Central Pac. Ry. Co. v. Evans

• Citation: 111 F. 71
• Decision Date: 12 August 1901
• Docket Number: 712.
• Parties: CENTRAL PAC. RY. CO. v. EVANS et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Nevada

111 F. 71

CENTRAL PAC. RY. CO. v. EVANS et al.

No. 712.

United States Circuit Court, D. Nevada.

August 12, 1901

W. F Herrin, John Garber, and M. A. Murphy, for complainant.

William Woodburn, Atty. Gen., James R. Judge, Alfred Chartz, and Trenmor Coffin, for defendants.

A. E Cheney, for defendants Alphonso A. Evans and Joseph W Guthrie.

HAWLEY District Judge.

This is a suit in equity, brought by complainant who is the owner of a franchise for a railroad, granted by the laws of the United States, extending from the city of Oakland in the state of California, to the city of Ogden, in the state of Utah, known as and called the Central Pacific Railroad, which extends across the state of Nevada, and through the counties of Washoe, Lyon, Churchill, Humboldt, Lander, Eureka, and Elko, and is not situate in any other county in this state, against all the county assessors in this state, to enjoin and restrain the assessors of the particular counties through which the Central Pacific Railroad is built 'from adopting, or being controlled in their action by, the said valuation of said meeting of assessors, in valuing and assessing said Central Pacific Railroad in their respective counties, and from proceeding to value and assess such portion thereof as lies in the county of each, respectively, otherwise than in the exercise of his own official judgment and discretion, and according to the said laws of the state of Nevada for the assessment of railroads. ' Upon the filing of the bill an order was made requiring the defendants to show cause, if any they had, why the relief asked for should not be granted, and in the meantime a restraining order was issued. The rule to show cause was heard upon the complaint and answer, and upon various affidavits and documents presented by the respective parties. The real object of the suit is to test the validity of the law entitled 'An act to provide for a more uniform valuation and assessment of property in this state,' approved March 16, 1901 (St. 1901, p. 61), and the validity of the proceedings had thereunder by the state board of assessors at its meeting held in Carson City, Nev., from April 1 to 4, 1901, inclusive. These are the main questions involved herein, but, as incidental thereto, it is alleged in the bill of complaint:

'That the valuation so assumed to be fixed by the said majority of said assessors upon said Central Pacific Railroad was and is arbitrary, unjust, oppressive, and greatly disproportionate to the fair value thereof, and to the value fixed by said board of assessors upon other similar property, and to the systematic valuation of other real property in said state, which is systematically undervalued by the assessors defendants herein throughout said state of Nevada, and is valued by them at not more than one-half of the market value thereof; that the fair value of said Central Pacific Railroad in the state of Nevada for the purposes of assessment and taxation does not exceed an amount greater than from $8,000 to $12,000 per mile of said Central Pacific Railroad, in different parts of said state, in respect of its main road, and an amount not greater than $3,500 per mile in respect to its side tracks in said state; * * * that the said valuation of said Central Pacific Railroad by said board of assessors at their said meeting held under said statute constituted, on the part of the majority of said board, a denial to this complainant of the equal protection of the law, and that such denial is in contravention of the 14th amendment to the constitution of the United States.'

The affidavits and documents introduced upon this hearing principally relate to the value of the road. The answer was filed on behalf of each and all of the defendants, but at the hearing the defendant Evans, the assessor of Washoe county, and the defendant Guthrie, the assessor of Humboldt county, appeared separately, and took issue as to the value placed upon the railroad by the state board of assessors. Defendants claim that they are entitled to have the restraining order dissolved upon the principles announced by the supreme court of this state in Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Dayton, 11 Nev. 161. In that case it was held that the complainant was not entitled to an injunction because it had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law. It was stated by counsel for defendants that the case is identical with the one under consideration. That case was brought to enjoin the collection of a tax upon personal property. It was averred, among other things, in the complaint, that the defendant, who was the county assessor, 'threatens to sell, and, unless restrained and enjoined, will sell, the office fixtures of complainant for the taxes assessed and levied by him to complainant; * * * that complainant has no speedy or adequate remedy at law; that, should defendant sell said fixtures, complainant will be greatly and irreparably damaged and injured; and that said defendant is wholly unable to respond in damages. ' It appeared in that case that the assessor, in assessing and attempting to enforce the payment of the taxes, was pursuing the identical course indicated by the statutes of this state, and all his acts were within the line of his official duties as prescribed by law. Upon those facts the chief justice, speaking for the court, said:

