State v. La. Land and Exploration Co.
| Decision Date | 26 April 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 2012–C–0884.,2012–C–0884. |
| Citation | 110 So.3d 1038 |
| Parties | STATE of Louisiana and the Vermilion Parish School Board v. The LOUISIANA LAND AND EXPLORATION COMPANY, et al. State of Louisiana v. Louisiana Land and Exploration, et al. State of Louisiana, et al. v. Louisiana Land and Exploration, et al. |
| Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Kean Miller, LLP, Leonardo L. Kilgore, III, Linda Sarradet Akchin, Michael R. Phillips, L. Victor Gregoire, King and Spalding, Robert G. Meadows, Carol M. Wood, Shelby W. Stratmann, Pro Hac Vice, Ottinger Herbert, LLC, Kevin Wade Trahan, for applicant.
Grady Joseph Abraham, Calvin Eugene Woodruff, Talbot, Carmouche & Marcello, Donald T. Carmouche, Victor L. Marcello, John Hogarth Carmouche, William R. Coenen, III, Brian T. Carmouche, Ross J. Donnes, D. Adele Owen, The Knoll Law Firm, L.L.C., Jerold Edward Knoll, for respondent.
Marshall Taylor Darden, Counsel for Louisiana Landowners Association, Inc. (Amius Curiae).
1
[2012-0884 (La. 1]We granted a writ to determine the proper interpretation of La. R.S. 30:29 and whether Chevron USA Inc. should be dismissed from the suit.
The State of Louisiana and the Vermilion Parish School Board (collectively “School Board” or “plaintiffs”) filed a “Petition for Damages to School Lands” on September 2, 2004, seeking damages and remediation of a sixteenth section of property in Vermilion Parish owned by the State and managed by the Vermilion Parish School Board situated in the East White Lake Field. The property at issue was allegedly polluted by oil and gas exploration and production performed pursuant to an oil, gas and mineral lease originally granted on the property in 1935 and a surface lease entered into in 1994. The plaintiffs claim damage to the land's soil, surface waters and ground waters.
[2012-0884 (La. 2]The plaintiffs urge various causes of action in their petition including negligence, strict liability, unjust enrichment, trespass, breach of contract and violations of both the Mineral Code and the Civil Code. The plaintiffs seek money damages for a comprehensive evaluation of the contamination of the property, remediation of the property, diminution in the property's value, mental anguish and inconvenience, as well as for both punitive and stigma damages.
Several defendants were named in the original petition and in supplemental and amending petitions as companies which conducted, directed, controlled or participated in various oil and gas exploration and production activities as operators and/or working interest owners, and/or joint venturers in the East White Lake Field. At the time of our review, the remaining defendants are Union Oil Company of California; Union Exploration Partners; Carrollton Resources, L.L.C.; Chevron USA Inc.; and Chevron Midcontinent, L.P.2
We are asked to review rulings of the trial court which arose in the context of summary judgments. A motion for partial summary judgment requires our interpretation of La. R.S. 30:29. In a motion for summary judgment, one of the defendants, Chevron USA Inc., seeks dismissal from suit.
The facts concerning the motion for partial summary judgment are as follows. The provisions of La. R.S. 30:29, enacted as Act 312 in 2006, became effective on June 8, 2006.3 Act 312 provides a procedure for the remediation of oilfield sites and exploration and production sites. In the School Board's “Fourth Supplemental and Amending Petition for Damages,” filed after the effective date of the Act, the plaintiffs specifically alleged Act 312 applies to this case. The [2012-0884 (La. 3]plaintiffs asserted damages awarded for remediation must be used, to the extent necessary under La. R.S. 30:29, for the purpose of funding the most feasible remediation plan adopted by the court. Plaintiffs alleged damages awarded by the court for remediation would be used to clean up the contamination of the property at issue.
