Paul v. Travelers' Ins. Co.

Citation112 N.Y. 472,20 N.E. 347
PartiesPAUL v. TRAVELERS' INS. CO.
Decision Date05 March 1889
CourtNew York Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from supreme court, general term, Fourth department.

Action by Ida M. Paul, administratrix of Matthew L. Paul, deceased, against the Travelers' Insurance Company on a policy of insurance issued to the deceased. From an order of the circuit court of Onondaga county, dismissing the complaint, plaintiff appealed to the general term, where the order was reversed, from which order defendant appeals.

Louis Marshall, for appellant.

Wm. S. Andrews, for respondent.

GRAY, J.

This record contains no other evidence or proofs than are embodied in a paper entitled ‘Statement of facts and stipulation of attorneys,’ which was submitted by the counsel to the trial judge. Upon this stipulation the trial judge found, among others, the following as facts: ‘That on December 3, 1884, and during the continuance of the said certificate or policy of insurance, the said Matthew L. Paul died; that at the time of his death he was stopping as a guest at the Sturtevant House, in New York city; that he went to his room in said hotel between 10 and 11 o'clock P. M. of December 2, 1884; that at some time, after he went to his room, the gas therein became turned on; that at about 2 o'clock of December 3, 1884, the said Paul was found dead in his bed; that the room was tightly closed, and the atmosphere therein was filled with illuminating gas; that the said Paul lay on his bed like a man asleep, without any outward indications that he was dead, and without any external or visible signs of injury upon his body; that the death of said Paul was caused by his breathing the atmosphere of said room, full, as aforesaid, of illuminating gas.’ And the judge also found as a fact ‘that the death of said Paul was occasioned by accidental means.’ The defendant resists a recovery upon the policy of insurance, on the ground that the deceased came to his death by the inhaling of gas, within the meaning of the policy, and from such a cause of death no right of action arises.

The sole question presented, therefore, is as to the proper interpretation of the policy of insurance issued to the plaintiff's intestate. By its provisions, the person insured is indemnified, in a certain sum per week, ‘against loss of time, not exceeding 26 consecutive weeks from the happening of such accident and injury as shall, independently of all other causes, immediately and wholly disable and prevent him from the prosecution of any and every kind of business by reason of bodily injuries, * * * through external, violent, and accidental means; or, in the event of death, occasioned by bodily injuries received as aforesaid, when resulting within ninety days from the happening thereof, and in such event only, will pay the sum of $3,000; * * * provided, always, that this insurance shall not extend to any bodily injury of which there shall be no external and visible sign upon the body of the insured; * * * nor to any death or disability which may have been caused * * * by hernia, bodily infirmities, * * * nor by the taking of poison, contact with poisonous substances, or inhaling of gas, or by any surgical operation, or medical treatment; nor to any case except where the injury is the proximate and sole cause of the disability or death. * * *’ With great ingenuity and ability the counsel for the litigants have argued in support of their respective positions; the one, that Paul's death was the result of an accidental cause, which was covered by the fair and reasonable interpretation of this policy; and the other, that, by language clear and unambiguous, which leaves no office for interpretation to perform, such a death was expressly excepted in the instrument of insurance. A careful consideration of this instrument, and of the scope and design of its provisions, leads us to the conclusion that the appellant must fail in his contention. At the foundation lie the facts, conceded and found, that there was a death caused by accidental means, and that the accidental means were the decedent's ‘breathing the atmosphere of the room full of illuminating gas.’ The absence of any external and visible sign upon the body of the insured presents no embarrassment. We do not understand the clauses of this agreement to require such a sign as a prerequisite to the right of recovery in case of death. We consider that point of construction to have been covered by the decision of this court in Mallory v. Insurance Co., 47 N. Y. 52. In that case the body of the deceased was found in a pond. The policy was one embracing causes only, where the death was caused by an injury received from an accident, and contained this clause: ‘Provided, always, that no claim shall be made under this policy by the insured in respect of any injury, unless the same shall be caused by some outward and visible means. * * *’ GROVER, J., delivering the opinion of the court, held: ‘The construction put upon the contract in the charge was correct. That construction was that the terms ‘outward and visible means' applied only to injuries not causing death in three months, but to such only as entitled the deceased to certain sums from the company during their continuance, as provided by the policy.’ In the present policy the proviso that the insurance shall not extend...

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