Mantorville Ry. & Transfer Co. v. Slingerland (In re Mantorville Ry. & Transfer Co.)

Decision Date12 July 1907
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court
PartiesIn re MANTORVILLE RY. & TRANSFER CO. MANTORVILLE RY. & TRANSFER CO. v. SLINGERLAND.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from District Court, Dodge County; Thomas S. Buckham, Judge.

Condemnation proceedings by the Mantorville Railway & Transfer Company against Teunis Slingerland, Jr., Judgment for defendant. From an order denying a new trial, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

Special benefits may be set off, in proceedings to condemn a right of way for a railroad company, against the value of the part taken and damages shown to have accrued to the remainder.

The term ‘special benefits,’ as used in condemnation of railway right of way, has the same meaning and is governed by the same principles as when employed in highway, drainage, or ordinary municipal improvement proceedings only in so far as private property is taken for public use by such proceedings.

In other cases, the identity of meaning and principles is to be determined with due reference to distinctions with respect to the exaction of payment as a condition precedent to subsequent use of railway facilities only, to the natural difference in accessibility to the improvement, and to the judicial nature of proceedings to condemn, as distinguished from the administrative character of ordinary local improvement assessments.

Such benefits must be pro tanto a fair equivalent for land parted with and damages inflicted. To that end they must be special, not common; direct, not consequential; substantial, not speculative; proximate, not remote; actual, and not constructive.

The usual beneficial results of the mutually advantageous arrangement between a state and a railway company having the right to exercise the power of eminent domain are not special benefits.

Mere increase in facilities of transportation does not amount to a special benefit.

A railroad in this case constructed its line over land, some of which was taken for use as a part of its right of way, along the only feasible route to reach stone quarries. The land without the road was of no immediate value for commercial or quarrying purposes, but with the road was possibly of considerable value for such uses. It is held that such value was not a special benefit. George A. Norton and Samuel Lord, for appellant.

Bunn T. Willson and Chas. C. Willson, for respondent.

JAGGARD, J.

In 1896 the plaintiff and appellant railway company, on notice to defendant and respondent, presented its petition to the district court, describing the route of its proposed railroad and the land of defendant it desired to appropriate, and asked the appointment of three commissioners to appraise damages. The commissioners, duly appointed, appraised defendant's damages at $575, and in 1896 filed their report. Both parties appealed from the award. The company gave the statutory bond, took possession of the land, and constructed its railroad over it. The proceedings on appeal were continued from time to time until 1906, when they were tried. The jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant for $1,050. This appeal was taken from an order of the trial court denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial.

The assignments of error are addressed to the rulings of the trial court in excluding evidence of special benefits to the land, due to the facts that the road was constructed along the only feasible route to reach two stone quarries on defendant's premises, part of which premises were taken for the right of way, and that without the road the lands were of no value for quarrying or commercial purposes, but with the road, constructed as it was, the quarries were worth over $1,500. The defendant insists that this testimony was directed to show the value of the two stone quarries on his premises, both of which were opened and operated at a time long subsequent to the commencement of these proceedings, the taking of the lands, and the construction of the road by the company, and that the testimony did not tend to show benefits to the defendant's land at the time at which such benefits are to be determined according to law. Sherwood v. Railway Co., 21 Minn. 122;Warren v. Railroad Co., 21 Minn. 424;Whitacre v. Railroad Co., 24 Minn. 311. See, however, Morin v. Railway Co., 30 Minn. 400, 14 N. W. 460; 18 Cent. Dig. ‘Eminent Domain,’ §§ 325-402. Construing the assignments of error and the record on which they are based with the liberality required by current appellate practice, we are of the opinion that the appeal is sufficient to present the merits of the controversy.

The essential question upon the merits is whether the court erred in holding that there were no special benefits available as a set-off shown or offered to be shown in this case. Plaintiff's argument upon the facts was that defendant's lands, having stone quarries upon them, must have been specially benefited by the building of a railroad across his property so near to the quarries that they could be easily reached. While it recognizes that at the time of taking the lands the railroad could not have been compelled to build a spur track, this, it insists, did not deprive the road of the right to deduct the value of the special benefit. ‘Railroads are built, among other things, to carry freight. Stub roads are built, as a rule, for the very purpose of reaching quarries, factories, mills, mines, and the like; and the fact that they are built for such purposes makes it reasonably certain that they will furnish necessary connections and switches.’ In support of and in opposition to this contention we are referred to many decisions, which counsel for the respective parties have collated with industry and classified with ingenuity. These decisions, the authorities therein referred to, and others which we have examined, reproduce many shades of opposing opinion. Frequently little heed has been paid in these opinions to the nature of the proceeding under which the question has arisen and to the subject-matter to which the benefits pertained. Much of their lack of harmony is due, also, to the failure to observe the varying rules adopted by the various jurisdictions with respect to whether either, neither, or both general and special benefits may be used as a set-off, and whether such counterclaims avail as to either, neither, or both the value of the part taken and damages to the remainder. There is observable in these authorities a general inclination to deduce the rule from the term ‘special benefits,’ and to treat that phrase as if it were feasible from it to determine, a priori, by reasoning of mere nominalists, how the owner of property shall be compensated for what part of his estate has been taken by power of law. Under the circumstances, it is desirable (1) to distinguish between the varying proceedings and subject-matter involved in each, respectively; (2) to advert to fundamental principles, and to note the pertinent rules of law adopted in different jurisdictions; and (3) to reach a conclusion in this case with regard, not to the phrase ‘special benefits,’ but to the substance of the actual conditions of fact presented by this record.

1. The term ‘special benefits' is used indiscriminately, as if its meaning were identical in cases of judicial highways and ditches, assessments for local improvements, and in condemnation proceedings. There are, however, substantial, but neglected, distinctions arising from the nature of these proceedings and the subject-matter to which they apply. The primary basis of distinction is that in condemnation proceedings only is part of the land invariably taken by eminent domain. It may or may not happen that highway, drainage, or municipal improvements include this exercise of that sovereign power of the state. It is only when this occurs that the term ‘special benefits' has exactly the same meaning, and that the identical principles apply to it as when employed in proceedings to condemn a right of way by a railway company. See Arbrush v. Town of Oakdale, 28 Minn. 61, 9 N. W. 30.

Another distinction is this: Of these cases, a railway company only secures lands for a public use for which the public is subsequently required to pay. When abutting property is charged for the construction of a sewer, a street, a sidewalk, a drain, or a ditch, or when property within a district is assessed for a park, a boulevard, a fill, or the like, no subsequent charge is made for use. It is true, however, that a water frontage assessment may be levied and a subsequent water rate be collected for water furnished; but even here no direct charge is made for incidental fire protection.

Another distinction is to be found in the accessibility of the improvement. When, for example, a street is opened through a man's property, he has, subject to reasonable regulation, instantaneous and immediate access to and egress from his property at every part of the street. Practically every other municipal improvement, and judicial highways and ditches, confer upon abutting owners similar privileges. In all such cases the right so conferred may be enforced by process. When a railroad, however, is constructed through a man's property, he may or may not have access to it at particular places. It is a question in the first place of statutory provision, and in the second place of fact, whether he can secure the exercise of discretion on the part of public officers in ordering the construction of a spur track, the furnishing of switch connections, or the location of a station. Under no circumstances is his privilege in this regard at all analagous to the complete, if not absolute, right of property owners to enjoy municipal improvements for which they have been assessed.

The final distinction is this: The ordinary local assessments are made by the administrative branch of the government, and the ability of the court to control them is limited in the extreme. The emphasis placed on the power of the executive to...

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2 cases
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