In re Cager's Will

• Decision Date: 27 November 1888
• Citation: 111 N.Y. 343,18 N.E. 866
• Parties: In re CAGER'S WILL.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

111 N.Y. 343

18 N.E. 866

In re CAGER'S WILL.¹

Court of Appeals of New York.

November 27, 1888.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, Fifth department.

Assessment of taxes on Mary Griffin and others, as devisees under the will of William Cager, by the surrogate of Cayuga county. Decree of surrogate reversed by general term, and the state appeals.

Chas. F. Tabor, Atty. Gen., for appellant.

A. P. Rich, for respondents.

RUGER, C. J.

While we concur in the reversal by the general term of the decree of the surrogate, imposing taxes upon the interest devised to some of the legatees by the will of William Cager, we do not approve of the reasons assigned therefor by that court. So far as a tax was levied upon the life-estate attempted to be devised to Mary Griffin, its value, as assessed by the appraiser, being less than $500, it was taken from the category of devises subject to taxation by the law, under which the proceeding was instituted. Section 1, c. 483, Laws 1885. That act was intended to authorize the imposition of taxes upon devises to collateral relatives and strangers only when the estate devised to them individually exceeded in value the sum of $500. The tax is upon the individual, and can be imposed only when the particular interest devised exceeds in value the amount of the limitation provided by the statute. So, too, the question in this case is not affected by the amendment made to the law of 1885 by chapter 713 of the laws of 1887, exempting legacies to adopted children from the operation of the law, as the tax in this case was adjudicated and imposed by the surrogate April 26, 1887, and before the amendment took effect.

We are thus brought to the only question in the case, which is whether the children of Mary Griffin took such an interest in the property devised by the will of William Cager as subjected them to the payment of a tax thereon by force of the acts referred to. This question is to be determined by a consideration of the provisions of that will. The portions affecting the question involved read as follows: ‘ First. After all my lawful debts are paid and discharged, I give, devise, and bequeath all my estate, both real and personal, of what nature and kind soever, to my wife, Mary Cager, to be used and enjoyed, and at her disposal during the term of her natural life. Secondly. I give and devise one-third of my real estate and personal property that may remain at the decease of my wife, Mary Cager, to my adopted daughter, Mary Griffin; that is to say, the use of said one-third during her natural life. Thirdly. I further devise and bequeath, at the decease of my wife, Mary Cager, the remaining two-thirds of the real estate and personal property to the present heirs of the aforesaid Mary Griffin, namely, Eva Griffin, William C. Griffin, Frank Griffin, and George Griffin, share and share alike. I further devise and bequeath that at the decease of my adopted daughter, Mary Griffin, the one-third (as above stated) of which she has had the use shall be divided between the present heirs of the aforesaid Mary Griffin, share and share alike.’ The report of the appraiser appointed by the surrogate to appraise the value of the property devised to the various legatees shows that he assessed the value of the estate devised respectively to the children of Mary Griffin upon two theories, leaving the question to the surrogate to determine upon which theory the tax, if any, should be assessed. Upon the theory that the widow took a life-estate only in the property, he found the value of that devised to the several children of Mary Griffin to be the sum of $640.96 each; but in case the interest devised to the widow was an estate in fee, or a life-estate with power of disposition,...