115 1081 Feltrop v. Missouri

Decision Date28 June 1991
Docket NumberNo. 90-7928,90-7928
Citation501 U.S. 1262,115 L.Ed.2d 1081,111 S.Ct. 2918
Parties. 115 L.Ed.2d 1081 Ralph Cecil FELTROP, petitioner, v. State of MISSOURI
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

On petition for writ of

certiorari to the Supreme Court of Missouri.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice MARSHALL, dissenting.

In Clemons v. Mississippi, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990), this Court held that, once a defendant is sentenced to death by an erroneously instructed jury, a reviewing court can resentence the defendant to death only if it clearly and expressly engages in either harmless-error analysis or reweighing of permissible aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See id., at ----, ----, 110 S.Ct., at 1444, 1451. It is conceded that the petitioner in this case was sentenced to death by an erroneously instructed jury. Nonetheless, the Missouri Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's summary denial of petitioner's motion to set aside the jury sentence constituted a constitutionally adequate resentencing. Because Clemons does not permit us to infer from the trial court's silence that it engaged in the requisite reweighing or harmless-error analysis, I would grant the petition for certiorari.

I

Petitioner was convicted of capital murder. At the conclusion of the penalty phase of his trial, the jury determined that the murder " 'involved depravity of mind and that as a result thereof it was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman.' " 803 S.W.2d 1, 14 (Mo. en banc 1991). On the basis of this single aggravating factor, the jury sentenced petitioner to death. Id., at 6. Petitioner thereafter filed a motion to reduce his sentence, arguing, inter alia, that the "depravity of mind" aggravating factor was unconstitutionally vague under this Court's precedents. The trial court denied the motion, stating from the bench that it " 'has listened attentively to [petitioner's argument] and has recalled the testimony and the evidence in this cause, and the Court will overrule the Motion for Reduction of Sentence.' " Id., at 16.

The Missouri Supreme court affirmed. The court acknowledged that the "depravity of mind" aggravating factor was uncon- stitutionally vague under this Court's decision in godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980). See 803 S.W.2d, at 14. See generally Shell v. Mississippis, --- U.S. ----, 11 S.Ct. 313, 112 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990), (per curiam ); clemons v. Mississippi, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. at 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990); Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988). It also acknowledged that the trial court had erred in not instructing the jury to apply the limiting construction fashioned by the the Missouri supreme Court in order to save the "depravity of mind" factor from unconstitutionality. See 803 S.W.2d, at 14, citing State v. Preston, 673 S.W.2d 1, 11 (Mo. en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 893, 105 s.Ct. 269, 83 L.Ed.2d 205 (1984).* Nonetheless, relying on Walton v. Arizona, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990), the Missouri Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's summary denial of petitioner's postsentence motin sufficed to cure any error in the jury's sentencing verdict. In Walton, this Court hled that, where the death sentence is imposed by a trial judge, the trial judge need not expressly state that he has relied upon a constitutionally necessary limiting construciton, because "[t]rial judges are presumed to know the law and to apply it in making their deicison."Id., at ----, 110 S.Ct. at 3057. The Missouri Supreme Court in this case reasoned that it could likewise "presum[e] that the trial judge knew and applied the relevant factors ennunciated in State v. Preston when he evaluated and rules on [petitioner's] motion for reduction of sentence." 803 S.W.2d, at 16.

