Nashville St Ry Co v. United States

Citation5 S.Ct. 460,113 U.S. 261,28 L.Ed. 971
PartiesNASHVILLE, C. & ST. L. RY. CO. v. UNITED STATES
Decision Date26 January 1885
CourtUnited States Supreme Court

This was a petition in the court of claims to recover compensation for carrying the United States mails between certain places in Tennessee from March 31 to June 8, 1861. The material facts, as found by that court, were as follows:

The petitioner, a corporation under the laws of Tennessee, on May 27, 1858, entered into contracts with the United States in the usual form to transport the mails both ways between Nashville and Chattanooga and between Tullahoma and McMinnville, for four years from July 1, 1858, at the yearly compensation of $32,750, payable quarterly; carried mails accordingly for the United States until June 8, 1861; from that date began carrying the mails for the confederate government, and was also largely engaged during the rebellion in transporting troops, supplies, and munitions of war, as well as mails for that government, and was regularly paid therefor, but was not paid for the claim set up in this suit. The rest of the finding of facts was in the following words:

'In 1871 a bill in equity, filed in behalf of the United States against the Nashville & Chattanooga Railway Company, was pending in the United States circuit court for the Middle district of Tennessee to enforce certain demands of the United States against said company. In pursuance of an agreement between and by consent of the parties to the suit the decree hereinafter set forth was entered in said court. The cause of action now pending in this court was not a subject of litigation in the circuit court. The company there did not set up as a set-off or cross-action any demand for mail transportation accruing before or since the war. And in the negotiations which led to the decree above mentioned the claim which forms the subject-matter of this action was not mentioned by either party. The following is the decree above described:

'Be it remembered that on the tenth day of November, 1871, this cause was heard before the judges of the circuit court of the United States for the Middle district of Tennessee, at Nashville, upon its equity side, upon the bill of complaint, exhibits, previous proceedings, and agreement of parties, in the presence of R. McPhail Smith, United States district attorney, representing the complainant, and E. H. Ewing and W. F. Cooper, solicitors of the defendant when it appeared to the court that since the last term, in and by virtue of an act of congress in that behalf, a compromise of all the matters in litigation between the parties has been entered into and fully consummated upon the following terms, stipulations, and conditions, namely: The defendant, the Nashville & Chattanooga Railway Company, for and in consideration of the return and surrender to it, by the United States, of its road as it existed the time of the said return and surrender, with all the iron, cross-ties, bridges, and other fixtures, appurtenances, and effects in anywise appertaining and belonging to the said road, and returned, surrendered, and turned over therewith, and for and in consideration of the rolling stock, depot-houses, and all other property and effects sold and delivered by the United States to the said defendant, and for which compensation is claimed by said bill, and for and in consideration of the transfer and assignment of said road, rolling stock, fixtures, appurtenances, and all other said property and effects as aforesaid by the United States to the said defendant, with all the rights of the United States therein, acquired by conquest or otherwise, and for and in consideration of the settlement, satisfaction, and discharge of all mutual claims and accounts between the parties, as they existed on the first day of June, 1871, admitted that there was due from the defendant to the United States on that day the sum of one million of dollars, and agreed to pay the same as follows: One-half of said sum, five hundred thousand dollars, to be paid ten years after the first of June, 1871, and the other half twenty years from said date, with interest upon the whole of said principal sum, until paid, at the rate of four per cent. per annum, payable semi-annually on the first day of December and June, counting from the first of June, 1871, the said principal and interest made payable at _____, and secured by the bonds of the Nashville & Chattanooga Railroad Com- pany, and a mortgage on the company's road, property, income, and franchise.

'It was further agreed that a final decree might be entered in this cause, setting forth the terms of the compromise, and providing that, in case of default for more than ninety days in the payment of any installment of interest as the same falls due, or any part thereof, or of the principal debt at maturity as aforesaid, or...

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