Sache v. Wallace
| Decision Date | 31 May 1907 |
| Docket Number | 15,153 - (149) |
| Citation | 112 N.W. 386,101 Minn. 169 |
| Parties | WILLIAM R. SACHE v. EMMA L. WALLACE |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Ramsey county against Ellen M Gillette to determine adverse claims. Defendant failed to answer or demur, and pursuant to an order of Orr, J., a default judgment was entered in favor of plaintiff. From an order of Kelly, J., granting a motion of Emma L. Wallace to vacate the judgment as to a certain provision therein plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.
In addition to jurisdiction of the parties and subject-matter of the action, it is necessary to the validity of a judgment that the court should have had jurisdiction of the precise question the judgment assumes to determine, or the particular relief which it assumes to grant.
Default Judgment -- Relief.
In an action to determine adverse claims to real property, or any similar action, plaintiff is entitled, on default of defendant to answer, to such relief, and to such relief only, as he demands in his complaint, or such as comes within the scope of its allegations, where the demand for relief is imperfectly framed.
Default Judgment -- Want of Jurisdiction.
A judgment in such an action awarding relief beyond the prayer of the complaint or scope of its allegations, the excessive relief appearing from the face of the record, is void for want of jurisdiction, and is open to attack before or after the time of appeal therefrom, even by a person not a party to the action, but who is affected by the judgment in his property rights.
Default Judgment.
A judgment of that character is not a mere irregularity, but extrajudicial and void.
Jurisdictional Defect.
Distinction between an irregularity not affecting the jurisdiction of the court and a jurisdictional defect pointed out.
William G. White, for appellant.
James Schoonmaker, for respondent.
This action was brought under R.L. 1905, § 4424, to determine adverse claims to certain real property. The complaint, so far as here material, alleges that the plaintiff is the owner in fee simple of the land, which is described therein; that it is vacant and unoccupied; and that defendant claims some title or interest therein adverse to plaintiff. "Wherefore the plaintiff prays that he may be adjudged to be the owner in fee simple of the above described real estate, * * * and that the defendant may be adjudged to have no right, title, interest or estate in said real estate * * * and that he may have such other and further relief," etc. The summons was duly served, but defendant made no appearance in the action. Thereafter, on application of plaintiff, the court below made an order reciting the service of the summons and default of defendant and directing the entry of judgment "in all things in accordance with the prayer of the complaint." There were no findings of fact disclosing the source of plaintiff's title to the property, or the title or right of defendant, nor any finding upon which to predicate a judgment transferring to plaintiff defendant's title, if any she had. The order for judgment was in the form often used in default cases, and does not disclose that any evidence was offered for the consideration of the court. On June 27, 1905, judgment was duly entered by the clerk, substantially as prayed for in the complaint, to the effect that plaintiff was the owner of the property and that defendant had no title or right therein, and for the following further relief not prayed for in the complaint, nor embraced within the scope of the order for judgment, namely:
It is further adjudged and decreed that all the right, title, interest, estate or lien in, to, upon, or against said premises, held, owned, or possessed by said Ellen M. Gillette [defendant], be and it is hereby transferred to and vested in William R. Sache, the plaintiff in this action.
Defendant was in fact neither owner of the property at the time of the commencement of the action nor had she any interest therein when judgment was entered, having prior thereto conveyed the same to Emma L. Wallace; but the deed had not then been recorded. On October 31, 1906, more than a year after the entry of the judgment, Mrs. Wallace, upon affidavits setting forth her ownership of the property and her ignorance of the action or judgment, moved the court to strike from the judgment the provision quoted above in full, by which the title of defendant was transferred to and vested in plaintiff, on the ground, among others, that the court had no authority to incorporate the same in the judgment, in that the relief thereby granted was not prayed for in the complaint. The court granted the motion, and plaintiff appealed.
