Fort v. Brinkley

• Decision Date: 05 October 1908
• Citation: 112 S.W. 1084,87 Ark. 400
• Parties: FORT v. BRINKLEY
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

112 S.W. 1084

87 Ark. 400

FORT v. BRINKLEY

Supreme Court of Arkansas

October 5, 1908

Appeal from Monroe Circuit Court; Eugene Lankford, Judge; reversed.

STATEMENT BY THE COURT.

P. W Fort was on the 21st day of October, 1907, tried and fined by T. H. Jackson, mayor of the city of Brinkley, for the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors, known as Fort's Tonic, and in addition to the fine imposed upon the appellant his license to practice medicine in the State of Arkansas was revoked.

Fort appealed from that portion of the judgment revoking his license to practice medicine, and the cause was submitted to the Monroe Circuit Court, sitting as a jury, upon the following agreed statement of facts, to-wit:

"The defendant, P. W. Fort, at the time of his arrest, was a practicing physician in the city of Brinkley, and had been for a long time before. And on the 19th day of October, 1907 the city marshal, R. E. Smith, filed an affidavit in the mayor's court of the city of Brinkley, charging the defendant, P. W. Fort, with selling intoxicating liquors known as Fort's Tonic. And thereupon Mayor T. H. Jackson issued a warrant for the arrest of the said P. W. Fort upon said affidavit so filed with him by the said R. E. Smith charging him with the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors known as Fort's Tonic; and on the 21st day of October 1907, the defendant was brought into court upon said warrant before the mayor, T. H. Jackson, to answer said charge. The city of Brinkley, being represented by C. F. Greenlee, attorney, announced ready for trial, and the defendant announced ready and pleaded not guilty to the charges made in said warrant. The case was tried, and the mayor, T. H. Jackson, after hearing the evidence of witnesses and the argument of counsel for the city of Brinkley, found the defendant guilty as charged and assessed the fine at $ 100 and all costs of the prosecution, and in addition to said fine revoked said defendant's license to practice medicine in the State of Arkansas. The defendant paid his fine and all the costs therein, and appealed from that part of the judgment revoking his license. It is further agreed that the city of Brinkley has no ordinance giving the mayor the right to revoke a physician's license, if he is found guilty of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude or for any other offense.

"The question that the circuit court is asked to determine is whether or not the mayor has the right to revoke the defendant's license, and, if he did have the right to revoke his license, if the crime committed by the defendant is one involving moral turpitude in the meaning of the statute."

The circuit court, sitting as a jury, rendered the following judgment upon the foregoing agreed statement of facts, to-wit: "Now, on this day, this cause coming on to be heard, comes the plaintiff, by its attorney, C. F. Greenlee, and comes the defendants, by his attorneys, G. Otis Bogle and Thomas & Lee, and both parties announced ready for trial. This cause was submitted to the court upon an agreed statement of facts. It appearing to the court that this is an action to determine if the defendant. P. W. Fort, is guilty of moral turpitude upon his having been convicted of selling an intoxicant called Fort's Tonic and assessed a fine and revoked his license as a practicing physician; defendant paid said fine but appealed from the judgment of the mayor's court in the revoking of his license. The court, after hearing the agreed statement of facts and argument of counsel, doth sustain said judgment rendered by the mayor's court. It is therefore considered, ordered and adjudged by the court that said judgment revoking defendant's license as a practicing physician be sustained, and the defendant pay all costs of this appeal."

On the same day the court rendered the above judgment in said cause the defendant filed his motion for a new trial.

Judgment is reversed and case dismissed.

Thomas & Lee, for appellant; G. Otis Bogle, of counsel.

1. Conviction for misdemeanor and fine do not involve moral turpitude under section 5247, Kirby's Digest. In law infamous punishment and moral turpitude mean the same thing in relation to crimes, and the latter words do not extend the meaning of the former. 3 Bing. N. C., 835; 8 Dow. & Ry., 140; 12 Barton, 212; 3 Brevard, 241.

2. Mere violation of the liquor laws do not imply moral turpitude. 31 Vt. 292; 8 Am. Dec. 648; 41 S.W. 430; 43 P. 652; 12 Cyc. 135; Newell, Defamation, Slander & Libel, § 12, etc.

3. The mayor has no jurisdiction to revoke a license, in the absence of an ordinance authorizing him to do so. In 68 Ark. 244 there was an ordinance.

C. F. Greenlee, for appellee.

1. Section 5246, Kirby's Digest, provides for the revocation of license by the same court in which a physician is convicted, and §§ 5247-8 provide that in addition to the other penalties his license shall be revoked. The mayor had jurisdiction. 68 Ark. 244.

2. The evidence in this cause does imply moral turpitude, and violation of liquor laws may so imply. Black "Turpit...