Spreitzer v. Peters

Decision Date23 May 1997
Docket Number96-1520,Nos. 96-1467,s. 96-1467
Citation114 F.3d 1435
PartiesEdward SPREITZER, Petitioner-Appellee, Cross-Appellant, v. Howard A. PETERS, III, Director, Illinois Department of Corrections and Richard B. Gramley, Warden, Pontiac Correctional Center, Respondents-Appellants, Cross-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Richard E. Cunningham (argued), Chicago, IL, Gary Prichard, Glen Ellyn, IL, for Petitioner-Appellee.

Steven J. Zick (argued), Office of the Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, for Respondents-Appellants in No. 96-1467.

Rita M. Novak, Office of the Attorney General, Chicago, IL, Steven J. Zick (argued), Office of the Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Division, Chicago, IL, for Respondents-Appellees in No. 96-1520.

Before BAUER, COFFEY, and KANNE, Circuit Judges.

BAUER, Circuit Judge.

Edward Spreitzer is a state prisoner who was sentenced to death in 1986. Spreitzer filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois on March 31, 1992. He argued, among other things, that he was denied due process of law when, after the prosecution raised the issue of his future dangerousness at sentencing, the court refused to allow evidence of or instruct the jury that if the jury did not impose the death penalty, he faced a mandatory alternative sentence of life imprisonment without parole under Illinois law. On January 31, 1996, the district court granted the writ of habeas corpus on this issue for the purpose of resentencing only. The district court found that Spreitzer was entitled to habeas relief based on Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994), which forbids the practice that occurred at Spreitzer's sentencing. The district court specifically held that Spreitzer was entitled to benefit from the Supreme Court's holding in Simmons because Simmons did not announce a "new rule" under Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989). Respondents filed a notice of appeal from the district court's decision on February 27, 1996. Spreitzer filed a cross-appeal contesting the district court's denial of two other claims. We reverse the district court's holding that Simmons did not announce a "new rule," and we reject Spreitzer's remaining claims for relief.

BACKGROUND
I.

Spreitzer was convicted of five murders and admitted his involvement in four others. The gruesome details of the murders, which involved assault, rape, and dismemberment, can be found in the Illinois Supreme Court's decisions, People v. Spreitzer, 123 Ill.2d 1, 121 Ill.Dec. 224, 525 N.E.2d 30 (1988) ("Spreitzer I") and People v. Spreitzer, 143 Ill.2d 210, 157 Ill.Dec. 467, 572 N.E.2d 931 (1991) ("Spreitzer II"), so we do not republish them here. Instead, we discuss the facts only where they are relevant to the individual issues in this opinion. We move on to recite the procedural background here.

On March 4, 1986 in Du Page County, Spreitzer was found guilty of the aggravated kidnapping and murder of Linda Sutton. After a bench trial, the State of Illinois requested a jury to impose the death penalty because of Spreitzer's four previous murder convictions. At a separate sentencing hearing, the jury found insufficient mitigating factors and sentenced Spreitzer to death. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and the death sentence on direct appeal (Spreitzer I), and the United States Supreme Court denied Spreitzer's petition for certiorari. See Spreitzer v. Illinois, 488 U.S. 917, 109 S.Ct. 274, 102 L.Ed.2d 263 (1988).

Spreitzer filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief under the Illinois Post-Conviction Hearing Act. See 725 ILCS 5/122-1. The trial court appointed Terry Ekl to represent Spreitzer for his post-conviction petition, but denied his amended petition on October 24, 1989, after hearing oral argument but

without an evidentiary hearing. The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Spreitzer's post-conviction petition (Spreitzer II) and set Spreitzer's execution for September 18, 1991. The United States Supreme Court again denied Spreitzer's petition for certiorari. See Spreitzer v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 985, 112 S.Ct. 594, 116 L.Ed.2d 618 (1991). Spreitzer then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. With the benefit of new attorneys, he filed an amended petition on November 23, 1994. His execution was stayed pending resolution of the habeas petition. On January 31, 1996, the district court granted the petition as to the death sentence only and ordered Spreitzer to be resentenced within 120 days in a manner comporting with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. See United States ex rel. Spreitzer v. Peters, No. 92 C 2182, 1996 WL 48585 (N.D.Ill. Feb.5, 1996). The district court denied relief on other sentencing and trial issues.

II.

The district court's January 31, 1996 order granted the writ of habeas corpus solely on the issue of whether Spreitzer was denied due process of law when, at sentencing, the State placed the issue of Spreitzer's future dangerousness before the jury, and the trial judge refused to allow Spreitzer to inform or instruct the jury that if the jury did not sentence Spreitzer to death, Spreitzer would nonetheless be ineligible for parole. During the sentencing hearing, the prosecution elicited testimony from a clinical psychologist that Spreitzer was "resentful of authority," had "some potential for dangerousness" and "could still be dangerous." During rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor told the jury that "Mr. Spreitzer, even by his own doctor who came in, is a very, very dangerous person" and that "people in your community have a right to live free from the fear of guys like Edward Spreitzer" and "a right to feel secure in their homes and on their streets." The trial judge refused to allow Spreitzer's trial attorney, Carol Anfinson, to put the Du Page County Public Defender, Peter Dockery, on the stand to testify as to Illinois law's mandatory alternative sentence of life imprisonment without parole, which would render Spreitzer ineligible for parole if the jury did not sentence him to death. See 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1. The trial judge never instructed the jury that Spreitzer would be ineligible for parole in the event that the jury did not return a death sentence.

