Wathen v. General Elec. Co.

• Decision Date: 10 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. 95-6339,95-6339
• Citation: 115 F.3d 400
• Parties: 74 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 48, 70 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 44,761 Paula WATHEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, d/b/a GE Lighting North American Production Division, Kentucky Glass Plant; Walt Nyzio; Jim Kerian; and Carl Murphy, Defendants-Appellees, David Six, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 400

115 F.3d 400

74 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 48, 70 Empl.

Prac. Dec. P 44,761

Paula WATHEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, d/b/a GE Lighting North American

Production Division, Kentucky Glass Plant; Walt

Nyzio; Jim Kerian; and Carl Murphy,

Defendants-Appellees,

David Six, Defendant.

No. 95-6339.

United States Court of Appeals,

Sixth Circuit.

Argued Sept. 24, 1996.

Decided June 10, 1997.

ARGUED: Deno C. Capello, Jr., Weinberg & Capello, Lexington, KY, for Appellant. Karen B. Newborn, Baker & Hostetler, Cleveland, OH, Jeffrey S. Walther, McDonald, Walther, Roark & Gay, Lexington, KY, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: David A. Weinberg, Deno C. Capello, Jr., Weinberg & Capello, Lexington, KY, for Appellant. Thomas F. Cooke, II, Baker & Hostetler, Cleveland, OH, Jeffrey S. Walther, McDonald, Walther, Roark & Gay, Lexington, KY, for Appellee.

Before: NORRIS, SUHRHEINRICH, and BATCHELDER, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

ALICE M. BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff Paula Wathen appeals from the district court's grant of summary judgment to her former employer General Electric Company ("GE") and three former employees, in this action involving allegations of sexual harassment. Wathen asserts claims under Title VII, and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, as well as claims under Kentucky law for the intentional tort of outrageous conduct and for breach of contract. We affirm the district court, finding: (1) neither Title VII nor the Kentucky Civil Rights Act allows employees/supervisors to be sued in their individual capacities; (2) because GE took prompt and effective action after Wathen filed her complaint, it cannot be held liable for sexual harassment; and (3) Wathen's state law claims are without merit.

I. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

In reviewing a district court's decision on a motion for summary judgment, we must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Accordingly, the following account of the employees' and employer's conduct is based on the allegations in Wathen's complaint and depositions and on the undisputed evidence.

Plaintiff Paula Wathen was employed as a plant nurse at GE's Kentucky Glass Plant from April 1993 until her resignation effective January 2, 1995. In June 1993, Wathen was provided with a copy of GE's manual entitled Integrity: The Spirit & Letter of Our Commitment ("Integrity "), which prohibits sexual harassment and requires that suspected violations be reported. ¹

Wathen signed and returned an acknowledgment form for the Integrity manual. The acknowledgment form describes the alternate channels by which an employee may report a GE policy violation. ² In addition to receiving the manual, Wathen received training and attended follow-up meetings designed to ensure that GE employees understood the policies and procedures for reporting policy violations.

GE also disseminated and posted a "Policy Against Sexual Harassment" ("Policy"), which addresses the company's prohibitions against sexual harassment. The Policy provides specific procedures for reporting potential violations, including the steps to take when one's supervisor is involved in the incident:

Any Employee who feels that she or he has been a victim of sexual harassment should report the incident as soon as possible after the occurrence through one of the following means:

-- Use the local plant/component problem-solving procedure.

-- Contact any supervisor, manager, or the local Human Resource Manager.

-- Contact the Division Human Resource Manager.

-- Consult with members of [GE's] Professional Relations Staff (Joyce Raimer, 8 * 346-3048, or Roger Freibott, 8 * 346-6649).

If the employee's supervisor is involved in the incident, the report should be made through one of the other alternatives described above.

The Policy was posted on the union bulletin boards and in the plant cafeteria. Wathen claims that she never saw the Policy because, as a salaried employee, she did not eat in the plant cafeteria and she had no reason to check the union bulletin boards.

