Simmons v. GTE North, Inc.

Citation116 F.3d 1483
Decision Date25 June 1997
Docket NumberNo. 95-1534,95-1534
PartiesNOTICE: Seventh Circuit Rule 53(b)(2) states unpublished orders shall not be cited or used as precedent except to support a claim of res judicata, collateral estoppel or law of the case in any federal court within the circuit. John E. SIMMONS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. GTE NORTH, INC. and GTE Corp., Defendants-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)

Before CUMMINGS, BAUER, and WOOD, Circuit Judges.

ORDER

John Simmons appeals summary judgment in favor of defendants in his suit alleging violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.

Simmons was employed by Contel of Illinois as a telephone repairman when he injured his back while on the job on March 15, 1990. The injury aggravated a previous back injury Simmons had suffered after a fall during a repair job, and eventually Simmons was declared totally disabled. He has not been actively employed since his 1990 injury.

At the time of Simmons's injury Contel of Illinois was a subsidiary of Contel Corporation. In 1991 Contel Corporation merged with GTE Corporation, and in 1993, Contel of Illinois merged with Contel of Indiana, Inc. and Contel of Pennsylvania, Inc. to form GTE North, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of GTE Corporation. The entities surviving the mergers were GTE Corporation and GTE North, Inc. Although Contel of Illinois became part of GTE North, the benefits plan provided by Contel of Illinois continued in effect for the GTE employees who had worked for Contel.

Between 1990 and 1993, Simmons contacted Contel and GTE personnel and requested copies of his benefits plan, to which he was entitled under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1024(b)(4), 1132. He was sent copies of the applicable collective bargaining agreement and the Contel medical, dental, life insurance, and pension plans. Contending that the merger made him a GTE employee rather than a Contel employee, Simmons asserted that he was not receiving the complete array of plans and forms to which he was entitled and that Contel/GTE was denying him his proper benefits. Eventually he brought suit under ERISA, contending that: (1) defendants failed to pay him all the benefits to which he was entitled; (2) he was entitled to a permanent injunction against defendants for failing to provide him the proper explanations of his benefits; (3) defendants failed to provide him the proper information regarding his benefits; (4) defendants failed to pay full benefits and threatened to request the return of some payments already made; (5) he was entitled to a declaratory judgment regarding the nature and extent of his medical and life insurance benefits; (6) he deserved compensation for the trauma resulting from his attempts to secure his benefits; (7) defendants had acted harassingly and in bad faith; and (8) he was entitled to attorney fees and costs for bringing legal action. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants and subsequently denied Simmons's timely Rule 59(e) motion. Simmons appeals.

Simmons first challenges the district court's decision to strike many of his filings for failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Northern District of Illinois Local Rule 12, the rule governing identification of evidence and factual disputes for summary judgment proceedings. Simmons filed the suit pro se, but later was represented by counsel. Counsel made little or no effort, however, to identify, either evidence in the record supporting her client's position or the precise factual disputes before the district court. 1

The district court was entitled to strike the deficient filings, including affidavits and statements of fact and law opposing the motion for summary judgment. "The requirements of such rules are not onerous, but they are exacting. [The Local Rule] makes explicit the responding party's burden of controverting the movant's position with adequate citations to the record." Little v. Cox's Supermarkets, 71 F.3d 637, 641 (7th Cir.1995) (internal citation omitted). Further, it "is reasonable to assume that just as a district court is not required to 'scour the record looking for factual disputes,' it is not required to scour the party's various submissions to piece together appropriate arguments." Id. (internal citation omitted) (quoting Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 922 (7th Cir.1994)).

Moving to the merits of the case, Simmons's claims generally rest upon his contention that the merger between Contel and GTE Corp./GTE North...

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