At the time of his sentencing hearing, Illinois law did not require the trial judge to instruct the jury on the alternative mandatory sentence of natural life. Spreitzer I, 123 Ill.2d at 43, 121 Ill.Dec. at 242, 525 N.E.2d at 48 (citing People v. Albanese, 102 Ill.2d 54, 81, 79 Ill.Dec. 608, 621-22, 464 N.E.2d 206, 219-20 (1984) and People v. Stewart, 105 Ill.2d 22, 70-71, 85 Ill.Dec. 241, 265, 473 N.E.2d 840, 864 (1984)). However, it is now established both under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and under Illinois law that if the defendant's future dangerousness is placed in issue, and the jury is not informed of the defendant's ineligibility for parole, the Due Process Clause is violated. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 156, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 2190, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994) (plurality opinion); People v. Gacho, 122 Ill.2d 221, 256-63, 119 Ill.Dec. 287, 303-07, 522 N.E.2d 1146, 1162-66, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 910, 109 S.Ct. 264, 102 L.Ed.2d 252 (1988).

In Simmons v. South Carolina, as in this case, the state put the issue of the defendant's future dangerousness before the jury, but the trial judge refused to instruct the jury that the defendant was ineligible for parole. 512 U.S. at 156-61, 114 S.Ct. at 2190-93. The prosecutor argued during closing argument that a sentence of death would be "a response of society to someone who is a threat. Your verdict will be an act of self-defense." Id. at 157, 114 S.Ct. at 2190-91. During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the judge asking whether "the imposition of a life sentence carr[ied] with it the possibility of parole[.]" Id. at 160, 114 S.Ct. at 2192. The judge instructed the jury "not to consider parole or parole eligibility" in reaching its verdict, and twenty-five minutes later, the jury returned a sentence of death. Id. A plurality of the Supreme Court held that "where the defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, and state law prohibits the defendant's On direct appeal in this case, the Illinois Supreme Court indicated that "[a]t the time of the sentencing hearing, it was the law of Illinois that the trial court was not required to instruct a jury on the alternative mandatory sentence of natural life." Spreitzer I, 123 Ill.2d at 43, 121 Ill.Dec. at 242, 525 N.E.2d at 48 (citing Albanese and Stewart). The Court indicated that People v. Gacho, 122 Ill.2d 221, 260, 119 Ill.Dec. 287, 305, 522 N.E.2d 1146, 1164 (1988) changed that rule, but that the Gacho rule was prospective only, and therefore was inapplicable. The Court concluded that the trial court's failure to permit evidence of sentencing alternatives was not error, and the failure of defense counsel to tender such an instruction was not incompetent "for the obvious reason that the trial court could properly have refused such an instruction prior to our decision in Gacho." Spreitzer I, 123 Ill.2d at 44, 121 Ill.Dec. at 242, 525 N.E.2d at 48.

                release on parole, due process requires that the sentencing jury be informed that the defendant is parole ineligible."  Id. at 156, 114 S.Ct. at 2190.   The plurality concluded its opinion by stating:  "The State may not create a false dilemma by advancing generalized arguments regarding the defendant's future dangerousness while, at the same time, preventing the jury from learning that the defendant will never be released on parole."  Id. at 171, 114 S.Ct. at 2198
                

In granting the writ of habeas corpus, the district court determined that the rule...

To continue reading

Request your trial
96 cases
  • Purnell v. State
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Delaware
    • 17 d4 Junho d4 2021
    ...is difficult to measure the precise effect on the defense of representation corrupted by conflicting interests."); Spreitzer v. Peters , 114 F.3d 1435, 1450 (7th Cir. 1997) ("This presumption of prejudice is necessary because a true conflict of interest forecloses the use of certain strateg......
  • McCamey v. Epps
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Mississippi
    • 12 d5 Março d5 2010
    ...815, 825 (9th Cir.1995) (Cuyler standard is applicable to conflicts of interest growing out of attorney self-interest.); Spreitzer v. Peters, 114 F.3d 1435, 1451, n. 7. (7th Cir.1997) (We have routinely applied both the Cuyler and Holloway standards to conflict of interest cases which are n......
  • State v. Love
    • United States
    • Wisconsin Supreme Court
    • 23 d3 Junho d3 1999
    ...concluded that the Cuyler test should be extended to conflict of interest cases involving serial representation. Spreitzer v. Peters, 114 F.3d 1435, 1450-52 (7th Cir.1997); Hernandez v. Johnson, 108 F.3d 554, 559-60 (5th Cir.1997); Maiden v. Bunnell, 35 F.3d 477, 480 (9th Cir.1994); cf. Uni......
  • Winsett v. Washington
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit
    • 18 d2 Novembro d2 1997
    ...emphasize the discretionary nature of our decision to raise the Teague rule when the Government waives it. See Spreitzer v. Peters, 114 F.3d 1435, 1442 n. 1 (7th Cir.1997); Young v. United States, 124 F.3d 794, 797 (7th Cir.1997); Jones v. Page, 76 F.3d 831, 850 (7th Cir.1996); Eaglin v. We......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles
  • Conflicts of interest in criminal cases: should the prosecution have a duty to disclose?
    • United States
    • American Criminal Law Review Vol. 47 No. 3, June 2010
    • 22 d2 Junho d2 2010
    ...343 F.3d 587, 597-98 (2d Cir. 2003). (24.) See Hall v. United States, 371 F.3d 969, 973 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Spreitzer v. Peters, 114 F.3d 1435, 1450 (7th Cir. 1997)) (discussing the two tests and describing Sullivan as imposing a "lighter burden"); Tueros, 343 F.3d at 592 (discussing th......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT