Negron v. City of Miami Beach, Florida, 95-5172

• Decision Date: 10 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95-5172,95-5172
• Citation: 113 F.3d 1563
• Parties: , 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 25 Wanda NEGRN, Antonio Dominguez, Victor Alfred Varela, William Calderin, Juan Carlos Perez, Maria B. Calcerrada, Maria Beatriz Guitierrez, Violeta Pilgrin, Victor Diaz, Plaintiffs-Appellants, Rafael Negrn, Russell Royce, Gloria Royce, Kathryne Schwickeri, Maria Martinez, Antonio Martinez, Judy Freyre, Jose M. Argote, Mirta Pestana, Elsa B. Dominguez, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, FLORIDA, et al., Defendants-Appellees, Dori J. De Falco, Intervenor-Plaintiff.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 1563

113 F.3d 1563

65 USLW 2822, 11 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. C 25

Wanda NEGRN, Antonio Dominguez, Victor Alfred Varela William Calderin, Juan Carlos Perez, Maria B Calcerrada, Maria Beatriz Guitierrez Violeta Pilgrin, Victor Diaz Plaintiffs-Appellants, Rafael Negrn, Russell Royce, Gloria Royce, Kathryne Schwickeri, Maria Martinez, Antonio Martinez, Judy Freyre, Jose M. Argote, Mirta Pestana, Elsa B. Dominguez, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF MIAMI BEACH, FLORIDA, et al., Defendants-Appellees, Dori J. De Falco, Intervenor-Plaintiff.

No. 95-5172.

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit.

June 10, 1997.

Stephen Michael Cody, Miami, FL, Victor M. Diaz, Jr., Miami, FL, for appellants.

Stephen M. Zack, Norman Christopher Powell, Zack Sparber Kosnitsky, Truxton Spratt & Brooks, Miami, FL, Keith Hope, Key Biscayne, FL, for appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

Before CARNES, Circuit Judge, and FAY and CAMPBELL ^*, Senior Circuit Judges.

CARNES, Circuit Judge:

Plaintiffs brought this action alleging that the electoral structure for selecting the members of the governing commission of the City of Miami Beach, Florida, violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act by diluting Hispanic voting power. After a bench trial, the district court concluded that there was no § 2 violation and entered judgment for the defendants. We affirm.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The City of Miami Beach is located on a seven mile stretch of beach between the Atlantic Ocean and Biscayne Bay. According to the 1990 census, 92,639 people live within its 87 blocks. The racial characteristics of the population are as follows:

                              White             44,721 1     48.27%
                              Black              3,358            3.62%
                              Hispanic          43,342           46.79%
                              Other              1,218            1.31%
                              -----------------------------------------
                              Total             92,639
                

The voting age population ("VAP"), defined as those aged 18 and over, is as follows:

                              White VAP         40,106           50.41%
                              Black VAP          2,548            3.20%
                              Hispanic VAP      35,947           45.18%
                              Other VAP            957            1.20%
                              -----------------------------------------
                              Total VAP         79,558
                

However, according to sample data released by the Census Bureau, only 50.16% of the Hispanic residents of Miami Beach are citizens, while 88.18% of the non-Hispanic residents are citizens.

Miami Beach is governed by the City Commission, consisting of a mayor and six commissioners. All seven members (the mayor and the six commissioners) are elected in at-large elections. The six commissioner positions are numbered so that candidates must run for a particular seat. The mayor presides over City Commission meetings but otherwise has no greater authority than the other six commissioners. The City Commission hires a city manager to run the city on a day-to-day basis.

A number of Hispanic citizens who reside in Miami Beach brought this action against the City, its mayor, the city commissioners, and the city clerk. ² The complaint alleged that the defendants violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973, and further violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Plaintiffs contended that the at-large method of electing the mayor and city commissioners impermissibly diluted Hispanic voting strength in Miami Beach.

The district court held a five-day bench trial beginning May 1, 1995. The court took judicial notice of a number of census tables, which included information from the 1990 census of the entire population and information from questions posed to a smaller sample population. The plaintiffs presented several witnesses, including four experts. The defendants called no expert witnesses. On the last day of trial, plaintiff Victor Diaz, proceeding pro se, moved in open court that the district court dismiss him as a party. The district court denied that motion.

