Skinner v. State ex rel. Williamson
| Decision Date | 18 February 1941 |
| Docket Number | 28229. |
| Parties | SKINNER v. STATE ex rel. WILLIAMSON, Atty. Gen. |
| Court | Oklahoma Supreme Court |
Rehearing Denied July 8, 1941.
Syllabus by the Court.
1. Art 1, Ch. 26, S.L.1935, 57 Okl.St.Ann. §§ 171-195, known as the Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, is a eugenic measure and not a penal law and does not violate Sec. 9, Art. 2 of the State Constitution, Okl.St.Ann., prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, or Sec. 15, Art. 2 of the Constitution prohibiting the enactment of a bill of attainder or ex post facto law.
2. In determining whether a statute is a reasonable exercise of the police power as against the unlawful infringement of a constitutional right, all presumptions of validity surrounding legislation will be indulged, and such a statute will not be declared unconstitutional unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no real or substantial connection between the provisions thereof and the preservation of the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare.
3. Where the Legislature has determined a fact as the basis for the enactment of a law under the police power of the state the Supreme Court is not at liberty to declare the law unconstitutional as an infringement of an inherent or constitutional right unless it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that such finding of fact is clearly erroneous.
4. Art 1, Ch. 26, S.L.1935, 57 Okl.St.Ann. §§ 171-195, which provides notice and an opportunity to be heard before a court or a jury, and provides that, "if the court or jury, as the case may be, find the defendant to be a habitual criminal, and, that said defendant may be rendered sexually sterile without detriment to his or her general health, then and in that event the court shall render judgment to the effect that said defendant be rendered sexually sterile," does not deprive the defendant of due process of law because a third finding to the effect that the defendant is the probable potential parent of a child of criminal tendencies is not required, the legislative act being a sufficient finding of such fact.
Appeal from District Court, Pittsburg County; R. W. Higgins, Judge.
Action by the State of Oklahoma, on the relation of Mac Q. Williamson, Attorney General, against Jack T. Skinner under the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act. From an adverse judgment, Jack T. Skinner appeals.
Judgment affirmed.
Claud Briggs and John Morrison, both of Oklahoma City, for plaintiff in error.
Mac Q. Williamson, Atty. Gen., and Owen J. Watts, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant in error.
This action was instituted in the district court by the State of Oklahoma against Jack T. Skinner under the provisions of Ch. 26, Art. 1, S.L.1935, 57 Okl.St.Ann. §§ 171-195, known as the "Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act." The act was enacted pursuant to the police power of the state. It defines an "habitual criminal" to mean a person who has been convicted two or more times to final judgment of the commission of crimes amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude, either in a court of competent jurisdiction of this state or any other state, and is thereafter convicted to final judgment in a court of competent jurisdiction of this state of the commission of a crime amounting to a felony involving moral turpitude and sentenced to serve a term of imprisonment in an Oklahoma penitentiary or reformatory or any other like penal institution now or hereafter established by the state. Excepted from the act are persons convicted of offenses arising out of the violation of the prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses.
The act provides that any person adjudged to be such an habitual criminal shall be rendered sexually sterile; if a male, by the operation of vasectomy; and, if a female, by the operation of salpingectomy.
The act provides that whenever it is brought to the attention of the Attorney General that any person has the status of an habitual criminal as defined by the act, the Attorney General shall commence a proceeding against such person by filing a petition in the district court in the county where he may be found and causing a summon to be issued by the clerk of the court. The act provides the form and contents of the petition, and further that the defendant shall file an answer. It further provides that the cause shall be set for trial any time after the expiration of ten days from the day defendant's answer is filed.
As to the trial, the material provisions are as follows: "And for the trial of such cases, the practice and procedure shall be that now or hereafter provided for in the Code of Civil Procedure of this State, so far as same may be applicable to and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act." Either party may demand that the questions of fact arising from the issues made by the pleadings be tried to a jury.
The act further provides for an appeal to this court from the orders and judgment of the trial court. The act contains other provisions, but they have no bearing on the questions presented for determination on this appeal.
In the instant case a proceeding was filed against the defendant, Jack T. Skinner. The matter was submitted to a jury. Defendant, an inmate in the State Penitentiary, at McAlester, admitted that he had been convicted three times,--the first for stealing chickens, and his two subsequent convictions for robbery with firearms. The date of the last conviction was October 15, 1934, which was prior to the passage of the act. Under the provisions of the act, therefore, the only questions to be determined by the jury were (1) whether he was an habitual criminal as defined by the act, and (2) whether he might be rendered sexually sterile without detriment to his general health. Upon this question the parties introduced evidence and the jury found that the general health of the defendant would not be impaired by the operation. Under the findings of the jury, the court entered its judgment ordering that the defendant be made sexually sterile, from which judgment the defendant has appealed.
There is ample evidence to support the findings of the jury on the issues left to its determination, and the primary purpose of this appeal is to test the constitutionality of the act.
1. It is contended that the act inflicts cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Sec. 9, Art. 2, of the Oklahoma Constitution, Okl.St.Ann., and further that the act constitutes a bill of attainder and is an ex post facto law, and is violative of Sec. 15, Art. 2, of the Oklahoma Constitution, and Sec. 10, Art. 1, of the Federal Constitution. These constitutional inhibitions have reference only to punishment for crime. 12 C.J. 1099, 1108; 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, §§ 437, 454; 11 Am.Jur. 1175, 1179. These contentions are, therefore, upon the premise that the act in question is a penal law, and that sterilization is inflicted as a punishment.
Where the operation of vasectomy is required or authorized in a purely penal statute as a punishment for crime, it has been held to constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
See Davis v. Berry, D.C., 216 F. 413; and Mickle v. Henrichs, D.C., 262 F. 687. However, in State v. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65, 126 P. 75, 41 L.R.A., N.S., 418, Ann.Cas. 1914B, 512, construing a strictly penal statute, the court held that the operation did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. But whatever may be our views on that question, if the act in question is a purely penal one, we are inclined to think it would be invalid as to defendant as an ex post facto law, in that at the time defendant committed his last offense and was convicted therefor, the act in question had not yet been passed.
On the other hand, the objections now being urged, are not applicable where the operation of vasectomy is required as a eugenic measure, and not as a punishment. In such case it is said to be analogous to compulsory vaccination and is non-punitive. In re Main, 162 Okl. 65, 19 P.2d 153; Smith v. Command, Wayne County Probate Judge, 231 Mich. 409, 204 N.W. 140, 40 A.L.R. 515; State v. Troutman, 50 Idaho 673, 299 P. 668; Davis v. Walton, 74 Utah 80, 276 P. 921; Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310, 130 S.E. 516, 51 A.L.R. 855.
Therefore, the decisive question in connection with the determination of these constitutional objections is whether the act under consideration is a penal statute or a eugenic measure.
The rule of construction urged by defendant is that where the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the words will be applied in their ordinary sense as they are usually understood. But there is nothing in the plain language of the act which classifies it as a penal one. In fact, the language is to the contrary. Therefore, we must look to the legislative intent as manifested from all parts of the act, keeping in mind that whenever reasonably possible, a statute must be so construed as to uphold its validity. 12 C.J. 787; 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, § 98.
The act here provides that the procedure as in civil cases shall be applicable. The operation is not...
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