Pas Communications, Inc. v. U.S. Sprint, Inc.

• Decision Date: 06 July 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-2182-JWL.,99-2182-JWL.
• Citation: 112 F.Supp.2d 1106
• Parties: PAS COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; Quality Transfer, Inc.; 1A Rob Moving; Reliable Maintenance, Inc.; K.E. Johnson Consultants, Inc.; and Riteway Magic Supply Company, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. U.S. SPRINT, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

112 F.Supp.2d 1106

PAS COMMUNICATIONS, INC.; Quality Transfer, Inc.; 1A Rob Moving; Reliable Maintenance, Inc.; K.E. Johnson Consultants, Inc.; and Riteway Magic Supply Company, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. U.S. SPRINT, INC., Defendant.

No. 99-2182-JWL.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

July 6, 2000.

Rebecca S. Yocum, Morrison & Hecker L.L.P., Overland Park, KS, Nimrod T. Chapel, Jr. Garrett M. Hodes, Humphrey, Farrington & McClain, Independence, MO, Christopher D Matchett, Matchett, Verbois, Futrell and Henchy, P.L.C., Baton Rouge, LA, D. Robert Webster, Neil E. Lucas, David K. Lee, Timothy E. Peterson, Bamberger & Feibleman, Indianapolis, IN, for plaintiffs.

Randall E. Hendricks, Lawrence A. Rouse, David J. Rempel, Rouse, Hendricks, German, May & Shank, Kansas City, MO, for defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LUNGSTRUM, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, several minority-owned businesses, allege that defendant intentionally denied plaintiffs on the basis of race subcontracting opportunities in connection with defendant's various projects. In that regard, plaintiffs allege that defendant interfered with plaintiffs' civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 2000d (Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Plaintiffs further allege that defendant conspired with others to boycott plaintiffs' services in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1.

This matter is presently before the court on defendant's motion to dismiss (doc. # 51) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).¹ As set forth in more detail below, the court grants in part and denies in part defendant's motion; the motion is granted with respect to plaintiffs' antitrust claim and is otherwise denied.²

I. Applicable Legal Standard

Defendant moves to dismiss plaintiffs' claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court will dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim only when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the theory of recovery that would entitle him or her to relief, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc., 144 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir.1998), or when an issue of law is dispositive. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). The court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, Maher, 144 F.3d at 1304, and all reasonable inferences from those facts are viewed in favor of the plaintiff. Witt v. Roadway Express, 136 F.3d 1424, 1428 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 881, 119 S.Ct. 188, 142 L.Ed.2d 153 (1998). The issue in resolving a motion such as this is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). With these principles in mind, the court turns to defendant's motion.

II. Plaintiffs' Section 1981 Claim

In their complaint, plaintiffs allege that defendant violated plaintiffs' right to make and enforce contracts pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Specifically, plaintiffs claim that defendant has intentionally denied plaintiffs on the basis of race subcontracting opportunities in connection with defendant's contracts. Defendant maintains that this claim must be dismissed because plaintiffs have failed in their complaint to identify any specific contracts that defendant allegedly denied them. In the alternative, defendant moves for a more definite statement of plaintiffs' section 1981 claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). As set forth below, the court denies defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' section 1981 claim and denies defendant's request for a more definite statement. The proper tool for eliciting additional detail with respect to the contracting opportunities allegedly denied plaintiffs by defendant is the discovery process.

In connection with their section 1981 claim, plaintiffs allege that defendant "annually contracts billions of dollars to vendors such as plaintiffs;" that defendant is a "beneficiary of numerous federal contracts and recently executed a contract with the Federal government believed to be in excess of Six Billion Dollars;" that defendant is currently involved in the construction of its world headquarters, a project "with a proposed budget believed to be in excess of Six Hundred and Sixty Million Dollars" — less than .005% of which has gone to African American contractors; that defendant "routinely" withholds bid information and bid opportunities from potential African American contractors on the basis of race; that plaintiffs have sought and been denied on the basis of race the opportunity to enter into contracts with defendant; and that contracting opportunities were routinely made available to majority-owned companies.

These allegations are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss under the federal rules. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) (pleading need only set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief"); see also Edwards & Assocs., Inc. v. Black & Veatch, L.L.P., 84 F.Supp.2d 1182, 1192 (D.Kan.2000) (discussing prima facie elements for section 1981 claim in connection with denial of contracting opportunities). The purpose of "fact pleading" as provided by Rule 8(a)(2) "is to give the defendant fair notice of the claims against him without requiring the plaintiff to have every legal theory or fact developed in detail before the complaint is filed and the parties have opportunity for discovery." Evans v. McDonald's Corp., 936 F.2d 1087, 1091 (10th Cir.1991). Considering a somewhat analogous argument under the Railway Labor Act, the Supreme Court has held:

The respondents also argue that the complaint failed to set forth specific facts to support its general allegations of discrimination and that its dismissal is therefore proper. The decisive answer to this is that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not require a claimant to set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim. To the contrary, all the Rules require is `a short and plain statement of the claim' that will give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. The illustrative forms appended to the Rules plainly demonstrate this. Such simplified `notice pleading' is made possible by the liberal opportunity for discovery and the other pretrial procedures established by the Rules to disclose more precisely the basis of both claim and defense and to define more narrowly the disputed facts and issues. Following the simple guide of Rule 8(f) that `all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice,' we have no doubt that petitioners' complaint adequately set forth a claim and gave the respondents fair notice of its basis.

See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47-48, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). In short, the court, after reviewing plaintiffs' complaint in light of the applicable pleading requirements, is convinced that plaintiffs have adequately pled a claim under section 1981 and that defendant has received fair notice of that claim.

As should be evident from the foregoing, the court also rejects defendant's argument that plaintiffs should be required to provide a more definite statement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e). Rule 12(e) provides that "[i]f a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement." The situations in which making a Rule 12(e) motion is appropriate are very limited and, as a result, such motions are infrequently granted. 5A Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1377 (2d ed.1990). Under the circumstances presented here, the court cannot conclude that plaintiffs' complaint is "so vague or ambiguous" that defendant "cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading." Additional detail with respect to plaintiffs' section 1981 claim should be elicited through the discovery process. See Schmidt v. Shawnee Mission School Dist., No. Civ.A. 98-2377-GTV, 1998 WL 892662, at *1 (D.Kan. Dec.16, 1998) (denying motion for more definite statement; "Courts expect parties to pursue discovery for details beyond those required by Rule 8 for pleadings."); Audiotext Communications Network, Inc. v. U.S. Telecom, Inc., Civ. A. No. 94-2395-GTV, 1995 WL 36543, at *5 (D.Kan. Jan.9, 1995) (denying motion for more definite statement; "If more information is required, defendant has the full panoply of discovery methods available to it.").

III. Plaintiffs' Title VI Claim

In addition to their section 1981 claim, plaintiffs allege in their complaint that defendant violated their rights under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et al., to be free from intentional discrimination "under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance," see id. § 2000d. Specifically, plaintiffs claim that defendant has intentionally denied plaintiffs on the basis of race various subcontracting opportunities in connection with defendant's federal contracts. Defendant contends that plaintiffs' Title VI claim must be dismissed because the federal contracts referenced in plaintiffs' complaint do not constitute "federal financial assistance" within the meaning of Title VI and because defendant as a whole is not subsidized by federal funds. As set forth below, the court concludes that plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of discovery on the issue of whether defendant receives federal financial assistance within the meaning of Title VI and, accordingly, denies defendant's motion with respect to plaintiffs' Title VI claim.

Title VI of the Civil Rights...