The district court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to carry their burden of proof on the § 2 vote dilution claim because they failed to establish any of the three preconditions and to satisfy the totality of the circumstances prong, as required by Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 106 S.Ct. 2752, 92 L.Ed.2d 25 (1986). The court further concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to show intentional discrimination, which was fatal to their § 1981 and § 1983 claims. Accordingly, the court entered judgment in favor of the defendants.

On appeal, the plaintiffs have abandoned their § 1981 and § 1983 claims, raising only the question of whether the district court correctly held that the plaintiffs failed to prove a § 2 violation. Additionally, Diaz appeals from the district court's refusal to dismiss him from the action.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a district court's findings of § 2 vote dilution for clear error. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 79, 106 S.Ct. at 2781. Deference is afforded the district court's findings "due to its 'special vantage point' and ability to conduct an 'intensely local appraisal of the design and impact of' a voting system." Lucas v. Townsend, 967 F.2d 549, 551 (11th Cir.1992) (quoting White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 769, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 2341, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973)). However, we will correct a district court's errors of law and its findings of fact based upon misconceptions of law. See United States v. Jones, 57 F.3d 1020, 1022 (11th Cir.1995) (citing Meek v. Metropolitan Dade County, Fla., 985 F.2d 1471, 1481 (11th Cir.1993)).

We review for abuse of discretion a district court's decision whether to grant a voluntary dismissal. See Fisher v. Puerto Rico Marine Management, Inc., 940 F.2d 1502, 1502-03 (11th Cir.1991) (citation omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

A. THE SECTION 2 VOTE DILUTION CLAIM

1. The Gingles Framework

Section 2(a) of the Voting Rights Act states:

No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color....

42 U.S.C. § 1973(a). Section 2(b) further explains:

A violation of [§ 2(a) ] is established if, based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by [§ 2(a) ] in that its members have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.

Id. at § 1973(b). As Justice O'Connor explained in Thornburg v. Gingles, "the essence of a vote dilution claim is that the State has created single-member or multimember districts that unacceptably impair the minority group's ability to elect the candidates its members prefer." 478 U.S. at 88, 106 S.Ct. at 2786 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).

The Gingles Court set forth three prerequisites for establishing a § 2 vote dilution claim. Plaintiffs must establish that:

(1) the minority group is "sufficiently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member district";

(2) the minority group is "politically cohesive"; and

(3) "the white majority group votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it ... to defeat the minority's preferred candidate."

Id. at 50-51, 106 S.Ct. at 2766-67 (citations omitted). These three Gingles factors are "necessary preconditions" to a § 2 vote dilution claim. Id. at 50, 106 S.Ct. at 2766.

Proving the three preconditions is not the end of the story, however. As the Supreme Court explained in a later case:

if Gingles so clearly identified the three [preconditions] as generally necessary to prove a § 2 claim, it just as clearly declined to hold them sufficient in combination, either in the sense that a court's examination of relevant circumstances was complete once the three factors were found to exist, or in the sense that the three in combination necessarily and in all circumstances demonstrated dilution.

Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1011, 114 S.Ct. 2647, 2657, 129 L.Ed.2d 775 (1994). As § 2 mandates, a court must look to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether there is impermissible vote dilution. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 79, 106 S.Ct. at 2781; De Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1011, 114 S.Ct. at 2657. Borrowing from the Senate report accompanying the 1982 Amendments to the Voting Rights Act, Gingles identified a list of factors that may under the totality of the circumstances support a claim of vote dilution. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 37, 106 S.Ct. at 2759 (quoting S.Rep. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 206-07).

The district court correctly utilized the Gingles framework in analyzing plaintiffs' § 2 claim. After examining the evidence, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to establish any of the Gingles preconditions: numerosity and compactness, minority cohesion, or bloc voting. The court further concluded that, under the totality of the circumstances, plaintiffs had failed to prove their § 2 vote dilution claim. Because we hold that the district court correctly determined that plaintiffs had failed to establish the first Gingles precondition, numerosity and compactness, it is unnecessary for us to review its other determinations.

2. The First Gingles Precondition

In their attempt to establish the first Gingles precondition, the plaintiffs offered Jerry Wilson, who testified as to the demographics of Miami Beach. Based on 1990 census data, Wilson explained that the Hispanic population of Miami Beach was concentrated in the southern and northern ends of the city. He also produced a plan, called...