'There must, in every case, be some special circumstances attending a threatened injury of this kind, which distinguishes it from a common trespass, and brings the case under some recognized head of equity jurisdiction, before the extraordinary and preventive remedy of injunction can be invoked. The necessity of strictly adhering to this rule is obvious. The legislature is invested with the sole power of providing the modes by which state and county taxes shall be levied, assessed, and collected, and it is essential that the modes prescribed, if within constitutional limits, should be faithfully carried out by the officers to whom is intrusted the duty of their enforcement. The state and county government are dependent for their support upon the taxes imposed upon the property of their citizens, and experience and observation teaches us that the payment of taxes has very often to be enforced by summary and stringent means against the adverse sentiment and persistent resistance of the taxpayer. * * * With such collections courts of equity ought never to interfere, unless the bill clearly shows that complainant is likely to suffer some great or irreparable injury from the acts of the officer, and further shows that he has no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law.'

See, also, Dows v. City of Chicago, 11 Wall. 108, 20 L.Ed. 65; Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Board of Public Works of West Virginia, 172 U.S. 32, 37, 19 Sup.Ct. 90, 43 L.Ed. 354, and authorities there cited.

The present suit is not brought to enjoin the collection of a tax. It is not brought to enjoin or restrain defendants, or either of them, from assessing the property of the complainant under the laws of this state; but is brought to compel the defendants to proceed according to law in making the assessments, the contention of the complainant being that by the law of the state of Nevada, regulating the assessment of railroads in said state, it is made the official duty of each of said assessors that he shall value and assess that portion of the Central Pacific Railroad which lies in the county of which he is the assessor according to his official judgment, and that in ascertaining, assessing, and fixing the value of said portion of the railroad for taxation he shall assess it the same as other property, and shall consider, treat, and assess such portion thereof at its value within his county as in integral part of a complete, continuous, and operated line of railroad, and not as so much land covered by the right of way merely, nor as so many miles of track consisting of iron rails, ties, and couplings, as prescribed by section 1238, Cutting's Comp. Laws. The injunction is asked for to prevent any assessor from assessing the property in any other manner. If the contention of complainant as to the law is correct, irreparable injury might follow, not only to the complainant, but also to the state and counties which are entitled to the tax to be collected from the complainant by a legal assessment of its property. If the contemplated and threatened assessment by the various county assessors is, as claimed by complainant, without authority of law, it would necessarily follow that complainant has no plain, speedy, or adequate remedy at law; and in this respect the case in hand stands entirely upon a different footing from the facts presented in the case of Wells, Fargo & Co. v. Dayton. Where there is an unlawful departure from the provisions of the law relating to assessment, or any violation of the fundamental law, it is the duty of the court to enjoin the proposed invalid assessment. Railroad & Telephone Cos. v. Board of Equalizers of Tennessee (C.C.) 85 F. 302, 308; Crim v. Town of Philippi, 38 W.Va. 122, 18 S.E. 466. In Cooley, Tax'n, 760, the author says:

'There are certain cases with which the courts of law cannot adequately deal. Their preventive remedies are few, and of narrow scope; and where the case is such that, if threatened action is allowed to be taken, the mischief will be irremediable, equity, under old and well-established principles, will interfere, because equity alone can do complete justice under such circumstances. * * * The available remedy in equity, when any is admissible, is commonly that by injunction.'

This principle was recognized and clearly stated in Wells, Fargo &amp Co. v. Dayton, supra. See, also, City of Ogden v. Armstrong, 168 U.S. 224, 237, 18 Sup.Ct. 98, 42 L.Ed....