 81-268-M
    • United States
    • Rhode Island Supreme Court
    • November 20, 1981
    ...has been construed to mean "county." Opinion to the Senate, 108 R.I. at 631 n.1, 278 A.2d at 854 n.1 (1971) (citing Taylor v. Gardiner, 11 R.I. 182 (1875)). Both before and after our State Constitution was adopted, an accused has generally been tried before a jury composed of residents of t......
  • Schultz v. Young
    • United States
    • New Mexico Supreme Court
    • July 24, 1933
    ...N. E. 15; Hay v. Reed, 93 Ind. App. 592, 178 N. E. 873; Preston Nat. Bank v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 142 Mich. 272, 105 N. W. 757; Taylor v. Gardiner, 11 R. I. 182; State v. Yager, 250 Mo. 388, 157 S. W. 557, 558; Hunt v. State, 27 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 16; cf. Newcomb-Buchanan Co. v. Baskett, 14 B......
  • Commonwealth v. Buccieri
    • United States
    • Pennsylvania Supreme Court
    • March 20, 1893
    ... ... State, 84 Ala. 410; State v. Nash, 7 Iowa, 347; ... State v. Mooney, 10 Iowa 506; Taylor v ... Gardiner, 11 R.I. 182; Com. v. Allen, 135 Pa ... 492; Goersen v. Com., 99 Pa. 398; Williams v ... Com., 91 Pa. 502; Rex v ... ...
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