Johnson v. Knowles

Decision Date21 May 1997
Docket NumberNo. 96-15852,96-15852
Citation113 F.3d 1114
Parties70 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,715, 97 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 3812, 97 Daily Journal D.A.R. 6474 Paul D. JOHNSON; Kevin Wadsworth; Ted Cooper; Lauren Cooper; Ray Sebastian, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. David KNOWLES; Republican Central Committee of El Dorado County; Steven Bailey; Robert Becker; Ed Borba; Bernard Carlson; Merlin Chardi; Christina Cowell; Charles Chrisman; Dan Dellinger; Tom Emigh; Michael Frenn; Maloa Gribkoff; Kevin Hanley; Tom Schumacher; John Stelzmiller; Laveta Stelzmiller; David Titus, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

G. Michael German, Law Offices of G. Michael German, San Francisco, California, for plaintiffs-appellants.

William J. Coyne and Michael R. O'Neil, Diepenbrock, Wulff, Plant & Hannegan, Sacramento, California, for defendant-appellee David Knowles.

Marjorie E. Manning and T.D. Bolling, Jr., Bolling, Walter & Gawthrop, Sacramento, California, for the remaining defendants-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Milton L. Schwartz, District Judge, Presiding, D.C. No. CV-95-00835-MLS.

Before: WIGGINS, JOHN T. NOONAN, Jr., and TROTT, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

TROTT, Circuit Judge.

OVERVIEW

Paul Johnson and Kevin Wadsworth, a gay couple, and a putative class of El Dorado County, California Republicans who elected Johnson and Wadsworth to the County's Republican party central committee (collectively, the "Plaintiffs") appeal the district court's order dismissing their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for failure to state a claim. 1 They alleged in their Complaint that David Knowles--a member of the California Assembly and ex officio member of the El Dorado County Republican Party Central Committee (the "Committee")--and 16 other Committee members (collectively, the "Defendants") conspired to oust Johnson and Wadsworth from their elected posts on the Committee because of their sexual orientation. This conduct, the Plaintiffs contend, violated their First Amendment rights to free speech and participation in the political process and their Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.

The district court ruled that the Committee's conduct was not action "under color of state law" and dismissed their claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

BACKGROUND

Since 1978, Paul Johnson and Kevin Wadsworth have lived together as exclusive life partners in a homosexual relationship. 2 For more than ten years, they have been active members of the California Republican Party, registering to vote as Republicans and serving on several Republican central committees in California.

Under the California Elections Code, members of county central committees are elected every two years at the direct primary election. Cal.Elec.Code § 7420. In both 1992 and 1994, Johnson and Wadsworth ran for and were elected to the El Dorado County Republican Central Committee. In these elections, they each received approximately 1500 votes.

Johnson and Wadsworth own and reside at the Lone Antler Ranch in El Dorado County. On August 25, 1994, they leased part of the ranch to the "Katie Hirning for Congress Campaign" for a fundraiser for Katie Hirning, the Democratic candidate in the November 1994 California Fourth Congressional District election. The "Katie Hirning for Congress Campaign" paid $100 to use the ranch. Neither Johnson nor Wadsworth participated in the fundraiser.

Defendant David Knowles is an elected Republican member of the California Assembly for the Fourth Assembly District. By virtue of his status as the Republican party nominee for the Assembly, Knowles also is an ex officio member of the Committee. Cal.Elec.Code § 7404(a). According to the Plaintiffs, Knowles actively worked to remove Johnson and Wadsworth from the Committee because of his alleged prejudice against homosexuals. He allegedly vowed to "get rid of those faggots" and used his power and influence as an Assemblyman to bring about their ouster.

On September 12, 1994, the Committee held a regularly scheduled meeting and, in the absence of Johnson and Wadsworth, 3 voted 13 to 1 with 3 abstentions to remove Johnson and Wadsworth from the Committee for providing support to Democratic candidates (i.e., for renting their ranch to the Hirning campaign). Although Knowles was not present at the meeting, he allegedly instructed other committee members to vote in favor of Johnson's and Wadsworth's removal. The Committee had not provided Johnson and Wadsworth with any notice that action was to be taken against them at this meeting.

