Janney v. Bell
Decision Date | 10 April 1940 |
Docket Number | No. 4589.,4589. |
Citation | 111 F.2d 103 |
Parties | JANNEY et al. v. BELL. In re BUCHANAN. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Alvin T. Embrey, of Fredericksburg, Va., for appellants.
T. Stokeley Coleman, of Spotsylvania, Va., for appellee.
Before PARKER, SOPER, and DOBIE, Circuit Judges.
This statement of the facts in this case is taken from the opinion of the Trial Judge:
This case thus presents a single problem: whether the claim of the deed-trustee, who had taken over the motor vehicles in question preparatory to a sale of them, is prior to the claim of the bankrupt-trustee. This may be broken down into two questions: (1) Whether, under the Virginia law, a chattel mortgage of a motor vehicle is good as between the parties without such registration of the claim as is required by the Virginia Motor Vehicles Act; (2) whether, if this question be answered in the affirmative, the Federal Bankruptcy Act gives priority as to these motor vehicles to the bankrupt-trustee over the deed-trustee. Of course, if the chattel mortgage be void as between the parties because of lack of statutory registration, then all title to and interest in the motor vehicles would remain in the bankrupt and accordingly would pass to the trustee.
The general law is pretty well settled that, apart from statutory restrictions, an unrecorded chattel mortgage is good as between the parties. See 11 C.J. 511 and cases cited. Under the Virginia law, which we must apply, it seems that apart from recordation statutes, the trustee in the deed of trust of personalty acquires a defeasible legal title. Sulphur Mines Co. v. Thompson, 93 Va. 293, 25 S.E. 232. It seems further that a trustee in a deed of trust given to secure a debt and the creditors secured occupy the high position of purchasers for value within the general meaning of registration laws, Rhea et al. v. Preston, 75 Va. 757, and see also Lawyer v. Bark, 45 W. Va. 468, 470, 31 S.E. 964. It does not seem necessary here to discuss, as to the Virginia situation, the title theory and the lien theory of chattel mortgages. See Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances and Preferences, Rev.Ed., Sections 497-499.
It might be remarked in this connection that, since under the general law an unrecorded chattel mortgage is good as between the parties and registration statutes under their general philosophy are enacted for the benefit of third parties, the chattel mortgage should be good as between the parties unless the recordation statute either expressly declares the mortgage void as between the parties or indicates such invalidity of the chattel mortgage by necessary intendment or very clear implication.
The Virginia Motor Vehicle Act (Sec. 2154(48) et seq.) is quite long, very complicated and leaves much to be desired from the standpoint of clearness in legislative draftsmanship. In some of its provisions as to the recordation of claims to motor vehicles, it does use language which would indicate that its recordation provisions are mandatory and therefore must be complied with in order that title or any other claim may have validity even as between the parties; but, on the other hand, there are many other provisions in which the draftsman of the recordation portions of the Act used the language of other recordation statutes, so that this language, if taken by itself, would indicate even more clearly that such provisions applied only to third persons and that an unrecorded claim would be quite valid between the parties. Neither the investigations of counsel nor my own independent searches have revealed any Virginia case which is directly in point. The question is close and is of no small practical importance.
If an unregistered chattel mortgage of motor vehicles in Virginia be void as between the parties, some rather strange results would seem to follow. Then, it would seem, the owner of a motor vehicle, after mortgaging it to secure a loan, could blandly repudiate the mortgage and re-claim the motor vehicle without paying the debt secured by the mortgage, even though no rights of creditors are involved. It would seem, too, that he could pledge the car for a loan (and a chattel mortgage becomes an effective pledge when, as here, the mortgagee takes possession of the mortgaged property) and, again without paying the debt, even though no rights of creditors are involved, could take the car back from the pledgee. Such results would seem to militate in favor of the view which we take, that in Virginia an unrecorded chattel mortgage of a motor vehicle is good as between the parties.
Various states of the United States have adopted Motor Vehicle Codes containing registration provisions. A majority of the courts in these states have adopted the view that these statutes did not completely over-ride the common law, and that transactions in such vehicles, which were hitherto valid under the general law, still remain valid as between the parties. Commercial Credit Co. v. McNelly, 1934, 36 W.W.Harr., Del., 88, 171 A. 446; Commercial Credit Co. v. Schreyer, 120 Ohio St. 568, 166 N.E. 808, 63 A.L.R. 674; Moore v. Wilson, 230 Ky. 49, 18 S. W.2d 873; Williams v. Stringfield, 76 Colo. 343, 231 P. 658; Bond Lumber Co. v. Timmons, 82 Mont. 497, 267 P. 802; Carolina Discount Corp. v. Motor Co., 190 N.C. 157, 129 S.E. 414; Hartford Ins. Co. v. Knight, 146 Miss. 862, 111 So. 748; Cerex Co. v. Peterson, 203 Iowa 355, 212 N.W. 890; Chucovich v. Securities Corp., 60 Cal.App. 700, 214 P. 263; Hennessy v. Ins. Ass'n, Tex.Com.App., 282 S.W. 791, 46 A.L.R. 521; Jackson v. James, Utah, 89 P.2d 235. Some of the state courts, however, appear to have taken an opposite view. Endres v. Mara-Rickenbacker Co., 243 Mich. 5, 219 N.W. 719; Muzenick v. McCain, 220 Mo.App. 502, 274 S.W. 888; Merchants' Securities Corp. v. Lane, 106 N.J.L. 576, 150 A. 559. See, also, Fairbanks Steam Shovel Co. v. Wills, 240 U. S. 642, 36 S.Ct. 466, 60 L.Ed. 841. These cases have value, though it is believed that in no single instance was the state statute in question even approximately identical with the Virginia statute.
Now as to the Virginia cases which were relied on and discussed at length by counsel in the argument of this case. In Thomas v. Mullins, 153 Va. 383, 149 S.E. 494, 496, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia did use very strong language in insisting on strict compliance with the registration provisions of the Virginia Motor Vehicle Act:
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