Wathen claims that beginning in November 1993, the work environment at the Kentucky Plant became hostile and abusive toward women. She contends that upper-level management, including defendants Carl Murphy, Walt R. Nyzio and Jim Kerian, subjected her to sexual jokes, comments, and innuendos. Specifically, she lists a number of incidents which she claims constitute violations of Title VII by the defendants in their official and individual capacities. She further claims that these kinds of incidents permeated the sexually hostile environment at GE. Because we conclude, as we more fully discuss below, both that Title VII does not impose upon individual employees liability for sexually harassing conduct, regardless of how crude or offensive it may be, and that the facts as alleged by Wathen demonstrate that GE cannot be found to be liable under Title VII for the conduct of these employees, we decline to reproduce here the specific allegations of harassment alleged by Wathen. It suffices to say that the conduct alleged, particularly that of defendant Kerian, was crude and offensive, and not to be tolerated in the workplace.

On March 29, 1994, Wathen filed with GE a claim of sexual harassment using the reporting procedures set forth in the Integrity manual. This claim was not made until four months after the harassment allegedly began and was the first mention Wathen made to GE of the problem. In response to Wathen's claims, GE conducted an internal investigation which resulted in defendant Kerian's termination, ³ a written reprimand against employee David Six, ⁴ public apologies to Wathen, and a finding of no basis for disciplinary action against Nyzio or Murphy. Plaintiff admits that there were no further instances of sexual harassment after she reported her claims to GE.

On June 8, 1994, while still employed by GE, Wathen filed suit in state court against her employer and the three individuals--Carl Murphy, Jim Kerian, and Walt Nyzio--in their official and individual capacities, alleging sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and the Kentucky Civil Rights Act, KY.REV.STAT. ANN. §§ 344.010 to 344.500 ("KRS Chapter 344"), and state law claims for the tort of "outrage" and breach of contract. The defendants timely removed the action to the United States District Court.

Each of the defendants moved for summary judgment, and the district court granted those motions. The court first held that Title VII does not impose liability on individual employees. Alternatively, the court held that the individual employees could not be held liable because "the frequency and severity of the conduct alleged by plaintiff against the individuals is insufficient as a matter of law to support her cause of action." With respect to GE's motion for summary judgment, the district court held that the employer responded adequately and effectively once it had notice of the individual defendants' actions, and therefore was insulated from liability. In rejecting Wathen's state law tort claim for outrageous conduct, the court concluded that Wathen failed to produce evidence which would allow any reasonable jury to find that any of the employees' conduct was "atrocious and utterly intolerable." Finally, the court dismissed Wathen's breach of contract claim, finding that GE's clear disclaimer stating that the manual is not to be considered a contract of employment defeats the breach of contract claim. Wathen now appeals.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo the grant of summary judgment, using the same standard applied by the district court. Terry Barr Sales Agency, Inc. v. All-Lock Co., 96 F.3d 174, 178 (6th Cir.1996). Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). In assessing the record to determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact, the court must resolve all ambiguities and draw all factual inferences in favor of the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2513-14, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Summary judgment is not appropriate if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. With these familiar principles in mind, we turn to Wathen's claims on appeal.

B. Individual Liability

Wathen claims and, for purposes of this appeal, we assume that Murphy, Nyzio and Kerian were employed in supervisory positions and were thus the agents of GE. She therefore sued each of them in his individual capacity for the alleged violations of Title VII and KRS Chapter 344. ⁵ The district court concluded that no individual liability lies under Title VII. The district court reasoned that individual liability is inconsistent both with the original remedial provision of Title VII, which provided for reinstatement and back pay, and with the 1991 amendments to Title VII, which added monetary damages with limits depending upon employer size. The district court, therefore, concluded that Congress did not intend to subject non-employers to liability for damages.

A majority of our sister circuits that have addressed this issue have held that an employee/supervisor, who does not otherwise qualify as an "employer," cannot be held individually liable under Title VII and similar statutory schemes. ⁶ See Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir.1995) (holding that "individual defendants with supervisory control over a plaintiff may not be held personally liable under Title VII"); E.E.O.C. v. AIC...