Edelstein v. Ryland Corp.

• Decision Date: 18 April 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95-56349,95-56349
• Citation: 111 F.3d 138
• Parties: NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. Edward EDELSTEIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The RYLAND CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation; M.J. Brock & Sons, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of the Ryland Corporation; Confederation Life Mutual Insurance Company, a Canadian corporation, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 138

111 F.3d 138

NOTICE: Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3 provides that dispositions other than opinions or orders designated for publication are not precedential and should not be cited except when relevant under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.

Edward EDELSTEIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The RYLAND CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation; M.J. Brock & Sons, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of the Ryland Corporation; Confederation Life Mutual Insurance Company, a Canadian corporation, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 95-56349.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Feb. 5, 1997.

Decided April 18, 1997.

Before: PREGERSON, REINHARDT, WIGGINS, Circuit Judges.

MEMORANDUM ^*

Edward Edelstein appeals the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants Brock & Sons, Inc. ("Brock") and The Ryland Corporation ("Ryland"). We reverse and remand for the reasons set forth below.

In granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the district court construed Edelstein's complaint as stating only an intentional misrepresentation claim. So construed, the district court concluded that Edelstein presented no evidence tending to show that defendants knowingly made false statements regarding their commitment to the San Diego area, as would be required to prove a claim of intentional misrepresentation. See, e.g., Funk v. Sperry Corp., 842 F.2d 1129, 1133 (9th Cir.1988).

We have no quarrel with the district court's ruling regarding Edelstein's claim of intentional misrepresentation. The record discloses no evidence that tends to show that Davidson and Olin knowingly made false statements regarding Ryland/Brock's commitment to the San Diego area. However, we believe the district court construed Edelstein's complaint too narrowly. In addition to an intentional misrepresentation claim, Edelstein's complaint stated a claim for negligent misrepresentation, alternatively alleging that "[d]efendants clearly knew or, in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known that they would not maintain a 'presence' in San Diego for any reasonable period of time." To recover under a negligent misrepresentation theory, Edelstein does not have to show that the defendants knowingly made false statements. Rather, Edelstein must show that the defendants made an untrue representation as to a material fact without any reasonable ground for believing that representation to be true. See Continental Airlines v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 264 Cal.Rptr. 779, 784 (Cal.Ct.App.1989); 5 Witkin, Summary of California Law (Torts) § 720 at 819 (1988).

In order to defeat summary judgment, Edelstein must come forward with "sufficiently specific facts" from which reasonable inferences may be drawn to establish the necessary elements of his claims. Triton Energy Corp. v. Square D Co., 68 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir.1995). When we review the facts in the record, we are unable to conclude that Edelstein has failed to meet that burden with...