U.S. v. Kitchens, s. 96-4191

• Decision Date: 22 May 1997
• Docket Number: 96-4192,Nos. 96-4191,s. 96-4191
• Citation: 114 F.3d 29
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Koffi KITCHENS, Defendant-Appellee. UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kedron KITCHENS, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 29

114 F.3d 29

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Koffi KITCHENS, Defendant-Appellee.

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Kedron KITCHENS, Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 96-4191, 96-4192.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued Jan. 31, 1997.

Decided May 22, 1997.

ARGUED: Paul Thomas Camilletti, Assistant United States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellant. Kevin David Mills, Mills & Scales, Martinsburg, West Virginia; William Benjamin Moffitt, Asbill, Junkin & Moffitt, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: William D. Wilmoth, United States Attorney, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellant.

Before MURNAGHAN, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded by published opinion. Judge MURNAGHAN wrote the opinion, in which Judge NIEMEYER and Judge MOTZ joined.

OPINION

MURNAGHAN, Circuit Judge:

Kedron and Koffi Kitchens were indicted for conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute approximately 62.4 grams of crack cocaine. They filed a motion to suppress evidence arguing that the police officers' warrantless search of their hotel room violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The magistrate judge recommended that the motion to suppress be granted and the district court adopted the magistrate judge's findings and granted the motion to suppress. Since we believe the defendants had no reasonable expectation of privacy in their motel room after check-out time, we reverse the district court's grant of the motion to suppress and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

FACTS

On March 10, 1994, Kedron and Koffi Kitchens were guests at the Town House Motel in Charles Town, West Virginia. The Town House Motel has a policy that all guests must check out by 11:00 a.m. The manager testified that if guests do not check out by 11:30 a.m., the motel contacts them and requests that they re-register or leave. The manager also testified that he has entered rooms and evicted the occupants when they stayed past 11:30 a.m. In addition, the manager testified that on several occasions he has called the police to assist him in evicting individuals who have stayed past 11:30 a.m. without paying for an additional night. It is undisputed that on the day in question the Kitchenses continued to occupy the motel room after check out time, and that the incident in question did not occur until approximately 12:30 p.m.

Two officers, Doug Nichols and Dave Kelvington, who were eating lunch at the restaurant at the Town House Motel, noticed an individual they recognized as a suspected drug dealer enter room 330. The officers asked the acting manager for the name of the person who was registered in room 330. The manager told the police that the room was rented to one of the defendants and that they were in the room past the 11:00 a.m. check-out time.

With the acting manager's consent, the officers went to the room to tell the occupants to either vacate the room or pay for an additional night. Officer Robbie Roberts of the Ranson Police Department was also having lunch in the restaurant and was asked to provide assistance to the two Charles Town police officers.

Just as the officers arrived at the room, the door opened and two individuals exited. While the door was open, Officer Kelvington noticed one of the occupants of the room run into the bathroom. Officer Kelvington entered the room and instructed the individual in the bathroom to come out. Officer Kelvington then noticed a vial of what he believed to be crack cocaine in plain view and arrested the defendants. Officer Roberts searched Kedron Kitchens incident to his arrest and found a sock containing bags with crack cocaine. The defendants moved to suppress the crack cocaine arguing that Officer Kelvington entered the room without a warrant. ¹

The magistrate judge determined that the defendants had a legitimate expectation of privacy in their hotel room even after check-out time. ² The magistrate then determined that there was no exception to the warrant requirement in the instant case and recommended that the motion to suppress be granted. The district court accepted the magistrate judge's recommendation.

DISCUSSION

The court of appeals reviews the district court's legal conclusions regarding a motion to suppress de novo, but factual determinations are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Rusher, 966 F.2d 868, 873 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 926, 113 S.Ct. 351, 121 L.Ed.2d 266 (1992).

The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures. However, to challenge a search under the Fourth Amendment, an individual must be able to show he has standing--he must show that he has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). Justice Harlan, concurring in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), outlined a two-prong test for determining whether an individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy. First, the individual must have a subjective expectation of privacy, and second, that subjective expectation must be reasonable. Id. at 361, 88 S.Ct. at 516-517.

A guest in a hotel room has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490, 84 S.Ct. 889, 893, 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964). However, this expectation is not unlimited. Generally, a guest does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his hotel room after his rental period has terminated. United States v. Jackson, 585 F.2d 653, 658 (4th Cir.1978); see also United States v. Rahme, 813 F.2d 31, 34 (2d Cir.1987) ("[W]hen a hotel guest's rental period has expired or been lawfully terminated, the guest does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the hotel room."); United States v. Allen, 106 F.3d 695, 699 (6th Cir.1997) (no legitimate expectation of privacy in a hotel room after rental period has expired); United States v. Larson, 760 F.2d 852, 855 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 849, 106 S.Ct. 143, 88 L.Ed.2d 119 (1985); United States v. Huffhines, 967 F.2d 314, 318 (9th Cir.1992) (no violation of the Fourth Amendment since search occurred after the motel had repossessed the room for nonpayment of rent).

A guest may still have a legitimate expectation of privacy even after his rental period has terminated, if there is a pattern or practice which would make that expectation reasonable. United States v. Watson, 783 F.Supp. 258, 263 (E.D.Va.1992) (legitimate expectation of privacy since guest had continually paid his bill several hours after the check-out time); United States v. Owens, 782 F.2d 146, 150 (10th Cir.1986) (legitimate expectation of privacy in a motel room after check-out time since the...