In re Howe's Estate

• Decision Date: 15 January 1889
• Citation: 112 N.Y. 100,19 N.E. 513
• Parties: In re HOWE'S ESTATE.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

112 N.Y. 100

19 N.E. 513

In re HOWE'S ESTATE.¹

Court of Appeals of New York.

January 15, 1889.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, Fourth department.

The surrogate of Tompkins county directed the executors of the will of Mary Howe, deceased, to pay a tax of 5 per cent. on certain legacies given by said will, and they appealed to the supreme court, where the order of the surrogate was reversed, (48 Hun, 235,) and the district attorney of Tompkins County appeals.

Atty. Gen. Tabor, for appellant.

Newman & McLachlan, for respondents

DANFORTH, J.

The record shows that Mary Howe died on the 16th of June, 1885, leaving property of more than $20,000 in value, and a will by which she devised it in different proportions to various persons; giving, among others, to Myra Taylor a legacy of less than $500. So far as is material to this appeal, two questions were presented to the surrogate: (1) Whether any of the property which passed by the will was subject to the tax imposed by the ‘Act to tax gifts, legacies, and collateral inheritances in certain cases.’ Chapter 483, Laws 1885. (2) And, if any, whether the legacy to Myra Taylor was liable to taxation under that act.

The surrogate answered both questions in the affirmative. Upon appeal, the general term were of a different opinion upon the first point, and found it unnecessary to pass upon the other.

The act was passed June 10, 1885, and declared that, ‘after the passage of this act, all property which shall pass by will,’ etc., to any person, etc., other than the father or certain other excepted persons, ‘shall be and is subject to a tax of five dollars on every hundred dollars, of the clear market value of such property: * * * provided, that an estate which may be valued at a less sum than five hundred dollars shall not be subject to said duty or tax.’ In the absence of any other provision, this act would have taken effect from its date; that being the time when, according to the certificate of the secretary of state, the bill became a law, (1 Rev. St. p. 157, tit. 4, pt. 1, c. 7, § 11; 7th Ed. p. 433;) but the words, ‘after the passage of this act,’ are no more significant than the word ‘hereafter,’ and the general provision of the Revised Statutes, (Id. § 12,) ‘of the enactment and promulgation of statutes, and of the time from which they take effect,’ declares that ‘every law, unless a different time shall be prescribed therein, shall commence and take effect, throughout the state, on and not before the twentieth day after the day of its final passage, as certified by the secretary of state.’

The provisions of this...