Life Ins. Co. of North America v. Von Valtier, 96-1947

• Decision Date: 19 June 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-1947,96-1947
• Citation: 116 F.3d 279
• Parties: LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sandra VON VALTIER, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 279

116 F.3d 279

37 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1112

LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Sandra VON VALTIER, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 96-1947.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Oct. 29, 1996.

Decided June 19, 1997.

William E. Hoverson (argued), Modesto, Reynolds & McDermott, Chicago, IL, for plaintiff-appellee.

Anthony E. Blumberg (argued), Marshall Patner, Marshall Patner & Associates, Chicago, IL, for defendant-appellant.

Before CUMMINGS, COFFEY and DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judges.

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge.

The unhappy facts of this case require us to decide whether the accidental death insurance policy from the Life Insurance Company of North America, the plaintiff in this declaratory judgment action, covers the self-inflicted death of Seymour O. Schlanger, who was a professor at Northwestern University. The district court granted summary judgment for Life Insurance, concluding that Sandra Von Valtier, Schlanger's former wife, had not brought forward competent evidence to show that the death was "accidental" within the meaning of the policy. Upon our independent review of the policy's language, we agree and therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

For some time prior to his death, Schlanger was suffering both from alcoholism and severe depression. He was under the care of psychiatrist Dr. Bernard I. Lifson. Lifson prescribed Halcion for Schlanger's depression, notwithstanding the fact (according to the affidavit of Dr. Gerson Kaplan, a board-certified psychiatrist) that Halcion is contra-indicated for alcoholics. Alcohol, Dr. Kaplan stated, is a known depressant, and Halcion is a benzodiazepeme that is known to have adverse side effects that might, when taken with alcohol, exacerbate the depressive effect of alcohol, cause a confused state of mind, or cause organic brain damage.

Professor Schlanger visited Dr. Lifson on June 19, 1990. Dr. Lifson prescribed Halcion for his depression, and Schlanger filled that prescription. About two weeks later, on June 30, 1990, Schlanger shot and killed himself. The Cook County Medical Examiner did not find evidence of Halcion in Schlanger's bloodstream, but pills were missing from the bottle of Halcion that Schlanger had obtained.

The insurance policy from Life Insurance that covered Northwestern's faculty members provided $250,000 in accidental death coverage on the following terms:

We agree to pay benefits for loss from bodily injuries:

a) caused by an accident which happens while an insured is covered by this policy; and

b) which, directly and from no other causes, results in a covered loss. (See the Description of Coverage.)

We will not pay benefits if the loss was caused by:

a) sickness, disease, or bodily infirmity; or

b) any of the Exclusions listed on page 2.

The exclusions to which the policy referred were (among others) losses resulting from "intentionally self-inflicted injuries, or any attempt thereat, while sane or insane," and "sickness, disease or bodily infirmity. (Bacterial infection resulting from an accidental cut or wound or accidental ingestion of a poisonous food substance are not excluded.)"

In September 1990, Von Valtier filed a claim under the policy. She asserted that Schlanger was a severely depressed alcoholic whose will was so impaired by the combination of alcohol and Halcion that he did not act intentionally when he killed himself. Her theory of intent had two aspects to it: first, that the drug combination so impaired his will that he did not appreciate the consequences of his actions, and second, that he did not realize how Halcion would interact with alcohol, and thus his ingestion of the Halcion itself was accidental. Life Insurance denied the claim on the ground that Schlanger's death was intentionally self-inflicted. It also argued that even if Dr. Lifson's alleged mistake in prescribing Halcion contributed to Schlanger's depressed state of mind, this was not an accident that "directly and from no other causes" resulted in Schlanger's death.

Two years later, Life Insurance filed this declaratory judgment action against Von Valtier seeking a judgment that (1) Schlanger died as a result of a self-inflicted injury, (2) his death was not an accident covered by the policy, and (3) his death was not a covered loss within the policy by virtue of the exclusion for intentionally self-inflicted injuries. Life Insurance, which asserted federal question jurisdiction because the accidental death policy was an employee benefit plan under ERISA (see 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.), also asked for costs and fees and for any other appropriate relief. When Life Insurance moved for summary judgment, Von Valtier responded with the affidavit of Dr. Kaplan mentioned above. In addition to describing the dangerous interactions between alcohol and Halcion, Dr. Kaplan opined that Schlanger's death was foreseeable and preventable and resulted from "circumstances outside his control," namely, his doctor's failure to exercise acceptable standards of care in prescribing the Halcion.