It is contended by appellant that, conceding for the purposes of the point that the relief granted exceeded that to which plaintiff was entitled under the complaint, the inclusion thereof in the judgment was an error or irregularity not going to the jurisdiction of the court, to be corrected by motion or appeal within the time prescribed by statute for the correction of such errors; that the judgment, not having been so proceeded against, became, after the time for appeal had expired, final and conclusive as to all the world. The merits of this contention depend wholly upon the question whether the embodiment of the excessive relief in the judgment was a mere irregularity, or whether it exceeded the jurisdiction and power of the court. If a mere irregularity, counsel's contention is sound. It is elementary that a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, after the expiration of the time of appeal, cannot be impeached, either directly or indirectly, for mere errors or irregularities not going to the jurisdiction of the court; but in all cases where the court exceeds its jurisdiction, and want of jurisdiction appears upon the face of the record, the judgment may be attacked at any time, before or after the time for appeal, even by a person not a party to the action, but who is affected thereby in his property rights. Mueller v. Reimer, 46 Minn. 314, 48 N.W. 1120; 12 Enc. Pl. & Pr. 188; Phelps v. Heaton, 79 Minn. 476, 82 N.W. 990.
1. The courts are not in full harmony as to what constitutes an irregularity within the meaning of the rule referred to. Generally speaking, however, an irregularity may be defined as a failure to follow appropriate and necessary rules of practice or procedure, omitting some act essential to the due and orderly conduct of the action or proceeding, or doing it in an improper manner. 17 Am. & Eng. Enc. (2d Ed.) 481; Jenness v. Circuit Judge, 42 Mich. 469, 4 N.W. 220; Holmes v. Russel, 9 Dowl. 487. Errors or defects of this character, that may be amended without prejudice to the absolute rights of the parties, do not affect the jurisdiction of the court to the extent that its final action is a nullity. But proceedings outside the authority of the court, or in violation or contravention of statutory prohibitions, are, whether the court have jurisdiction of the parties and subject-matter of the action or proceedings, or not, utterly void. Ex parte Simmons, 62 Ala. 416; Ex parte Gibson, 31 Cal. 620, 91 Am. Dec. 546; Barton v. Saunders, 16 Ore. 51, 16 P. 921, 8 Am. St. 261.
The mere fact that the court has jurisdiction of the subject-matter of an action before it does not justify an exercise of a power not authorized by law, or a grant of relief to one of the parties the law declares shall not be granted. If the court may do so under the guise of "jurisdiction of the subject-matter," then it may commit all sorts of depredations upon the rights of parties, particularly in default cases. "Jurisdiction of the subject-matter" means, not only authority to hear and determine a particular class of actions, but authority to hear and determine the particular questions the court assumes to decide. Though it has general jurisdiction over the subject-matter, for instance, of actions to foreclose mortgages, to quiet title to real property, or for damages for personal injuries, its power to decide and determine matters in dispute between the parties in a given action is limited to those questions which are brought before it by the pleadings. The foundation of the rule that judgments of a court of competent jurisdiction are attended with a presumption of absolute verity is the fact that the parties have been properly brought into court and given an opportunity to be heard upon the matters determined. But the foundation falls and the rule of verity ceases when it affirmatively appears from the record that the judgment adjudicated and determined matters upon which the parties were not heard. When the court goes beyond and outside the issues made by the pleadings, and in the absence of one of the parties determines property rights against him which he has not submitted to it, the authority of the court is exceeded, even though it had jurisdiction of the general subject of the matters adjudicated. Such a departure cannot be held a mere irregularity. This position is sustained both from the view point of our statutes upon the subject and under the rules and principles of the common law.
2. The action was one to determine adverse claims to real property. The complaint alleges title in plaintiff, and that defendant claims to have some estate or interest therein adverse to plaintiff. The prayer for relief was that plaintiff be decreed the owner of the property, and that defendant be adjudged to have no interest in or title to the same. The court ordered judgment for the relief demanded in the complaint. Plaintiff caused judgment to be entered for the other and further relief now objected to.
Our statutes (R.L. 1905, § 4264) provide: That ...
To continue reading
Request your trial