In my view, the Missouri Supreme Court's reliance on Walton was clearly misplaced. As used in Walton, the "presumption" that a trial court has followed the law stands only for the proposition that error cannot be inferred where a trial court, acting as the initial sentencer, fails expressly to articulate its reliance on a limiting construction of what would otherwise be an unconstitutional aggravating factor. However, this presumption is clearly rebutted when, as here, the trial court erroneously instructs a sentencing jury by omitting any reference to the necessary limiting construction. Under such circumstances, the question is no longer whether error can be inferred from what the trial court has not said; error is mainfest in what the court has said to the jury. See Shell v. Mississippi, supra; Walton v. Arizona, supra, 110 S.Ct. at 3051; Clemons v. Mississippi, supra, at 1451; Maynard v. Cartwright, supra, 486 U.S., at 363-364, 108 S.Ct., at 1859; Godfrey v. Georgia, supra, 446 U.S., at 427-429, 100 S.Ct., at 1764-1765 (plurality opinion). Thus, the question at that stage is whether a reviewing court has taken the steps necessary to correct sentencing error. In holding that the trial court's summary denial of petitioner's postsentence motion sufficed to cure the trial court's erroneous jury instructions in this case, the Missouri Supreme Court established a "presumption" that a reviewing court perceives and corrects all errors when it resentences a defendant to death.

This presumption is completely at odds with this Court's decision in Clemons v. Mississippi, supra. As in this case, the trial court in Clemons erred by failing to instruct the jury on a necessary limiting construction of a facially vague aggravating factor. This Court held that under such circumstances a reviewing court may itself resentence the defendant to death either by engaging in harmless error analysis or by reweighing the properly defined aggravating and mitigating circumstances. See id., 110 S.Ct., at 1444. Nonetheless, because it was "unclear whether [the reviewing court] correctly employed either of these methods," this Court vacated the sentence and remanded. Id., at 1444; see id., at 1451. In particular, because the reviewing court's opinion was "virtually silent" on whether fresh consideration had been given to the mitigating evidence proffered by the defendant, this Court declined to infer that the reviewing court had...

To continue reading

Request your trial
108 cases
  • State v. Parker
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • October 25, 1994
    ...to determine the qualifications of prospective jurors. State v. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1262, 111 S.Ct. 2918, 115 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1991). Only clear abuse of discretion and a real probability of prejudice justify reversal. Id. The critical question in a bias......
  • Westport Taxi Service, Inc. v. Westport Transit Dist.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • August 15, 1995
    ... ... denied, 489 U.S. 1081, 109 S.Ct. 1535, 103 L.Ed.2d 840 (1989). The reasonableness of the ... ARA Services, Inc., 488 U.S. 855, 109 S.Ct. 143, 102 L.Ed.2d 115 (1988). A plaintiff injured by an antitrust violation may recover both ... ...
  • Feltrop v. Delo, 93-2738
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • March 28, 1995
    ...denial of post-conviction relief in a consolidated appeal. State v. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1262, 111 S.Ct. 2918, 115 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1991). That Court subsequently denied Feltrop's petition for state habeas corpus and motion to recall the mandate. Feltrop the......
  • State v. Richardson
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • May 28, 1996
    ...109 S.Ct. 1211, 1215, 103 L.Ed.2d 435 (1989); see also State v. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d 1, 9 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1262, 111 S.Ct. 2918, 115 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1991); Clemmons, 753 S.W.2d at 910-11. Caldwell only prohibits misleading the jury as to its role in the sentencing process; it......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Section 11.13 Actions of Interrogators
    • United States
    • The Missouri Bar Criminal Practice Deskbook Chapter 11 Statements of a Defendant
    • Invalid date
    ...rule,” should be considered. See § 544.170, RSMo Supp. 2004; State v. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d 1, 12–13 (Mo. banc 1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1262 (1991); Roberts v. State, 476 S.W.2d 490, 494 (Mo. 1972); Gooden v. State, 846 S.W.2d 214, 219 (Mo. App. S.D. 1993). Confessions extracted by a dir......
  • Section 11.19 Removal of Jurors for Cause
    • United States
    • The Missouri Bar Civil Trial Practice 2015 Supp Chapter 11 Making and Preserving the Record
    • Invalid date
    ...on appeal unless there is a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d 1, 9 (Mo. banc 1991), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1262 (1991); Edley v. O’Brien, 918 S.W.2d 898, 903 (Mo. App. S.D. 1996). Sections 494.400 and 494.425, RSMo 2000, set forth those persons who, as a m......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT