King v. Barnes

• Decision Date: 03 May 1889
• Citation: 21 N.E. 182,113 N.Y. 476
• Parties: KING v. BARNES.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

113 N.Y. 476

21 N.E. 182

KING

v.BARNES.¹

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 3, 1889.

Appeal from supreme court, general term, Second department. See 4 N. Y. Supp. 247.

Wm. B. Hornblower, for appellant.

W. W. McFarland, for appellee.

FINCH, J.

The defendant, Barnes, appeals from an order which punishes him by fine and imprisonment for contempt. His offense consisted in advising and procuring the disobedience of the officers of the Staten Island Terminal Company to a final judgment rendered against them and him, which required the formal transfer of stock upon the books of the company, and to two orders granted upon the foot of that judgment, each of which fixed a time and place for such transfer, and required it to be made. The offense charged was certainly not a criminal contempt, and it is now insisted that it was not a civil contempt, because neither described in the specific definitions of section 14 of the Code, nor in the final provision of that section which preserves the common-law right in cases not specifically enumerated. I think the case is covered by the last clause of subdivision 4 of the section referred to. That subdivision specifies as constituting a contempt the act of a person who falsely assumes to be an attorney or officer of the court, and acts as such; who rescues any person or property in its custody; who prevents any party or witness from attending or testifying in any action or special proceeding; or who is guilty of any other unlawful interference with the proceedings therein. The subdivision specifies certain acts of interference with the due and orderly progress of an action or proceeding to its final and ultimate close, and then adds generally a provision which covers any other interference with it. So that the act of any person who interferes with the process or control or action of the court in a pending litigation unlawfully and without authority, is guilty of a civil contempt if his act defeats, impairs, impedes, or prejudices the right or remedy of a party to such action or proceeding. The action against the officers of the company remained pending through the permission to apply for further relief upon the foot of the judgment until its purposes were fully accomplished. Barnes interfered to prevent obedience to the judgment, and to defy the orders of the court. He did this actively and intentionally, through his control over the officers, who were put in position to do his bidding, and were always ready to obey his commands. The evidence warranted a conclusion that he caused and aided their disobedience, paying their fines when payment could not be escaped, and supporting them out of the jurisdiction when the fire of the courts became too hot for safety, or their orders could be thwarted by that means. His conduct, therefore, was a direct interference with the action, and its ultimate proceedings in aid of the judgment; and it was an interference which for a time defeated, and which in the end impeded and impaired, the remedy of the plaintiffs, and was planned and intended to effect that precise result. I think it was clearly within the provisions of the Code defining a civil contempt.

It is next argued that the punishment of six months' imprisonment was without authority, and exceeded the jurisdiction of the court. When the proceeding against Barnes was begun, the stock had not been transferred, and the officers of the company were in contempt. Before the final order against him was made, the officers of the company had...