During discovery, Union Oil Company of California and Union Exploration Partners (collectively “Unocal”) admitted “environmental damage,” as defined by the statute, exists on the subject property and further admitted its responsibility under the provisions of La. R.S. 30:29(C). As a party admitting responsibility under Act 312, Unocal moved to refer the case to the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (“La.DNR”) for determination of a plan for remediation, as required under the act. The plaintiffs objected, arguing such a referral could not take place until the finder of fact determined the responsibility of all of the defendants and adjudicated the private claims asserted by the plaintiffs. Although the trial court initially granted Unocal's motion, the trial court ultimately granted the plaintiffs' motion for new trial on this issue, rescinding its initial judgment and staying all proceedings before the La. DNR, Office of Conservation. The appellate court denied the defendants' writ on this issue, concluding a reasonable time under the statute within which the trial court should order the Unocal defendants to submit a remediation plan to the La. DNR would be some time after liability and damages issues have been resolved regarding all of the defendants.4 This court likewise denied the defendants'writ. 5
Before this court's action on its writ, the defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment, asserting plaintiffs had no right to seek remediation damages [2012-0884 (La. 4]in excess of those found necessary to fund the plan for remediation mandated under the statute to be determined by the court. The defendants argued Act 312 provided such “excess remediation damage” is allowed only under the terms of an express contractual provision. Since the 1935 oil, gas and mineral lease in this case did not include such an express provision, the defendants contended Act 312 acted as a substantive cap on remediation damages resulting from a tort or the implied restoration obligation of a mineral lease. After consideration of the plaintiffs' opposition and discussion of the issue at several hearings, the trial court agreed with the defendants.
The School Board took a writ to the appellate court on this ruling, which was denied on the ground the ruling was a partial judgment which had not been certified as a final judgment. While the writ application was under consideration, the School Board filed a motion in the trial court seeking to have Act 312 declared unconstitutional as applied. The trial court denied this motion and the court of appeal likewise denied a writ, referencing the prior writ application on the same subject matter as a partial judgment and indicating the question of constitutionality could be rendered moot by a successful appeal of the prior ruling. Thereafter, the trial court's rulings on the motion for partial summary judgment and the motion to have Act 312 declared unconstitutional were certified as final judgments, and the School Board lodged an appeal.
The following facts concern the motion for summary judgment. The School Board's suit was filed in September, 2004. Chevron USA Inc. was named as an additional defendant as “successor to Union Oil Company of California,” in the plaintiff's “Third Supplemental and Amending Petition for Damages,” filed on August 13, 2007. Chevron USA Inc. filed exceptions and an answer to the plaintiffs' third supplemental and amending petition on October 6, 2008, admitting [2012-0884 (La. 5]“Chevron U.S.A. Inc. is the successor in interest to Union Oil Company of California....” On July 12, 2010, Chevron USA Inc. filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting it was not the successor in interest to Union Oil Company of California.
From October 6, 2008 until July 12, 2010, Chevron USA Inc. participated in discovery with the rest of the remaining defendants. At times, Chevron USA Inc. was referred to collectively with other companies, including Union Oil Company of California, as “Chevron,” or as “Unocal.” This occurred even after Union Oil Company of California and Union Exploration Partners admitted responsibility for environmental damage under the Act and, thereby, included Chevron USA Inc. as “Unocal” in its references to admitting responsibility for environmental damage. Moreover, this confusion continued after Chevron USA Inc. filed its motion for summary judgment. In some filings, Chevron USA Inc. was referred to as “UNOCAL USA Inc.” either in the body of the document or on the signature line for defense counsel.
Plaintiffs opposed Chevron USA Inc.'s motion for summary judgment, arguing there were still issues of material fact they had not been able to discover. Plaintiffs claimed Chevron USA Inc. refused to produce a witness for a corporate deposition, sought to quash its notice for a corporate deposition and filed a motion for a protective order. After a hearing, the trial court deferred ruling on Chevron USA Inc.'s motion for protective order and motion to quash pending a corporatedeposition limited to certain topics.
Thereafter, the defendants filed a motion and order for leave to file an amended answer to the plaintiffs' petition. In this amended answer, the defendants denied Chevron USA Inc. was the successor in interest to Union Oil Company of California, while admitting Union Oil Company of California is the successor in interest to Union Exploration Partners, Ltd. On November 3, 2010, the trial court [2012-0884 (La. 6]granted the motion for leave to file an amended answer. Plaintiffs applied for a writ to review that determination.
The corporate deposition of Chevron USA Inc. occurred on October 19, 2010. Chevron USA Inc. subsequently filed a supplemental memorandum to its motion for summary judgment, seeking dismissal, to include its amended answer. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, dismissing the claims against Chevron USA Inc. with prejudice and...
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