Based on this evidence, the district court issued an order on December 27, 1995, granting summary judgment for Life Insurance. In its minute order, the court first noted that Von Valtier had not filed a Local Rule 12(N) statement in response to Life Insurance's Local Rule 12(M) statement asserting that the following critical facts were uncontested: "(1) the Deceased died as a result of a self-inflicted gunshot wound to his head; and (2) the policy at issue provides that no death benefits are payable when a loss is caused by an intentionally self-inflicted injury, while sane or insane." The court held that the lack of a Rule 12(N) statement meant that those two facts were admitted, citing Schulz v. Serfilco, Ltd., 965 F.2d 516, 519 (7th Cir.1992). Von Valtier had attached Dr. Kaplan's affidavit to her response--a move that did not comply with the Local Rules--but the court found that even considering his affidavit, Life Insurance was entitled to judgment. The existence of a contributing reason for Schlanger's actions, in the form of the drug interactions and the medical negligence that led to them, was not enough to raise the possibility that Schlanger's death was accidental or that he lacked the mental capacity to shoot himself intentionally. The court entered judgment for Life Insurance on December 28, 1995.

While the summary judgment motion was pending, Von Valtier obtained the transcript of Dr. Kaplan's November 1995 deposition. She moved on January 3, 1996, for leave to file it with the court, but her motion was dismissed as moot. She then filed a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) to alter or amend the judgment. The file stamp on that motion indicated that it was received on January 18, 1996, which would have been six days too late as time is computed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), since January 12, 1996, was the tenth "day" after December 28, 1995, excluding weekends and legal holidays. In ruling on the motion to reconsider, the district court addressed the time question as follows:

The court has no record that defendant filed this motion by January 12, 1996, and could deny the motion on the ground of untimeliness. However, the court will credit defendant's explanation for the filing date discrepancy, but nevertheless denies defendant's motion under both Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b).

Looking at the merits of the motion, the court then took into account Dr. Kaplan's deposition testimony. It proved not to be completely helpful for Von Valtier. Life Insurance pointed out that Dr. Kaplan had admitted that the Cook County Medical Examiner had not found any Halcion in Schlanger's blood. Dr. Kaplan conceded that this meant that Schlanger had not taken a large dose of Halcion before his death, but he continued to think that Schlanger had taken some Halcion because of the missing pills. When asked whether Schlanger understood "that the bullet was going to enter his head," Dr. Kaplan responded affirmatively. He also explained that a person in Schlanger's mental frame of mind would have known that such a bullet would lead to his death, but that he would not comprehend death as such. This testimony did not raise a genuine issue of fact on whether Schlanger's will was impaired, and the court therefore denied the motion to reconsider.

When the appeal reached this court, we issued an order requiring the parties to brief the question whether the appeal from the underlying judgment (as opposed to from a de facto Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) ruling of the district court) was timely. Von Valtier responded with a memorandum explaining that Judge Gettleman had issued a standing order providing for filing in chambers, as permitted by Fed.R.Civ.P. 5(e), and that counsel had done so on January 12, 1996. Attached to the memorandum was a copy of the notice of motion and proof of service that had been served on Life Insurance, both of which showed the date of January 12, 1996. No document showed that the court received anything on January 12. On the basis of this showing, this court issued a briefing schedule on May 2, 1996, which allowed the case to proceed to oral argument.

The timely filing of a motion under Rule 59(e) (or another of the motions listed in Fed. R.App.P. 4(a)(4)) is a jurisdictional prerequisite to tolling the time to file a notice of appeal from a final judgment. See Hope v. United States, 43 F.3d 1140, 1142-43 (7th Cir.1994); Green v. Bisby, 869 F.2d 1070, 1072 (7th Cir.1989). Before reaching the merits of this appeal, we therefore must decide whether Von Valtier's motion was indeed filed within the time permitted by the rules. If the motion to reconsider was actually filed on January 18, 1996, then this court would have no jurisdiction to consider anything but whether the district...