In re Coleman's Will

• Decision Date: 27 November 1888
• Citation: 111 N.Y. 220,19 N.E. 71
• Parties: In re COLEMAN'S WILL.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

111 N.Y. 220

19 N.E. 71

In re COLEMAN'S WILL.¹

Court of Appeals of New York.

November 27, 1888.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, Third department.

James C. Rogers, for appellants.

A. D. Wait, for respondent.

RUGER, C. J.

The probate of the will of William Coleman, deceased, was contested before the surrogate by his widow and several of his children and grandchildren, upon the ground that he was not of sound mind and memory at the time of its execution, and its execution was procured through undue influence, fraud, and intimidation exercised over him by Robert S. Coleman. The will was admitted to probate, and the decree was affirmed upon appeal by the general term. It is urged upon this appeal that the evidence produced before the surrogate by the contestants, as to the mental and physical weakness and incompetency of the testator to make a valid will, is so strong and conclusive that this court should reverse the decision of the court below upon the facts. It is not our purpose to go into a detailed history of the evidence, or comment upon the weight and force of the various facts and circumstances proved on the trial by the respective parties to sustain their several positions, as it is not even claimed by the appellants that there was no evidence to support the decree of the surrogate. Their utmost contention is that the evidence on the part of the contestants is so persuasive and convincing, either of the mental incompetency of the testator or of the exercise of undue influence by the proponent in procuring the execution of the will, that the court should hold as matter of law that it was error for the surrogate to admit it to probate. The argument of the appellants is based, to a large extent, upon evidence which was admitted on the trial against the objections of the proponent, and which we deem to be clearly inadmissible. While we consider the case made by the contestants upon the evidence to be very strong, and as presenting a serious question whether the testator was competent to make a valid will or not, yet the exclusion of the evidence improperly received on their behalf by the surrogate very much impairs the force and strength of their case, and leaves the evidence as to the testator's competency more nearly balanced than it would otherwise have been.

A general outline of the facts will be sufficient to present the views we deem it necessary to express upon the determination of this appeal. Robert S. Coleman, the only son of the testator, was the proponent of the will, and one of the three executors named therein; the others having renounced or declined to act in that capacity. The testator at the time of its execution was upwards of 80 years of age, and died within a year thereafter. He was then possessed of property mainly consisting of real estate of the value of about $40,000, and had several children and grandchildren who were in needy circumstances, partially dependent upon him for support; but were not mentioned in or provided for by the will, although apparently the natural objects of his bounty. That instrument, after making slight provision for two of his grandchildren, gave his personal property, together with a life-estate in his homestead, to his widow, and the remainder thereof, together with a remainder in the homestead, to the proponent. Robert was by profession a lawyer, and although living in his father's family, and being supported by him until he was nearly 40 years of age, had never rendered material assistance to the testator in his business affairs, and was not apparently regarded by him with favor, or as a proper or fit person to have the management and control of business such as that in which the testator had theretofore been engaged.

Upon the trial much evidence was given upon both sides in regard to the mental and physical condition of the testator during the three or four years preceding his death; but no direct evidence was produced as to any effort on the part of the proponent to procure the making of a will by his father, or to influence or dictate the nature of its provisions. The proof on the part of the contestants as to the exercise of undue influence is based wholly upon inference sought to be drawn from the apparently unfriendly relations existing between the testator and his son; the alleged unnatural and inequitable disposition of the property; the advanced age of the testator; and the absence of any apparent reason, except the assumed existence of some extraneous influence, for excluding the other children from a share in his estate. There was much evidence produced by the contestants as to the impairment of the mental and physical condition of the testator subsequent to 1877, when it was claimed that he had experienced a paralytic affection which caused a gradual but continuous impairment of his faculties down to the time of his death, in April, 1881. The evidence was met on the part of the proponent by nearly an equal number of witnesses, who testified to facts and circumstances showing the continued mental soundness of the testator's faculties, and his capacity to transact business affairs, until after the execution of the will.

The evidence on the part of the contestants is subject to the criticism that much of it was given under the objection of the proponent, and was of doubtful admissibility upon the questions litigated. Aside from the evidence of Mrs. Coleman, the most material and important facts on the part of the contestants were undoubtedly proved by the witnesses Mrs. Seelye, the daughter of the testator, and the two physicians, Drs Clark and Little, who testified to the unsoundness of mind of the testator during...