Following the ouster, Johnson resigned his Republican party membership in disgust and re-registered as a Democrat. Wadsworth, however, continued as a Republican and, in January 1995, took his seat on the Committee that he had won in the June 1994 primary. 4

On January 9, 1995, the new Committee held its organizational meeting. Wadsworth was sworn in to his new, elected seat on the Committee. The Committee elected officers, and, over Wadsworth's objection on the ground of inadequate notice, adopted new bylaws, including a provision for disciplinary procedures that enabled the Committee to remove members whose actions were deemed "injurious to the Committee." At the end of the meeting, Defendant Tom Emigh, a Committee member, indicated that he would seek Wadsworth's removal at the next scheduled Committee meeting.

On February 13, 1995, at the next Committee meeting, Defendant Emigh moved to remove Wadsworth. The Committee voted 9 to 3, with 1 abstention, to remove Wadsworth. Although Knowles was not present at the meeting and did not vote for Wadsworth's removal, he allegedly instructed, prevailed upon, or otherwise influenced other Committee members to vote for Wadsworth's removal. The Committee's stated grounds for Wadsworth's removal included Wadsworth's alleged public criticism of the Committee and his alleged support of Hirning's campaign. Knowles, however, allegedly told Defendant Tom Schumacher, a Committee member, that he encouraged Wadsworth's removal because of his homosexuality.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Lewis v. Telephone Employees Credit Union, 87 F.3d 1537, 1545 (9th Cir.1996). A complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the Plaintiffs can prove no set of facts in support of their claim that would entitle them to relief. Id. In reviewing the dismissal, we must take all allegations of material fact in the Complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs. Smith, 84 F.3d at 1217.

DISCUSSION

To state a claim for relief under section 1983, the Plaintiffs must plead two essential elements: 1) that the Defendants acted under color of state law; and 2) that the Defendants caused them to be deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir.1983). Because the Plaintiffs have failed to show that the Defendants acted under color of state law and fail to point to any way that such action can be shown, we affirm the district court's order dismissing the Plaintiffs' claim with prejudice.

I. Assemblyman Knowles

A person acts under color of state law if he "exercise[s] power 'possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.' " West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 2255, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326, 61 S.Ct. 1031, 1043, 85 L.Ed. 1368 (1941)). "[G]enerally, a public employee acts under color of state law while acting in his official capacity or while exercising his responsibilities pursuant to state law." Dang Vang v. Vang Xiong X. Toyed, 944 F.2d 476, 479 (9th Cir.1991).

There is no doubt that Knowles, in his capacity as a member of the California Assembly, is a public official. But even as a public official, Knowles's alleged wrongful actions are not taken under color of state law if they are " 'not in any way related to the performance of [his] duties' " as a public official. Id. (quoting Murphy v. Chicago Transit Auth., 638 F.Supp. 464, 467 (N.D.Ill.1986)). Thus, we must determine whether Knowles's actions related to the duties and powers of his position as an Assemblyman or instead related to his role as a member of the Republican party.

Knowles's ex officio membership on the Committee derives from his position as the Republican nominee for the Assembly, not from his status as a California Assemblyman. Cal.Elec.Code § 7404. As an ex officio Committee member, Knowles has the same rights and powers as the other Committee members, with one immaterial exception: As an incumbent office holder, Knowles can appoint an alternate Committee member to vote in his stead without the Committee's authorization. Cal.Elec.Code § 7406. Thus, Knowles's status as an Assemblyman gives him no direct power over the Committee and its actions; he has no greater power on the Committee as an Assemblyman than any other Committee member has as an elected member.

The Plaintiffs argue that Knowles's Assemblyman status enabled him to exercise greater influence over the Committee. But the mere fact that the prestige of Knowles's office may have enhanced his influence over the Committee is not enough to convert his actions into state action. "[A]ll actions of a government official are not, simply by virtue of the official's governmental employ, accomplished under the color of federal law." Laxalt v. McClatchy, 622 F.Supp. 737, 746 (D.Nev.1985) (holding that a United States Senator did not act under color of law when he wrote a letter on Senate stationery demanding retraction of a newspaper article).

In sum, Knowles acted against...

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